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GOLD KING MINE SPILL: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND LEGAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONDERS 
 
Clifford J. Villa* 
 
Abstract 
On August 5, 2015, EPA contractors working at the Gold King Mine 
in southwestern Colorado accidently released approximately three million 
gallons of contaminated mine water into the drainage of the Animas River. 
The water contained metals which created a bright orange plume that 
coursed down the Animas River and into the connecting San Juan River 
for many days, attracting nationwide attention and creating great concern 
for many local communities. The plume touched at least three states, three 
tribes, and numerous municipalities. The release fortunately did not prove 
an environmental catastrophe as many people feared at the time. How-
ever, it did inspire much angst, ire, investigation, and litigation.  
The first part of this Article attempts to explain what really happened 
with the Gold King Mine spill, both the causes of the spill and the response 
to it. The Article then considers a number of federal environmental laws, 
including the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), in order to assess alleged violations and demonstrate some of 
the important legal protections available to parties who engage in the 
challenging work of responding to mining contamination in the United 
States. The Article concludes with a look at protections for individual re-
sponders and hopes for cooperative efforts to address the mining contam-
ination in the Animas River watershed and other contaminated mine sites 
across the country. 
                                                   
* © 2019 Clifford J. Villa. Keleher & McLeod Professor of Law, University of New 
Mexico School of Law. As a former attorney for U.S. EPA Region 10 in Seattle, WA, the 
author served as legal counsel for the EPA Region 10 emergency response program. The 
views expressed in this Article are the author’s alone and not necessarily positions of the 
University of New Mexico or the EPA. The author thanks Professors Steve Gold, Joel Mintz, 
and supportive colleagues on the UNM School of Law faculty for their generous time and 
comments. Thanks to UNM SOL ‘18 student Mark Rosebrough for research assistance. And 
thanks especially to my Mom, who collected years of newspaper clippings on the Gold King 
Mine spill and also inspired my early love for the San Juan country as a kid. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
“Typically we respond to emergencies; we don’t cause them . . . .”1 
 
On August 4, 2015, work seemed to go according to plan at the Gold King 
Mine. The plan provided for limited excavation at the Gold King Mine Level 7 mine 
portal in order to locate the edges of the mine opening, which had been covered by 
loose materials sliding down the steep slope of Bonita Peak in the San Juan Moun-
tains of southwestern Colorado.2 By the morning of Wednesday, August 5, 2015, 
the excavation work conducted by contractors for the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) had almost been completed. Two mine specialists from the Colorado 
Division of Reclamation, Mining and Safety (DRMS) visited the site that morning, 
talked with the EPA On-Scene Coordinator who supervised the contractors, and 
agreed with the plan for proceeding that day.3 After the DRMS personnel left, at 
approximately 10:51 a.m., the operator of the excavator observed a spurt of clear 
water shooting up from the floor of the excavation.4 Within minutes, the clear spurt 
turned into a massive release of acidic mine water, picking up a bright orange color 
as the pressurized water blew out of the mine and through a pile of waste rock on 
the hillside below.5 By 11:33 a.m., the peak of the flow from the mine had passed,6 
although pressurized water continued to drain from the mine for nine hours.7 In total, 
                                                   
1 Bruce Finley, Regional EPA Director Calls Wastewater Spill in Animas River 
‘Tragic,’ DENVER POST (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/10/12/gold-king-
mine-epa-employee-will-not-prosecute/ [https://perma.cc/B9LX-7757] (quoting Dave Os-
trander, EPA regional director of emergency response). 
2 The plan for work on August 4–5, 2015, was largely set out in an email dated July 29, 
2015. Email from Steven Way, Federal On-Scene Coordinator, to Matt Francis, Response 
Manager, Environmental Restoration, LLC, (July 29, 2015, 10:42:00 AM) [hereinafter Way 
email] (on file with author). While names in the Way email remain redacted, the identities 
have been widely revealed. See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON NAT. RES., 114TH CONG., EPA, THE 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, AND THE GOLD KING MINE DISASTER 8 n.19 (Com. Print. 
2016) [hereinafter MAJORITY STAFF REPORT]; see also Jonathan Thompson, Silverton’s Gold 
King Reckoning, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 2, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.7/sil-
vertons-gold-king-reckoning [https://perma.cc/GFE7-K3JK] (reporting names of lead and 
back-up On-Scene Coordinators for the EPA).  
3 BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
OF THE GOLD KING MINE INCIDENT 51–52 (2015) [hereinafter BOR TECHNICAL 
EVALUATION].  
4 Id. at 53 fig.48.  
5 The metal load was dominated by iron and aluminum, which gave the water its infa-
mously bright color. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF RESEARCH & DEV., ANALYSIS 
OF THE TRANSPORT AND FATE OF METALS RELEASED FROM THE GOLD KING MINE IN THE 
ANIMAS AND SAN JUAN RIVERS ii (2017) [hereinafter ORD REPORT]. 
6 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 60 fig.59.  
7 ORD REPORT, supra note 5. 
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the blowout on August 5, 2015, resulted in a discharge of some three million gallons 
of acidic mine water from the Gold King Mine.8 
From the Gold King Mine Level 7 portal, high up on Bonita Peak at 11,400 
feet,9 the mine water crashed down a steep slope to the North Fork of Cement Creek 
below. After joining Cement Creek, the orange plume flowed eight miles to enter 
the Animas River near Silverton, Colorado. From that point, the Animas River flows 
south 126 miles, through Durango, Colorado, crosses the Southern Ute Indian Res-
ervation, then enters the State of New Mexico. Near Farmington, New Mexico, the 
Animas River empties into the San Juan River. West of Farmington, the San Juan 
River enters the Navajo Nation, swings north back into Colorado and the Ute Moun-
tain Ute Reservation, then enters the State of Utah (See Figure 1). After 215 miles, 
the San Juan River flows into Lake Powell, which the plume reached nine days after 
the Gold King Mine spill, on August 14, 2015.10  
 
Figure 1: Pathway of discharge from Gold King Mine spill.  
 
Graphic: Tony Anderson, UNM School of Law 
 
The spectacle of the “orange river” naturally attracted the attention of news 
media far and wide for days and weeks.11 This was followed by months and years of 
                                                   
8 Id.; see also JONATHAN P. THOMPSON, RIVER OF LOST SOULS: THE SCIENCE, POLITICS, 
AND GREED BEHIND THE GOLD KING MINE DISASTER 5 (2018). Thompson’s book-length 
treatment of the Gold King Mine spill builds upon a series of related articles published orig-
inally in the High Country News, setting the spill in the broader context of decades of re-
source development (and associated follies) in the San Juan Basin. 
9 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 7.  
10 Id. at 1.  
11 Chase Olivarisu-Mcallister, Catastrophe on the Animas, DURANGO HERALD, Aug. 6, 
2015, at A1; Ollie Reed, Jr., Spill Heads to NM, ALBUQUERQUE J., Aug. 8, 2015, at A1; 
Jonathan Thompson, When Our River Turned Orange, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Aug. 9, 2015), 
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technical evaluations, congressional hearings, and inevitably, litigation. Over time, 
parties including the State of New Mexico, the State of Utah, the Navajo Nation, and 
hundreds of private plaintiffs sued parties including the EPA, EPA contractors, and 
a handful of mining companies under theories of liability including common-law 
tort claims, as well as statutory claims under a number of federal environmental 
laws. Whatever the outcome of this litigation, the Gold King Mine spill succeeded 
in drawing attention back to the massive and continuing problems of mining con-
tamination in the United States. Besides the astronomical scope and scale of mining 
contamination in the United States,12 one of the particular challenges of remediating 
mine sites is the constant threat of physical hazards. Despite safety improvements, 
the mining industry still experiences dozens of fatalities each year due to accidents.13 
The Gold King Mine itself reportedly suffered at least two dozen fatalities over its 
active years of operations.14 The adjoining Sunnyside Mine narrowly avoided a ca-
lamity on June 4, 1978, when Lake Emma burst into the mine workings, sending an 
estimated 500 million gallons of mud and water through the mine and out through 
the American Tunnel; if this blowout had not happened on a Sunday, 125 miners 
might have lost their lives at that one time.15 
The Lake Emma blowout highlights the hazards to mine workers and mine 
cleanup workers alike. Much has already been written about the general legal 
                                                   
https://www.hcn.org/issues/48.7/silvertons-gold-king-reckoning [https://perma.cc/GFE7-
K3JK]; David Kelly, River Spill Is a Toxic Blast from the Past, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2015, 
at A1; Julie Turkewitz, Environmental Agency Uncorks Its Own Toxic Spill, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 11, 2015, at A12; Richard Parker, A River Runs Yellow, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2015/08/a-river-runs-yellow/401966/ [https:// 
perma.cc/L6QL-A7LQ]. 
12 For a quick snapshot of the impacts of mining pollution in the United States, see 
Identification of Priority Classes of Facilities for Development of CERCLA Section 108(b) 
Financial Responsibility Requirements, 74 Fed. Reg. 37, 213–17 (Priority Notice of Action 
July 28, 2009). According to estimates presented here, hardrock mining may be responsible 
for polluting 3,400 miles of streams and 440,000 acres of land. To address this contamina-
tion, the EPA estimates it spent approximately $2.7 billion between 1988 and 2007. The EPA 
also estimated that “the cost of remediating all hardrock mining facilities is between $20 and 
$54 billion.” Notwithstanding this staggering sum to address existing mining contamination, 
the EPA noted that the hardrock mining industry continued to generate “between one to two 
billion tons of mine waste” annually. Id.  
13 See Mine Safety and Health at a Glance, MINE SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.msha.gov/data-reports/statistics/mine-safety-and-health-
glance [https://perma.cc/A58Y-RBL4]. 
14 Jonathan Thompson, A Gold King Mine Timeline: A Tangled History of Profit, Trag-
edy and Unfulfilled Dreams, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (May 2, 2016), https://www.hcn.org/is-
sues/48.7/silvertons-gold-king-reckoning/a-gold-king-mine-timeline [https://perma.cc/6B6 
Y-8FZM] [hereinafter Thompson, Gold King Mine Timeline] (reporting four workers killed 
in 1899 and “the total death toll at the mine . . . easily exceed[ing] two dozen” by the time 
the mine shut down in 1924). 
15 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 16. 
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frameworks for responding to mining contamination in the United States.16 This Ar-
ticle will consider the unusual circumstances of the Gold King Mine spill as a means 
of exploring the particular legal protections available to government agencies and 
contractors who engage in the challenging but necessary work to address mining 
pollution in the United States. Part II explores the roles of the EPA and other agency 
partners in carrying out the emergency response to the Gold King Mine spill. Part 
III backs up before the spill on August 5, 2015, to examine why it happened. From 
that deeper contextual examination, Part IV evaluates whether and to what extent 
the EPA or agency partners or contractors may be liable under federal environmental 
law for the Gold King Mine spill. Part IV considers the application of environmental 
statutes such as the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 
along with relevant legal doctrines such as sovereign immunity. Part V then con-
cludes with a look at legal protections for individual responders and what may be 
next for the final cleanup of the Animas River watershed. 
 
II.  THE EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
 
Despite all the attention to the Gold King Mine spill, major media and congres-
sional critics largely overlooked the massive emergency response to the spill led by 
the EPA.17 The emergency response to the Gold King Mine spill began within 
minutes after the initial blowout. After ensuring the immediate safety of all person-
nel at the site, the EPA On-Scene Coordinator and contractor crew went back to 
work at the adit after the peak flow had passed. By 12:06 p.m., the EPA crew had 
rebuilt berms and routed the mine flow away from the waste pile and into an existing 
pipe.18  
Another immediate response was to notify downstream parties. One problem, 
however, with providing immediate notice was the lack of cell phone service high 
                                                   
16 For perhaps the most thorough and exhaustive scholarly examination on the subject 
of mining contamination and federal law, see John Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the En-
vironment: Issues of Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795 (2004) (in-
cluding 850 footnotes). For one focused examination of the environmental threats posed by 
abandoned mines in the West and the particular context of the Gold King Mine spill, see 
Kelly Roberts, A Legacy that No One Can Afford to Inherit: The Gold King Disaster and the 
Threat of Abandoned Hardrock Legacy Mines, 36 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 361 
(2016). 
17 In some cases, it is clear that this oversight was more than an innocent mistake. For 
just one example, Senator John Barrasso of Wyoming, in a Senate field hearing on April 22, 
2016, stated, “Because it’s Navajo, only $157,000 has been spent” by the EPA on the re-
sponse, even after Senator Barrasso had been advised that same morning in sworn testimony 
that the EPA had already spent more than $22 million on response efforts by that time. Ex-
amining EPA’s Unacceptable Response to Indian Tribes: Field Hearing Before the Comm. 
on Indian Affairs U.S. Senate, 114th Cong. 8 (2016) [hereinafter Field Hearing] (statement 
of Hon. Mathy Stanislaus, Ass’t Administrator, U.S. EPA); id. at 49 (statement of Sen. Bar-
rasso).  
18 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 61 fig.60. 
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up on Bonita Peak at the Gold King Mine. In fact, even satellite phone service was 
unreliable and unavailable in that area.19 To compound the problem, the blowout had 
washed across an access road, temporarily trapping the EPA crew up on the moun-
tain. Fortunately, via two-way radios, the EPA crew was able to contact other con-
tractors and Colorado DRMS personnel who were working lower down on the 
mountain. The DRMS personnel drove to Silverton, Colorado, established cell ser-
vice, and notified the National Response Center at 12:27 p.m.20 Within twelve 
minutes, the NRC notified parties including the U.S. Department of Homeland Se-
curity, the U.S. Department of the Interior, the EPA Region 8 Emergency Operations 
Center, and the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment 
(CDPHE).21 CDPHE, in turn, notified downstream water users, reporting to the EPA 
that it completed these notifications by 1:39 p.m.22  
After that initial round of official notifications, word of the Gold King Mine 
spill spread through unofficial channels. The Southern Ute Indian Tribe, for exam-
ple, reported that it received word later that same day from the Colorado Department 
of Natural Resources.23 The next day, August 6, 2015, as the potential geographic 
reach of the spill became clearer, further notices were issued. By 2:00 p.m., EPA 
Region 6 had provided notice to the New Mexico Environment Department.24 That 
same day, EPA Region 8 provided email notice to members of its Regional Response 
Team, including representatives from the State of Utah.25 By that evening, EPA Re-
gion 9 had provided email notice to the Navajo Nation.26 
Following the emergency notices, as the scale of the incident became more ap-
parent, the EPA mounted what eventually became one of the largest emergency re-
sponses in its history, deploying more than 210 emergency response personnel from 
across the country.27 One of the first needs was to take samples of river water and 
                                                   
19 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., GOLD KING MINE RELEASE: 
INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS 20–21 (2017) [hereinafter 
OIG RESPONSE].  
20 Id. at 21.  
21 Id. at 22.  
22 Id. at 23.  
23 Id. at 23–24. 
24 Id. at 24. EPA Region 6, based in Dallas, Texas, is responsible for implementing 
EPA programs and intiatives in New Mexico and four other states. See EPA Region 6 (South 
Central), U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/region6 [https://perma.cc/JV2L-NCFV]. 
25 OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 24. EPA Region 8, based in Denver, Colorado, is 
responsible for implementing EPA programs and intiatives in Colorado, Utah, and four other 
states. See EPA Region 8 (Mountains and Plains), U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/region8 
[https://perma.cc/K5RQ-JR93]. 
26 OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 24. EPA Region 9, based in San Francisco, Cali-
fornia, is responsible for implementing EPA programs and intiatives in the Navajo Nation, 
regardless of the states the Navajo Nation may cross. See EPA Region 9 (Pacific Southwest), 
U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/region9 [https://perma.cc/X8AK-EVA6]. 
27 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ONE YEAR AFTER THE GOLD KING MINE INCIDENT 10 
(2016), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2016-08/documents/mstanislausgkm1yr 
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 269 
 
sediments immediately before and after the plume passed. By August 20, 2015, at 
the height of the emergency response, the EPA had taken 462 surface water samples, 
325 sediment samples, and 555 samples from private drinking water wells.28 By the 
same day, responding to concerns about the use of river water, the EPA had deliv-
ered 327,000 gallons of drinking water to affected communities, over 2 million gal-
lons of water for livestock and agricultural purposes, and 628 bales of hay for live-
stock.29 Meanwhile, back at the Gold King Mine, temporary treatment ponds had 
been constructed by August 10, 2015, to capture the continuing flow from the mine, 
followed three months later by the installation of a larger treatment system farther 
down on Cement Creek.30 By September 15, 2015, the mine opening had been 
cleared of waste rock and debris, and the face of the surrounding rock had been 
stabilized to provide a safer work environment for continuing investigations inside 
the mine.31  
Of course, the EPA did not do this work alone. On August 20, 2015, there were 
282 personnel on-site, working out of command posts in Durango, Farmington, and 
other locations in the area.32 On-site personnel included a number of EPA employees 
and contractors, but also personnel from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, U.S. 
Coast Guard, the Colorado Office of Emergency Management, the CDPHE, the New 
Mexico Environment Department, the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, 
the Southern Ute Indian Tribe, the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe, the Navajo Nation, the 
Durango Fire Department, and the San Juan County Health Department, among 
many other governments and agencies.33 
While perhaps getting off to a slow start, the EPA soon realized the need for 
providing public information about the spill. Over the first four days, in addition to 
daily calls with media and elected officials, the EPA participated in four public meet-
ings in Silverton and Durango.34 Within ten days, the EPA participated in nine public 
meetings on the Navajo Nation alone.35 At first, much of the public information fo-
cused on public health advisories and preparations for the ecological catastrophe 
anticipated from the Gold King Mine spill.36 Fortunately, many of the worst fears 
from the spill never materialized.  
                                                   
reportwhole8-1-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/XE9M-LPSR] [hereinafter ONE YEAR AFTER]. For 
background on the EPA’s emergency response program, including trained personnel and re-
sponse tools and assets, see Emergency Response, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/emer-
gency-response [https://perma.cc/AE55-6GMP]. 
28 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AREA COMMAND, SITUATION REPORT #10, at 3 (2015) 
[hereinafter SITUATION REPORT #10]. 
29 Id. at 4. 
30 ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 10.  
31 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 62–64 figs.62–65. 
32 SITUATION REPORT #10, supra note 28, at 8. 
33 Id. at 7; see also ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 9–10.  
34 ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 10. 
35 Id. 
36 For example, on August 6, 2015, the day after the Gold King spill, the New Mexico 
Environment Department (NMED) issued an advisory to public water systems to shut down 
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Initially, the spill appeared worse than first understood, with the original spill 
estimate of one million gallons of mine water soon revised to three million gallons 
of mine water.37 Those three million gallons were acidic but not at levels presenting 
any immediate threats to human health or the environment.38 And, of course, the 
spill high up on Bonita Peak eventually crossed three states, three reservations, and 
dozens of local jurisdictions and concerned communities. However, both the initial 
results and the final analyses confirmed that neither a public health emergency nor 
an ecological catastrophe ever followed from the Gold King Mine spill, as indicated 
below.  
A peer-reviewed study by scientists from the EPA Office of Research and De-
velopment (ORD), issued in January 2017, found that the estimated three million 
gallons of mine water released from the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015, carried 
approximately 540 tons of metals into the Animas River.39 Of this mass, approxi-
mately 96% consisted of aluminum or iron,40 while less than 2.4% consisted of more 
toxic metals such as arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc.41 More encouraging 
news concerned the form of the metals released. According to EPA scientists, only 
3% of the metals released from the Gold King blowout were in dissolved state, leav-
ing 97% of the metals in the less mobile and less toxic particulate form.42 Consistent 
with this relative immobility and reduced toxicity, there were no observed or re-
ported fish-kills as a result of the Gold King Mine spill.43 Nor were there any 
                                                   
water intakes from the Animas River. News Release, State of New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, New 
Mexico Reminds Animas River Water Users to Stop Taking Water from Animas River Dur-
ing EPA Gold King Mine Toxin Spill (Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.env.nm.gov/docu-
ments/150806PR-OOTS-KingGoldMineEPAAnimasRiverSpill.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TD2 
-AWF2]. The following day, NMED issued another advisory expanding precautions to in-
clude both the Animas River and San Juan River. News Release, State of New Mexico Env’t 
Dep’t, Environment Department Issues Precautions for EPA Gold King Mine Spill (Aug. 7, 
2015), https://www.env.nm.gov/documents/150807PR-OOTSGoldKingMineEPASpill2.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2KAJ-RBVQ]. 
37 Press Releases and Updates for Gold King Mine Response, U.S. EPA (Aug. 9, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/press-releases-and-updates-gold-king-mine-response 
[https://perma.cc/Q4QD-KZE3] (click “August 9, 2015” to expand content toward the bot-
tom of the page). 
38 As the spill plume passed Silverton, Colorado, entering the Animas River, it was 
measured with the pH of approximately 4.8, which the EPA noted was less acidic than either 
black coffee or apples. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PH OF COMMON SUBSTANCES (2015), 
https://semspub.epa.gov/work/08/1622624.pdf [https://perma.cc/QF7E-3YWG]. 
39 ORD REPORT, supra note 5, at ii.  
40 In kilograms, the total metals released into the Animas River was estimated at 
490,000 kg. Id. at 56. Scientists found this amount included approximately 433,086 kg of 
iron and 41,132 kg of aluminum. Id.  
41 Of the estimated 490,000 kg of total metals released into the Animas River, some 
11,600 kg consisted of the toxic metals arsenic, cadmium, copper, lead, and zinc. Id.  
42 Id. at ii–iii. 
43 Id. at iv. These observations were confirmed by biologists who walked and paddled 
the river looking for dead fish. Frequent Questions Related to Gold King Mine Response, 
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confirmed impacts to terrestrial animals, including birds or mammals,44 or benthic 
invertebrates.45 Assuaging concerns for human health, there were no exceedances of 
federal drinking water standards for metals in potentially affected well-water.46 Nor 
were there any exceedances for recreational use of the affected water.47  
Within two weeks, data indicated that water quality had returned to “pre-event 
conditions,”48 allowing the rivers to be reopened for recreation49 and bans on the use 
of river water for public and private water supplies to be lifted.50 While there were 
                                                   
U.S. EPA (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/frequent-questions-related-
gold-king-mine-response [https://perma.cc/2JR8-232Z]. These observations were also con-
sistent with studies by Colorado Division of Parks and Wildlife biologists, who placed fin-
gerling trout in cages in the Animas River before the Gold King plume arrived, in order to 
test the toxicity of the contaminated waters. EPA’s Animus Spill: Joint Oversight Hearing 
before the Comm. on Natural Resources and Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th 
Cong. 95 (2015) (testimony of Larry Wolk, M.D. P.S.P.H., Executive Director and Chief 
Medical Officer, Colo. Dept. of Public Health and Env’t). Of 108 fish placed in the cages 
before the plume arrived, only one fish died, and reportedly not due to change in water qual-
ity. Id.  
44 Frequent Questions Related to Gold King Mine Response, U.S. EPA (Mar. 16, 2017). 
In at least one case, biologists for the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish found wild 
birds with staining apparently from the Gold King Mine spill. EPA Prioritizes Data, Safety 
During Today’s Gold King Mine Response, U.S. EPA (Aug. 11, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/epa-prioritizes-data-safety-during-todays-gold-king-
mine-response [https://perma.cc/8DQH-XKK5]. However, the New Mexico biologists ob-
served that these birds were still able to fly and did not require rehabilitation. Id. 
45 ORD REPORT, supra note 5, at 161 (reporting results of a 2016 study conducted by 
Mountain Studies Institute, which found that benthic communities in the affected area had 
mostly survived despite exposure to concentrated heavy metals).  
46 Id. at iv. 
47 Id. Among other things, this was good news for the three kayakers in the famous 
photograph where they are seen paddling on the bright orange Animas River below Silverton 
on August 6, 2015. See Shane Benjamin, Durango Kayaker Reacts to Animas River Photo 
that Went Viral, THE DURANGO HERALD (Aug. 9, 2015), https://durangoherald.com/arti-
cles/1532 [https://perma.cc/SK56-2LS6]. 
48 ORD REPORT, supra note 5, at iii. Note that “pre-event conditions” does not mean 
clean, but recognizes the existence of significant and continuing contamination in the rivers 
before and after the Gold King Mine spill, as will be discussed infra. 
49 See, e.g., Press Release, San Juan Health Dep’t et al., Update on Local Response to 
Gold King Mine and Animas River Impacts – Sheriff Smith Opens Recreation on the River 
in La Plata County (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/ 
Animas_Sheriff_Opens_River.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJV7-SN46]. 
50 See, e.g., News Release, New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, Ban on Domestic Well Water 
Use in Animas Floodplain Lifted by New Mexico Environment Department and Health De-
partment (Aug. 14, 2015), https://www.env.nm.gov/documents/150814PR-OOTSGoldKing 
MineSpill7.pdf [https://perma.cc/86WC-P3VA]; News Release, New Mexico Env’t Dep’t, 
New Mexico Departments of Environment, Health, and Game & Fish Lift Ban on Water 
Systems’ Supply Connection to Animas and San Juan Rivers and on Public’s Recreational 
Use of Rivers (Aug. 15, 2015), https://www.env.nm.gov/documents/150815PR-
OOTSGoldKingMineSpill-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQG9-YCHJ].  
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temporary rises in metals following a storm in late August 2015 and again following 
the 2016 spring snowmelt,51 monitoring through the summer and fall of 2016 indi-
cated the metal concentrations in both the water and sediments of the Animas River 
and San Juan River had returned to and remained at pre-event levels.52 
So, other than the psychic trauma inflicted by the orange river, was there ever 
any real environmental catastrophe caused by the Gold King Mine spill? The spill 
did contribute to elevated levels of metals in both the Animas River and San Juan 
River as the plume passed within forty-eight hours.53 This led to exceedances of 
water quality standards most frequently for aluminum and lead,54 both of which ex-
ceeded criteria for domestic water supply, human contact, and agriculture.55 Tribal 
water quality criteria for aluminum and lead were also exceeded in segments of the 
San Juan River through the Navajo Nation and Ute Mountain Ute Tribe reserva-
tion.56 But for the most part, the sudden release from the Gold King Mine on August 
5, 2015, appeared not to result in the ecological calamity that many observers feared. 
What the Gold King Mine spill certainly did do, however, was draw attention 
to the real calamity created by thousands of abandoned mines across the United 
States. According to one 2011 estimate by the U.S. Government Accountability Of-
fice, there are at least 161,000 abandoned hardrock mines in twelve western states 
and Alaska, and at least 33,000 of these mines have resulted in the contamination of 
surrounding surface waters and groundwater. 57 In the immediate area surrounding 
the August 5, 2015 spill, the Gold King Mine plus thirty-two other mines in the 
Animas River watershed discharge a combined average of 5.4 million gallons of 
mine water every day,58 a daily discharge that will continue to degrade water quality 
in the Animas River and San Juan basins until these on-going discharges are ad-
dressed. 
  
                                                   
51 Both of these spikes represented the predictable result of particulate metals, settled 
into the sediments, resuspended into the water by high river flows. ORD REPORT, supra note 
5, at iii–iv. 
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 160–61. 
54 Id. at 161. Brief exceedances of acute criteria, lasting only several hours, were also 
observed for metals including cadmium, copper, lead, manganese, and zinc. Id.  
55 Id. at 160. 
56 Id.  
57 GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ABANDONED MINES: INFORMATION ON THE 
NUMBER OF HARDROCK MINES, COST OF CLEANUP, AND VALUE OF FINANCIAL ASSURANCES 
i (2011), https://www.gao.gov/assets/130/126667.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KUW-TFVA] 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT] (statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director Natural Resources and 
Environment Team at the Government Accountability Office). 
58 ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 6. 
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III.  BEFORE THE SPILL: WHY IT HAPPENED 
 
“[E]ach mine is unique.”59 
 
After the Gold King Mine spill, many observers concluded that the release was 
caused by the negligent action of the EPA.60 As time and further investigations re-
vealed, however, such conclusions were premature and perhaps unwarranted. For a 
full and accurate understanding of what really happened, and why, this Part begins 
by reviewing some of the history of hardrock mining in the West and particularly in 
the Animas River watershed. This Part then focuses on the sources of pollution as-
sociated with hardrock mining, with a particular focus on mining pollution in the 
Animas River watershed. Following that, this Part considers various efforts to ad-
dress mining pollution in the Animas River watershed, including the specific efforts 
by the EPA that led directly to the Gold King Mine spill. Finally, this Part will take 
a close look at what went wrong, considering the findings of multiple investigations.  
 
A.  Mining in the Animas River Watershed 
 
As in many parts of the American West, the history of European settlement in 
the San Juan Mountains of southwestern Colorado is largely a story of hardrock 
mining.61 The first European exploration into what is now the southwestern part of 
the United States was driven in part by a search for precious metals, with Spanish 
explorers in the early 16th century stomping around present New Mexico in search 
of the fabled Seven Cities of Gold.62 While the Spanish never found those cities of 
                                                   
59 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., GOLD KING MINE RELEASE: 
INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS 12 (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-06/documents/_epaoig_20170612-17-p-
0250.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S4Y-V9PP]. 
60 For example, at a hearing on Earth Day, April 22, 2016, Senator John McCain sum-
marily declared, “There’s no question as to the EPA’s culpability and negligence in this dis-
aster.” Field Hearing, supra note 17, at 3; see also Roberts, supra note 16, at 379 (noting 
“the EPA’s negligence in not checking the water levels”); PAUL J. LARKIN, JR. & JOHN-
MICHAEL SEIBLER, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION, THE ONGOING LACK OF EPA 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE GOLD KING MINE SPILL: THE EPA’S NEW “RESPONDER” THEORY 
2 (2016) (“The federal government has criminally prosecuted private parties under the Clean 
Water Act for negligently polluting bodies of water like the Animas River.”). Leaping past 
negligence, some corners of the Internet suggested that the EPA caused the Gold King Mine 
spill intentionally. See, e.g., Michael Bastasch & Ethan Barton, EPA’s Gold King Mine Blow-
out Was No Accident, DAILY CALLER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://dailycaller.com/2016/03/14/ 
breaking-epas-gold-king-mine-blowout-was-no-accident/ [https://perma.cc/4E8V-4F9N]. 
61 “Hardrock” mining refers to a process of extracting valuable minerals from rock 
types that are hard and strong. Hardrock minerals include gold, silver, lead, copper, nickel, 
uranium, and zinc, and exclude softer minerals such as oil, gas, coal, phosphate, potassium, 
and sulfur. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HARDROCK MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 243 (1999) 
(defining “Hardrock”).  
62 JOSEPH P. SANCHEZ ET AL., NEW MEXICO: A HISTORY 12–17 (2013). 
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gold, of course, other explorers did eventually strike gold in the West. Most fa-
mously, the discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill on the American River in 1848 set off 
the California Gold Rush and stampede of “Forty-Niners.”63 This was soon followed 
by many other gold strikes in the western United States, including the Colorado Gold 
Rush starting in 1858, which drew an influx of “Fifty-Niners.”64  
The story of mining in the San Juan Mountains of southwestern Colorado would 
follow similar lines. In 1860, gold was discovered in the San Juan Mountains.65 In 
1872, commercial mining operations began in the San Juans, followed two years 
later by the founding of the town of Silverton.66 By 1890, the mining industry of the 
San Juans was bustling, with 176 mines and thirteen mills active in San Juan 
County.67 By 1907, mining in the district reached its peak, with more than 2,000 
men employed in the industry.68 From that point, commercial production from the 
district would fall, then rise up for a while, following the traditional cycles of “boom 
and bust” in mining.69  
In 1886, as mining in the district expanded rapidly, production began at the 
Gold King Mine high up on the west slope of Bonita Peak. A literal as well as 
                                                   
63 RODMAN WILSON PAUL & ELLIOTT WEST, MINING FRONTIERS OF THE FAR WEST, 
1848–1880 12–14 (1974). 
64 Id. at 113. Beginning along the Platte River and its tributaries including Cherry Creek 
within the present Denver metro area, miners soon located deposits of gold, silver, and other 
precious metals throughout the Colorado Territory. See DUANE A. SMITH, THE TRAIL OF 
GOLD AND SILVER 12–14 (2009). In 1859, prospectors discovered gold along Clear Creek, 
near Idaho Springs, Colorado. Id. at 37. In 1860, prospectors discovered gold in California 
Gulch, near Leadville, Colorado. Id. at 50–51, 100–02. By 1880, Leadville was the second 
largest city in Colorado, with an annual output of silver that surpassed the total production 
of almost every nation. PAUL & WEST, supra note 63, at 128. By the mid-1880s, however, 
the “silver queen” crown was wrested away by the mining district that came to be known as 
Aspen, Colorado, with famous diggings including the Smuggler Mine. SMITH, supra note 64, 
at 114–20. A century later, of course, with a more developed and diversified economy, Aspen 
and other Colorado towns became famous for more than just mining. Still, mining continued 
to play a role in the state economy with new discoveries such as the Summitville Mine in the 
San Luis Valley of southern Colorado. Id. at 237. In 1992, Summitville became the scene of 
another EPA emergency response after its Canadian owner suddenly abandoned the property, 
leaving behind some 150 million gallons of contaminated solution from a cyanide heap-
leaching operation, and threatening the headwaters of the Rio Grande. Id. at 238. Signifi-
cantly, each of these four mining districts—along with many others in Colorado—would 
leave behind a legacy of toxic metals, eventually placing each on the National Priorities List 
of the federal Superfund statute.  
65 See BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 13; see also SMITH, supra note 
64, at 52–53. 
66 Aptly named, Silverton and the surrounding mines would quickly become more fa-
mous for silver mines than gold. SMITH, supra note 64, at 84; see also Thompson, Gold King 
Mine Timeline, supra note 14. 
67 Thompson, Gold King Mine Timeline, supra note 14. 
68 Id. 
69 See generally id.  
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figurative gold mine, the Gold King Mine proved “wildly profitable,”70 producing 
more than 343,000 ounces of gold and more than 1.6 million ounces of silver before 
operations ended around 1923.71 Lower down the mountain on the east side of Bonita 
Peak was the Sunnyside Mine, the largest mine in the county. After the Gold King 
Mine shut down, the Sunnyside Mine continued operations into the late 1930s.72 In 
1959, the Sunnyside Mine regained new life with extension of the two-mile Ameri-
can Tunnel, connecting opposite faces of Bonita Peak.73 For three more decades, the 
county enjoyed a revival of the local mining industry. Then in 1991, almost inevita-
bly, the Sunnyside Mine shut down,74 bringing an end to commercial mining in the 
San Juan Mountains around Silverton. 
 
B.  Mining Pollution in the Animas River Watershed 
 
As demonstrated in the Animas River watershed and many other mining re-
gions of the West, mining processes may result in massive volumes of pollution to 
the environment from a number of different waste streams. First, the digging, drill-
ing, blasting, loading, hauling, and other elements of the process for extracting val-
uable minerals from the ground may result in substantial volumes of waste rock piled 
outside of mine portals or spilled down mountainsides.75 Once this waste rock comes 
in contact with water, contaminants in the waste rock, including metals in a miner-
alized area, can be leached or otherwise mobilized for transport downstream.76 In-
deed, the waste rock pile outside the Gold King Mine Level 7 appears to be the 
source of 99% of the metals released to the waters downstream on August 5, 2015.77 
Once ore is extracted from a mine, it is usually transported to a mill for concen-
tration of the valuable minerals, a process known as beneficiation.78 The beneficia-
tion process often begins with crushing and grinding the ore into fine particles. These 
fine particles are then subjected to further physical or chemical processes to separate 
out the valuable minerals from the rest of the fine material.79 The rest of the fine 
material, known as mill tailings, was often dumped directly into nearby watercourses 
                                                   
70 Id. at 8. 
71 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 13. 
72 Thompson, supra note 2, at 6. 
73 Id. 
74 The Sunnyside shutdown in 1991 came in part due to competition from much larger 
mines outside of Colorado and outside the United States. Id. at 9.  
75 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 25. For an impressive view of the waste 
rock pile fanning out on the slope outside the Gold King Mine Level 7 near the peak of 
production from the mine, see the historical photograph reproduced in BOR TECHNICAL 
EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 14 fig.5. 
76 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 154. 
77 ORD REPORT, supra note 5, at ii. 
78 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 26.  
79 Id. 
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for efficient waste disposal before restrictions came into place.80 Mills in the Silver-
ton area, for example, followed this common practice by dumping mill tailings di-
rectly into the Animas River,81 forcing Durango downstream to seek an alternate 
water supply in 1902.82 Like waste rock, mill tailings may serve as a major source 
for release of toxic metals to surrounding soils, sediments, surface waters, and 
groundwater.83 From the mill, the valuable, concentrated metals may be transported 
to a smelter for furthering refining into ingots, bars, or other solid forms. Smelter 
operations, such as the one in Durango that served the mines of the San Juan Moun-
tains,84 were also notorious sources of air pollution.85 
With the Durango smelter now gone, like many others in the West,86 one of the 
major remaining pollution problems in the Animas River watershed, like elsewhere 
across the West, is acid mine drainage. Acid mine drainage forms when metal sulfide 
minerals, commonly found in rock associated with metal mining activity, become 
exposed to air and water.87 The resulting sulfuric acid may bring the pH of 
                                                   
80 In some mining districts, the volume of mill tailings dumped into watercourses 
reached astronomical proportions. In the Silver Valley of northern Idaho, for example, the 
volume of tailings dumped in the Coeur d’Alene River was estimated to be enough to cover 
a football field with a pile four miles high. See Clifford J.Villa, Superfund vs. Mega-Sites: 
The Coeur d’Alene River Basin Story, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255, 256 (2003).  
81 Over the life of the mining industry in the area, an estimated 8.6 million tons of 
tailings ended up in the Animas River watershed. BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 
3, at 16. 
82 Thompson, supra note 2, at 9. 
83 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 154. 
84 The smelter in Durango was a major operation, boasting one of the most sophisticated 
plants of its time and feeding the fortunes of the ASARCO “smelter trust” and the Guggen-
heim family. By 1927, as the peak of Colorado mining had passed, the Durango smelter and 
the smelter in Leadville were reportedly the only two smelters still operating in Colorado. 
SMITH, supra note 64, at 168, 188, 205.  
85 Smelters cooked heavy metals such as arsenic and lead out of the ore bodies, sent 
these toxins up a stack into the air, and then allowed them to settle down upon surrounding 
areas to kill forests and other vegetation and, in the worst cases, poison animals and people. 
By the 1870s, early smelters in Colorado already had severe “smoke problems,” with one 
smelter emitting “considerable arsenic” and resulting in a “silencing” of the song birds. Id. 
at 91. A full century later, smelters still contributed to some of the most egregious impacts 
to human health and the environment. For example, at the Bunker Hill smelter in the Silver 
Valley of northern Idaho, a fire in September 1973 partially destroyed the pollution control 
equipment and yet the company decided to run the smelter anyway, poisoning 99% of the 
children in the surrounding community of Smelterville and resulting in some of the highest 
blood-lead levels ever recorded. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 40–41. 
86 The site of the former Durango smelter is now the Smelter Mountain Hiking Trail, 
after the smelter complex was demolished and contaminated soils removed by the early 
1990s. See Smelter Mountain Trail, DURANCO OUTDOORS, https://www.durangoutdoors. 
com/trails/smelter-mountain-trail.htm [https://perma.cc/S6CV-HXA6].  
87 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL HARDROCK MINING FRAMEWORK B-3 
(1997). 
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surrounding waters down near 2.5.88 In addition to the direct hazards of corrosivity, 
acid mine drainage can also dissolve minerals and result in releases of toxic metals 
such as cadmium, copper, lead, silver, and zinc into an aquatic environment.89 As a 
result, miles of streams with acid mine drainage and dissolved metals can become 
uninhabitable to fish and other aquatic life.90  
Acid mine drainage can form naturally, as when rain or snow falls upon ex-
posed mineralized rock outcroppings. With the mineralized geology of the San Juan 
Mountains, acid mine drainage formed naturally in Cement Creek and other tribu-
taries to the Animas River.91 However, the generation of acid mine drainage may be 
greatly increased by mining activity, where miles of mining shafts and tunnels ex-
pose mineralized rock to precipitation and groundwater, and where piles of waste 
rock and tailings are left exposed to the elements.92 From the earliest days of mining 
in the Animas River watershed, mining activities likely resulted in acid mine drain-
age.93 Thus, the natural acid mine drainage of the Animas River watershed was likely 
compounded greatly by the century of mining in the region. 
Once it begins, acid mine drainage is notoriously difficult to stop.94 Methods 
for addressing acid mine drainage fall into two broad categories: methods to prevent 
the generation of acid mine drainage and methods to treat acid mine drainage.95 
Methods to prevent acid mine drainage may include capping and sealing mine open-
ings to prevent air and water from reaching mineralized rock or to prevent the dis-
charge of acid mine water into the environment.96 Methods to treat acid mine drain-
age may include the addition of neutralizing materials such as lime.97 Settling ponds 
may also be used to slow down water and give toxic metals an opportunity to fall 
out of solution.98  
Depending on the volume of water to be treated, as well as the pH and the 
metals concentrations, active water treatment can be technically challenging and 
                                                   
88 Id. at B-5. 
89 Id. 
90 For a simple, lay explanation of the chemical processes and ecological effects of acid 
mine drainage, see Thompson, supra note 2, at 7. 
91 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that Cement Creek and 
other local drainages “were biologically dead prior to any mining activity in the area”); see 
also Thompson, supra note 2, at 13 (observing that “Nature . . . is the biggest polluter in the 
[Animas River] watershed”).  
92 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 16. 
93 For a clear view of acid mine drainage streaming out of the Gold King Mine Level 7 
and down the hillside circa 1906, see Thompson, Gold King Mine Timeline, supra note 14. 
94 Lead mines operating during the Roman Empire reportedly continue to discharge 
acid mine drainage today, 2000 years later. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 
154. Even further back, a mine in Spain abandoned 4000 years ago reportedly discharges 
acid mine drainage into the Rio Tinto to this day. Thompson, supra note 2. 
95 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 155. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 156. 
98 Settling ponds were constructed within days of Gold King Mine spill to capture and 
treat continuing mine drainage.  
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expensive.99 This can be especially problematic for the tens of thousands of aban-
doned mines in the United States, where there are no identifiable owners or operators 
to build and maintain a treatment plant. In the 1970s, the one exception in the Sil-
verton area was the Sunnyside Mine, the last operating mine in the region. The 
American Tunnel, completed beneath Bonita Peak in 1961, drained the underground 
workings of the Sunnyside Mine, discharging volumes of acid mine water to Cement 
Creek.100 With the passage of the federal Clean Water Act in 1972,101 the discharge 
from the American Tunnel required a permit102 which, in turn, required treatment of 
the mine water before discharge into Cement Creek. When the Sunnyside Mine shut 
down in 1991, a big question was what to do with the Clean Water Act permit for 
the Sunnyside Mine and how to manage the mine water continuing to flow from the 
American Tunnel at a rate of about 1,700 gallons per minute.103 Efforts to resolve 
this question and the broader issue of mine water contamination in the Animas River 
watershed would consume energies for the next twenty-five years, leading to and 
beyond the Gold King Mine blowout on August 5, 2015. 
 
C.  Animas River Watershed Restoration Efforts: 1991–2015 
 
From 1991, efforts to address mining contamination in the Animas River wa-
tershed—and especially the problem of acid mine drainage—proceeded along three 
main tracks: negotiations between the Sunnyside Mine and the State of Colorado to 
address mine water discharges from the American Tunnel; collaborative efforts by 
the Animas River Stakeholders Group to improve water quality throughout the Ani-
mas River watershed; and efforts by EPA Region 8 and the State of Colorado to 
address continuing discharges from abandoned mines in the watershed. This sub-
                                                   
99 See, e.g., BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 18 ($10 million to get out 
of water treatment obligation); see also infra text accompanying note 115. 
100 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 13, 17. 
101 Clean Water Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1388 (2018). For a classic introduction 
and overview of the Clean Water Act, see WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
246 (2d ed. 1994). 
102 In brief, Section 301 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), prohibits the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person to any waters of the United States. See Clean Water 
Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. §1362 (defining “discharge,” “person,” and “pollutant”). The permit 
program established by Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342, is known as the National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES). NPDES permits may be issued by the 
EPA or by states with permit programs approved by the EPA. NPDES permits in most states, 
including Colorado, are in fact issued by state agencies. NPDES Permits Around the Nation, 
U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/npdes-permits [https://perma.cc/YR7J-AZWL].  
103 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 17–18. Other estimates of the flow 
varied slightly, with attorneys for the mining company indicating a flow of 1,500 gallons per 
minute. See Christopher G. Hayes & William C. Robb, Negotiating a Voluntary Agreement 
Under the Clean Water Act—The Sunnside Experience, 26 COLO. LAW. 95, 96–97 (1997). 
Even at 1,500 gallons per minute, this would result in nearly 2.1 million gallons of mine 
water discharged every day, from this one source in a region littered with hundreds of other 
sources. 
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part will examine each of these three efforts in turn to illuminate the root causes of 
the Gold King Mine blowout. 
 
1.  Sunnyside Mine Negotiations 
 
After the Sunnyside Mine closed in 1991, the operator of the mine, Sunnyside 
Gold Corporation (SGC), sought to terminate the Clean Water Act permit for the 
American Tunnel and end their expensive obligation for operating the water treat-
ment plant at nearby Gladstone.104 The permit program in Colorado was adminis-
tered by the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment, Water Quality 
Control Division (WQCD). In negotiations with WQCD, SGC proposed to be re-
lieved of its permit requirements by shutting off the flow of water from the American 
Tunnel.105 SGC would shut off this flow primarily by installing “a massive concrete 
plug” in the mine.106 SGC’s experts knew this would cause the mine workings within 
Bonita Peak to flood, but in their estimate, this would only restore the groundwater 
table to some pre-mining condition and would be unlikely to have any harmful ef-
fects on water quality in Cement Creek or the Animas River.107 
WQCD did not embrace this proposal wholeheartedly. In particular, it ex-
pressed concern that closure of the American Tunnel might result in new “seeps and 
springs” on Bonita Peak that could adversely affect water quality in Cement Creek 
and downstream.108 The state agency even worried that rising water levels within the 
mine workings could lead to a “potential environmental catastrophe.”109 The mining 
company’s attorneys dismissed this fear, claiming that “all studies showed [this] was 
unlikely.”110 In hindsight, of course, after August 5, 2015, we know the state was 
right and the fears of an “environmental catastrophe” were well-founded. 
Ultimately, WQCD was persuaded to accept SGC’s proposal for mine closure 
after SGC agreed to additional terms in a consent decree signed in May 1996.111 One 
of these terms required SGC to conduct reclamation work at a number of “orphan” 
mine sites in the drainage, particularly to help reduce the amount of zinc loading to 
the Animas River.112 SGC also agreed to maintain financial assurance in favor of 
                                                   
104 While precise estimates of the costs for this water treatment are not widely available, 
the expense must have been substantial because it was later estimated that SGC spent $10 
million on work under the consent decree to get out of its water treatment obligation. BOR 
TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 18. 
105 Extraordinary background and details of this negotiation are available through an 
article authored by the legal counsel who represented SGC in this negotiation. See generally 
Hayes & Robb, supra note 103. 
106 Id. at 96. 
107 Id.  
108 Id. at 97. 
109 Id. at 98.  
110 Id. 
111 Sunnyside Gold Corp. v. Colo. Water Quality Control Div., No. 94-CV-5459 (Dist. 
Ct., Denver City & Cty., Colo. May 8, 1996) (consent decree and order). 
112 Id. at App. B: Mitigation Projects.  
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WQCD during the closure and monitoring period, in case SGC became insolvent 
before the completion of all required work.113  
Consistent with the settlement, SGC proceeded to install hydraulic bulkheads 
to seal off the American Tunnel. SGC completed the first bulkhead in October 
1996.114 At first, the $10 million project appeared to be the success its promoters 
promised, with flows from the American Tunnel dropping dramatically from 1,700 
gallons per minute (gpm) to around 100 gpm.115 As a result, the closure kept some 
“300 pounds per day of fish-killing zinc from Cement Creek”116 and water quality 
in the Animas River appeared to improve.  
Predictably, with the drain thus plugged, the vast mine workings within Bonita 
Peak began to fill with water like a bathtub. In 1986, the Gold King Mine appeared 
to be “dry,” with no identified discharge of acid mine drainage.117 After the Ameri-
can Tunnel (10,668 feet elevation) was plugged by SGC in 1996, hydrology on 
Bonita Peak began to change dramatically. In 2000, acid drainage began to discharge 
from the Mogul Mine (11,440 feet).118 Two years later, significant flows were dis-
charging from both the Red and Bonita Mine (10,940 feet) and the Gold King Mine 
Level 7 (11,480 feet).119 By 2005, the Gold King Mine was reported to “belch out 
seriously” and quickly became one of the worst polluters in the State of Colorado.120 
Confirming the fears expressed by WQCD in its negotiations with Sunnyside Gold 
Corporation, closure of the American Tunnel had indeed created an “environmental 
catastrophe.”121 
                                                   
113 Id. ¶ 25 (requiring $5,000,000 in financial assurance via irrevocable letter of credit). 
114 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 18. For an extraordinary, eyewitness 
account of this “boxcar-sized concrete plug” installed a mile deep into the American Tunnel 
in 1996—almost twenty years before the Gold King Mine spill—see THOMPSON, supra note 
8, at 247–56. After completion of the first bulkhead in 1996, two more bulkheads were in-
stalled in 2001 and 2003 to prevent mine water from pouring into the Tunnel. Thompson, 
Gold King Mine Timeline, supra note 14.  
115 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 18. 
116 Thompson, supra note 2. 
117 In fact, that same year, a new owner of the Gold King Mine who was hoping to 
restart operations there claimed that he did not need a permit under the Clean Water Act 
specifically because “No drainage occurs from any of the portals – the district is deep-drained 
by the Americal Tunnel.” Thompson, Gold King Mine Timeline, supra note 14 (describing 
the 1986 “Dry” Mine).  
118 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 18 fig.8. 
119 Id. 
120 Thompson, supra note 2. 
121 Hayes & Robb, supra note 103, at 98 (warning of “potential environmental catas-
trophe” by Colorado WQCD staff). Of course, the Colorado WQCD was not the only party 
to voice concern about the tunnel closure. For example, in 1998, Peter Butler, the director of 
a local environmental group, prophetically worried that, “If the plugs in the mine blow out 
years from now, as plugs in other mines sometimes do, . . . the public may end up paying for 
that massive cleanup.” Ray Ring, A Radical Approach to Mine Reclamation, HIGH COUNTRY 
NEWS (Jan. 19, 1998), https://www.hcn.org/issues/122/3884 [https://perma.cc/A6NG-
LPRZ].  
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2.  Animas River Stakeholders Group 
 
In 1994, as negotiations continued over the Sunnyside Mine permit and closure 
of the American Tunnel, members of the local community around Silverton, Colo-
rado began to look for new approaches to address mining pollution in their area. The 
result was the establishment of the Animas River Stakeholders Group (ARSG) in 
1994.122 In addition to local citizens, participants in the ARSG included representa-
tives for local government, state agencies, federal entities, mining companies, and 
environmental interests.123 At the time it was formed, the ARSG agreed upon a mis-
sion of “improving water quality and aquatic habitats in the Animas River watershed 
through a collaborative process designed to encourage participation from all inter-
ested parties.”124 A secondary mission appeared to be avoiding the involvement of 
state and federal authorities—above all, avoiding any Superfund designation in the 
local area.125 
The ARSG pursued its mission with a three-part strategy: first, it would conduct 
extensive studies of water quality to understand the baseline physical and biological 
conditions in the watershed; second, it would attempt to determine the most urgent 
needs and priorities for cleanup in the watershed; and third, it would initiate on-the-
ground cleanup projects in the watershed.126 To be sure, this was a massive under-
taking, with more than 2,000 abandoned mines in the Animas River watershed.127 
And yet, to some extent, the ARSG accomplished each of these three elements. With 
funding from the EPA and technical assistance from state and federal agencies, the 
ARSG conducted detailed investigations of mine sites and water quality impacts in 
                                                   
122 For a thorough history of the Animas River Stakeholders Group, placed in context 
of a contemporary movement promoting “Community-Based Conservation” in the mid-
1990s, see generally Sean T. McAllister, The Confluence of a River and a Community: An 
Experiment with Community-Based Watershed Management in Southwestern Colorado, 3 
U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 287 (2000). 
123 Id. at 315–16 n. 232. State agencies included the Colorado Division of Wildlife and 
the Division of Minerals and Geology. Federal entities included the U.S. EPA, U.S. Forest 
Service, and U.S. Geological Survey. Local governments included the City of Durango and 
Town of Silverton. Mining interests included the then-Gold King Mining Company. Envi-
ronmental interests included the Colorado River Alliance. Id.; see also Thompson, supra 
note 2 (interviewing members of ARSG). 
124 McAllister, supra note 122, at 316 (quoting Animus River Stakeholders Group, His-
tory and Stakeholder Process, http://www.waterinfo.org/arsg/history.html (webpage no 
longer available) (last visited Feb. 26 1999)). 
125 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 12 (“The last thing most people wanted was to 
be declared the nation’s next Love Canal.”); McAllister, supra note 122, at 315 (“[L]ocals 
saw the collaborative approach as an opportunity to avoid the stigma of Superfund designa-
tion”). 
126 McAllister, supra note 122, at 317. 
127 CAROL COX RUSSELL, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PRIORITIZATION OF 
ABANDONED MINES IN THE ANIMAS WATERSHED, SOUTHWESTERN COLORADO (2019).  
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the Animas River and its tributaries, including Mineral Creek and Cement Creek.128 
Based on these investigations, the ARSG identified priorities for cleanup actions in 
the watershed129 and encouraged the initiation of discrete cleanup actions undertaken 
by private parties, such as Sunnyside Gold Corporation, and public entities, such as 
the U.S. Bureau of Land Management.130  
While the ARSG achieved some clear successes, both in its technical work and 
in building goodwill among diverse stakeholders, the conclusion of one critical re-
view in 2000 found that it was still too early to declare victory.131 In fact, the success 
of the ARSG faced a number of significant challenges. One common criticism of 
community-based conservation groups in general is that they do not fairly represent 
all community interests, particularly environmental interests.132 This concern was 
indeed expressed in relation to the composition and functioning of the ARSG.133 
Another common barrier to success is funding to carry out the mission of the com-
munity-based conservation group. Ironically, while a major subtext for the ARSG 
was minimizing the involvement of the EPA in the Animas River watershed, the 
EPA was the single largest source of funding to the ARSG.134 In fact, for 1999, the 
ARSG received a substantial portion of all funding available from the EPA in Col-
orado under the grant program established by Clean Water Act Section 319,135 some 
$450,000.136  
While $450,000 may be a lot of money for most people and many community 
organizations, it would not go very far toward the scale of earth-moving and water 
management often required to address pollution in old mining districts. For example, 
by some estimates, Sunnyside Gold Corporation was required to spend upwards of 
$22 million for reclamation of the Sunnyside mine site and a handful of other orphan 
mine sites in the surrounding area.137 While reliable estimates for cleaning up the 
entire Animas River watershed remain years away, total costs upwards of $500 mil-
lion would not be surprising based upon experiences with other contaminated 
                                                   
128 Id. 
129 Notably, the priorities for action identified by the ARSG did not include the Gold 
King Mine, later recognized as one of the worst polluters in the state. See Thompson, supra 
note 2, at 14; accord RUSSELL, supra note 127, at tbl.3 (listing 16 priority mine sites in Ani-
mas River, not including Gold King Mine). 
130 McAllister, supra note 122, at 317. 
131 Id. at 320. 
132 Id. at 310 (noting “environmentalists often feel outnumbered by adverse interests 
and unwelcomed in the process”).  
133 Id. at 324. 
134 Id. at 331 (showing the EPA provides 25% of ARSG’s overall budget, compared to 
20% each from volunteers, BLM, and U.S. Forest Service). 
135 Clean Water Act § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2018) (noting that this Act makes funds 
available to states and tribes in order to address issues of nonpoint source water pollution). 
For a quick overview of the 319 Program, see U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 319 GRANT 
PROGRAM FOR STATES AND TERROITORIES, https://www.epa.gov/nps/319-grant-program-
states-and-territories [https://perma.cc/TNG6-PB95]. 
136 McAllister, supra note 122, at 330. 
137 Id. at 328. 
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mining districts.138 Given this, the “experiment” with community-based watershed 
management represented by the ARSG obviously could not, by itself, secure a solu-
tion to the massive problems of mining contamination in the Animas River water-
shed.139 
 
3.  EPA Region 8 and Colorado Division of Reclamation, Mining and Safety 
 
While the EPA provided financial and political support to the activities of the 
ARSG, it also continued to investigate and address discrete sources of mining pol-
lution in the Animas River watershed through exercise of its independent legal au-
thorities, including those under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),140 perhaps better known as “Superfund.” 
At the same time, agencies of the State of Colorado, led by the Division of Recla-
mation, Mining and Safety (DRMS),141 continued to conduct investigations and 
mine reclamation as well. Unfortunately, the combined efforts of the EPA and 
DRMS to address the worst contributors of acid mine drainage to the Animas River 
watershed would lead directly to the Gold King Mine spill on August 5, 2015. 
In 1986, the State of Colorado issued a new permit to authorize a restart of mine 
operations at the Gold King Mine.142 The permit holder, however, eventually filed 
for bankruptcy, prompting the DRMS to foreclose on a reclamation bond in 2007.143 
By this point, more than ten years after closure of the American Tunnel, DRMS 
recognized that there was a “drastic new high quantity discharge from the Gold King 
Level 7 portal of extremely poor quality water,” with the portal going from 
                                                   
138 For example, the total estimated cost of remediation for mining contamination in the 
Coeur d’Alene Basin of northern Idaho is more than $1.2 billion dollars. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, SUPERFUND CLEANUP IMPLEMENTATION PLAN, 2016–2025, at 5-2 (2016); see also 
Brad Tyler, Remediating a Superfund Sacrifice Zone on Montana’s Clark Fork River, HIGH 
COUNTRY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011), https://www.hcn.org/issues/43.16/remediating-the-coun-
trys-largest-superfund-site-on-the-upper-clark-fork-river-in-montana [https://perma.cc/TY 
26-M7AL] (addressing the mining contamination in Butte, Montana, and along the Clark 
Fork River, remedial estimates amount to around $1.3 billion dollars). 
139 See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. KENNY, ARGUING ABOUT CONSENSUS: EXAMINING THE CASE 
AGAINST WESTERN WATERSHED INITIATIVES AND OTHER COLLABORATIVE GROUPS ACTIVE 
IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 1, 2 (2000) (observing that in 2000, “collaborative 
efforts” have been fairly criticized as “largely unproven experiments, bolstered more by des-
perate enthusiasm and unsubstantiated generalizations than by real and documented re-
sults”). Whether the same critique still applies as fairly today remains open to further review.  
140 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2018). For a useful introduction to the world of 
CERCLA, defined as much by case law as by statutory code, see RODGERS, supra note 101, 
at ch. 8. 
141 See ePermitting, COLO. DIVISION OF RECLAMATION, MINING AND SAFETY, 
http://mining.state.co.us/Pages/Home.aspx [https://perma.cc/5Z7U-NKQD] (giving an over-
view of the organization and its functions). 
142 See BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 27. 
143 Id. 
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“originally dry” to draining at approximately 200 gpm.144 Identifying the Gold King 
Mine Level 7 as an urgent environmental priority, DRMS applied bond proceeds to 
preliminary work here in 2008 and more extensive work in 2009. The work per-
formed by DRMS in 2009 included closing all four portals to the Gold King Mine, 
including the original Level 7 portal and a “new” Level 7 portal approximately 100 
feet to the east.145 Through the closure process, DRMS backfilled each of the four 
portals. At this time, both the “Old” and the “New” Level 7 portals were already 
partially collapsed. Before sealing the New Portal, DRMS attempted to install two 
pipes: one to allow for continued drainage from the adit, the other to allow for ob-
servations down into the adit. Unfortunately, neither pipe could penetrate the col-
lapsed material inside the adit, defeating the utility of this pipe installation.146 
In its 2009 Project Summary, DRMS recognized that the mine drainage from 
Gold King Mine Level 7 new portal “contain[ed] extremely high levels of metals 
and continues to flow between 150 and 300 gallons per minute.”147 The 2009 Project 
Summary by DRMS also noted, prophetically, that “[a] future project at the site may 
attempt to cooperatively open the Level 7 [New] Portal in an effort to alleviate the 
potential for an unstable increase in mine pool head within the Gold King work-
ings.”148 In other words, by 2009, DRMS was clearly concerned about the risk of a 
blowout from the Gold King Mine. 
The EPA was also concerned about that risk. With the support of DRMS and 
the Animas River Stakeholders Group,149 EPA Region 8, based in Denver, began 
investigating the possibility of addressing major sources of acid mine drainage in 
the Animas River watershed, starting with the two big dischargers on Bonita Peak: 
the Red and Bonita Mine and the Gold King Mine.  
In 2011, the EPA began work at the Red and Bonita Mine. Prior to digging 
open the Red and Bonita Mine portal, the EPA was aware of the danger for a blowout 
from this mine. To evaluate this risk, the EPA drilled a well thirty feet upslope from 
the mine opening. It was a challenging effort, with an unstable drill pad on the slope 
and the first two holes missing the adit.150 The third hole, however, penetrated the 
mine and allowed the EPA to determine that there was water in it, but it was not full 
to the top.151 With this information, the EPA determined it could proceed safely with 
                                                   
144 COLO. DIV. OF RECLAMATION, MINING & SAFETY, PROJECT SUMMARY, GOLD KING 
BOND FORFEITURE M-1986-013 (2009) [hereinafter DRMS PROJECT SUMMARY]. 
145 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 14 (discussing that the new adit was 
driven in the 1970s to allow for exploration after the old adit had caved in).  
146 Id. at 29–30.  
147 Id. at 32–33 fig.19 (noting that the the DRMS Project Summary from 2009 actually 
refers here inadvertently to the Level 7 “Old Portal,” a mistake caught later after the 2015 
Gold King Mine blowout). 
148 Id. at 35. 
149 Thompson, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting ARSG coordinator Bill Simon saying, “we’d 
spent all of our money, plus we knew that we had limited abilities, . . . so we invited the EPA 
to help.”).  
150 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 24. 
151 Id. 
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 285 
 
further actions at the Red and Bonita Mine. The EPA proceeded to insert a “stinger” 
pipe down through the debris at the mine entrance and pump out the mine pool to 
avoid the risk of a mine blowout. With the mine water thus removed, the Red and 
Bonita Mine adit was safely opened by October 2011.152 
Over the next few field seasons, the EPA cleaned out and stabilized the Red 
and Bonita Mine, in consultation with DRMS and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 
Incorporating input from the other agencies, the EPA completed construction of a 
hydraulic bulkhead inside the Red and Bonita Mine in the summer of 2015.153 With 
this work at the Red and Bonita Mine completed, the EPA team, still mobilized for 
the 2015 field season, moved up the mountain to the Gold King Mine Level 7. 
The EPA had actually begun its work at the Gold King Mine in 2014, when the 
EPA was requested by DRMS to reopen and stabilize the Gold King Mine Level 7 
New Adit.154 In August 2014, the EPA recorded the flow from the adit at 112 gpm; 
however, by September, the flow had dropped to 12.6 gpm, suggesting seasonal var-
iations in the mountain’s hydrology.155 As the EPA proceeded with initial excavation 
at the mine portal, EPA and DRMS personnel noticed seeps coming through the 
mine fill. The seeps appeared to be four feet below the top of the adit, indicating that 
the mine contained water but was not full.156 Nevertheless, because the EPA was not 
ready to manage the amount of water they estimated within the mine, excavation 
work ended for the season while new drain pipes were installed, replacing the pipes 
placed by DRMS in 2009.157 The EPA then buttoned up the site for the long, harsh 
winter in the San Juan Mountains. 
The work at the Gold King Mine, as at the Red and Bonita Mine, was carried 
out by EPA Region 8 under authority of the CERCLA removal program. Under 
CERCLA removal authority, the EPA may exercise broad authorities for investigat-
ing and responding to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances.158 
CERCLA removal actions are usually overseen by On-Scene Coordinators 
(OSCs),159 a corps of highly trained personnel who may be designated at all levels 
                                                   
152 Id. at 25. 
153 Id. (noting that although the the bulkhead was completed, the valve on the bulkhead 
was left open due to concern that closing it could affect the mine pool at the nearby Gold 
King Mine).  
154 Id. at 35 (noting that the Level 7 New Adit had reportedly not been maintained or 
monitored since DRMS completed its closure of the portal in 2009).  
155 Id. at 35, 42 (furthering the notion of seasonal fluctuations in the mountain hydrol-
ogy by referencing that, on July 15, 2015, before beginning the excavation that led immedi-
ately to the August 5 blowout, the EPA measured the drainage from the adit at 69 gpm). 
156 Id. at 36. 
157 Id. at 39–40 figs.28–29.  
158 See CERCLA § 104, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) (noting the trigger for exercise of 
CERCLA response authorities); CERCLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (establishing the 
definition of “removal”).  
159 See National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. 
§ 300.120 (designation and responsibilities of OSCs). 
286 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
of government,160 with legal authorities specified by statutes161 and regulations.162 
The removal action for the Red and Bonita Mine, beginning in 2011, was overseen 
by EPA OSC Steve Way.163 Over the winter of 2014–15, OSC Way worked with 
DRMS and many others to develop a plan for investigating the Gold King Mine. In 
January 2015, Way provided the ARSG with some early ideas on how to approach 
the Gold King Mine work for 2015.164 Later in May, OSC Way along with DRMS 
personnel presented the Gold King Mine investigation plan to the ARSG, receiving 
no stakeholder objection to the proposed approach.165  
As preparations for investigating the Gold King Mine continued, OSC Way was 
also preparing for a long-planned vacation in the first week of August 2015.166 At 
least two months before leaving, Way requested another OSC, Hays Griswold, to 
fill in for him while he was gone.167 Both individuals were “qualified, experienced 
                                                   
160 OSCs may be designated by state or tribal entities or by agencies across the federal 
government. Training requirements for EPA OSCs include some 300 hours of general train-
ing in response tactics, 160 hours in health and safety, and 54 hours in contracts management. 
See OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 9. 
161 Among other places, Congress recognized and codified the authority of the OSC in 
CERCLA Section 107(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1) (creating limited exemption from liability 
for certain parties acting “at the direction of an onscene coordinator”). See infra notes 351–
352 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA “Good Samaritan” provision). 
162 Among other things, regulations under the Clean Water Act create a limited exemp-
tion from permit requirements for “[a]ny discharge in compliance with the instructions of an 
On-Scene Coordinator.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(d). See infra note 292 and accompanying text 
(discussing CWA permit exclusion).  
163 See Bruce Finley, EPA Gold King Mine Coordinator Retires as Animas Water, Soil 
Tests Begin, THE DENVER POST (June 14, 2016) https://www.denverpost.com/2016/06/14/ 
epa-gold-king-mine-coordinator-retires. [https://perma.cc/GF57-U6BN] 
164 Meeting Summary, ARSG 1 (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production 
/files/2015-08/documents/asrg_jan_27_2015_meeting_summary_redacted.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7FH9-GSZU] (providing updates on “Activities Regarding Red & Bonita and Gold 
King” including that the EPA is “discussing how best to approach the opening of the Gold 
King”). 
165 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUMMARY REPORT: EPA INTERNAL REVIEW OF THE 
AUGUST 5, 2015 GOLD KING MINE BLOWOUT 5 (2015) [hereinafter EPA INTERNAL REVIEW]. 
According to the ARSG Meeting Summary dated May 27, 2015, “Steve Way with EPA and 
Allen Sorenson with DRMS gave a presentation” on work planned in 2015 for the “Red & 
Bonita and Gold King.” The proposed plan would have “the contractor start to open up the 
Gold King #7 level.” The plan also noted that “[t]here is a pool of water several feet deep 
behind the collapsed portal.” Meeting Summary, ARSG 2 (May 27, 2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/asrg_may_27_2015_meet-
ing_summary_redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/7YKD-9AJ3].  
166 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ADDENDUM TO EPA INTERNAL REVIEW OF GOLD KING 
MINE INCIDENT 3 (Dec. 8, 2015) [hereinafter EPA ADDENDUM]. 
167 See id. The EPA redacted the names of both the EPA OSCs and DRMS personnel 
from many documents including the EPA Internal Review and the EPA Addendum to protect 
the individuals from threats and harassment. See EPA’s Animas Spill: Joint Oversight Hear-
ing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources and H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 287 
 
individuals with relevant expertise,” according to the findings of the EPA Inspector 
General, with over fifty years combined experience as EPA OSCs on top of technical 
degrees, professional training, and prior work experience in the mining industry.168  
With an experienced field team,169 the EPA approached the Gold King Mine in 
the summer of 2015 aware of many hazards at the mine, including the threat of land-
slides. In July 2015, the team observed specific evidence of landslides on the steep 
slope above the Gold King Mine Level 7, burying the mine portals.170 There was 
also evidence that the unstable slope above the mine workings was caving in, with 
a subsidence pit observed above the Level 7 Old Adit.171 This observation from the 
slope outside the mine workings was consistent with prior observations inside the 
mine, which identified roof collapses in both Level 7 adits.172 In fact, while all un-
derground mines may be dangerous, the Gold King Mine was particularly so, with 
perhaps two dozen deaths at the mine by the time it shut down in the 1920s, and 
another death in 1987 during an attempt to reopen the mine.173 
The team well understood the potential for a blowout from the Gold King Mine 
adit. The work plan for the site specifically advised, “[c]onditions may exist that 
could result in a blowout of the blockages and cause a release of large volumes of 
contaminated mine waters and sediment from inside the mine . . . .”174 Recognizing 
this hazard, OSC Way provided specific written instructions to his contractors on 
                                                   
Reform, 114th Cong. 29 (2015) [hereinafter Joint Oversight Hearing] (“Because of threats 
or harassment related to the Gold King Mine release on August 5, the EPA has not released 
the names of employees on-site at the time of the release.”). Nevertheless, the identities of 
each were widely known and reported to the public. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 2, at 1 
(identifying both Steve Way and Hays Griswold as the EPA OSCs for the Gold King Mine 
in 2015); Finley, supra note 163, at 1 (same). 
168 See OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 9–11. 
169 While working on the Gold King Mine site, OSC Griswold would be assisted by 
two senior geologists from DRMS with a combined experience of 54 years, a removal man-
ager contractor with 19 years of experience, an excavator operator with over 30 years of 
experience, and other seasoned contractor personnel. Id. at 10–11. 
170 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 42, 43 fig.33. Among other things, 
they observed that rock, soil, and a tree had slid down onto the drain pipes they installed in 
September 2014. See id. at 43 fig.34, 44 fig.35. 
171 Id. at 42 fig.32. 
172 DRMS PROJECT SUMMARY, supra note 144, at 1. 
173 Thompson, Gold King Mine Timeline, supra note 14 (noting the cause of the death 
in 1987 was reported as a large rock falling from the ceiling of the Gold King Level 7, strik-
ing a mine worker in the head). 
174 ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, LLC, ACTION / WORK PLAN 1 (2015) [hereinafter 
ER WORK PLAN]. In fact, a full year before the August 5, 2015, spill, the Request for Pro-
posals soliciting bids for work at the Gold King Mine specifically advised prospective con-
tractors of the dangers of a blowout from the mine. See ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION, 
LLC, REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS RFP # G8-15-001 1 (2014) (advising “[t]he blockage in the 
adit must be removed in a manner to prevent a surge of impounded mine water from being 
released”). 
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July 29, 2015,175 setting out a series of four major steps “to prepare for opening the 
adit.” Step 1 involved improving pipes or channels to direct the continuing flow of 
water from the mine portal. Step 2 involved setting up a system of pipes, pumps, 
hoses, and filters to safely drain the pool of water suspected to be behind the block-
age inside the adit. Step 3 involved use of an excavator to investigate the slope above 
the adit and “expose the rock face.” Finally, Step 4 involved “Adit face excavation,” 
that is, digging to expose the mine portal itself.176 Work on these four steps had 
already begun by the time Way sent this email on Wednesday, July 29, 2015. By the 
end of that week, the team had begun work on a “sump basin” for capturing contam-
inated water pumped from the mine and had begun assembling a pipe system to filter 
the mine water.177 The following week, Way went on his planned vacation and things 
at the Gold King Mine went very wrong. 
 
D.  What Went Wrong 
 
What went wrong at the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015, may never be fully 
determined. On August 4 and 5, 2105, the EPA field team was using an excavator 
to reach up above the adit, knock down loose soils, and expose the bedrock around 
the adit.178 Under the direction of the OSC, “the team slowly and carefully scraped 
away loose soil and rubble near the face of the adit with the initial goal of locating 
the primary blockage.”179 By the end of the day on August 4, 2015, “the team had 
located the blockage, which they were able to identify . . . based on the tightness and 
condition of the material.”180 On the morning of August 5, 2015, the OSC consulted 
with DRMS personnel at the site,181 and then directed the contractors to continue 
                                                   
175 Way email, supra note 2.  
176 Id. Unlike Steps 1–3, Step 4, “Adit face excavation,” required the on-site presence 
of specific project managers, suggesting this step was perceived as having the greatest risk 
of blowout.  
177 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 44–45. 
178 As explained by the EPA, removal of loose material around the adit was necessary 
“in order to plan a safe approach to the plug.” Email from [redacted] to [redacted] (Aug. 16, 
2015). Although names in this email were redacted, it was evidently sent by Hays Griswold, 
the backup OSC at the time of the blowout, reporting his personal observations at the time 
of the blowout [hereinafter Griswold email]. 
179 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166, at 4. Ignoring this explanation of the work on 
August 5, a recent comment simply assumed without support that “the interim EPA project 
supervisor ordered [the EPA contractor] to excavate the mine in a manner that was contrary 
to both the plan set in place and the orders of the head supervisor.” Timbre Shriver, Holding 
the Harmful Harmless: Lessons from Gold King Mine, 89 COLO. L. REV. 1001, 1005 (2018). 
In a more detailed narrative, the comment later relies upon allegations in a civil complaint. 
Id. at 1009 nn.41–43 and accompanying text. 
180 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166, at 4. The tight “blockage” was apparently the 
compacted backfill placed by DRMS when it attempted to close the four portals to the Gold 
King Mine in 2009. See DRMS PROJECT SUMMARY, supra note 144.  
181 Like the names of the EPA OSCs, the names of DRMS personnel who consulted at 
the site have also been redacted. However, according to the contractor field notes for the day 
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“additional excavation to identify the location of bedrock above and around the 
adit.”182 Just prior to finishing this excavation work on Wednesday morning, August 
5, 2015, “the team noticed a water spout a couple of feet high in the air near where 
they had been excavating above the top of the adit.”183 Minutes later, hell broke loose 
as the clear spurt cut rapidly through the unconsolidated waste materials in front of 
the adit, enlarging an opening, and ultimately resulting in a release of some three 
million gallons of mine water. 
From the post-mortems that began almost immediately after the spill, three pri-
mary allegations emerged: (1) the EPA misestimated the top of the mine opening; 
(2) the EPA field team for the week of August 5, 2105 acted contrary to the plan 
established by lead OSC Steve Way; and (3) the EPA failed to determine the water 
level within the adit. This sub-part will examine each of these three allegations in 
turn. 
 
1.  Elevation of the Mine Opening 
 
Beyond doubt, one direct cause of the Gold King Mine blowout was the EPA’s 
error in determining the level of the roof in the Gold King Mine. At times when the 
EPA thought it was digging above the mine opening, it was digging directly at the 
mine opening, weakening the blockage that was holding back pressurized mine wa-
ter. The question is why the EPA made this error.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
of the spill, “DRMS personnel” met with the OSC at the Gold King Mine site at approxi-
mately 9:30 am. They “discussed the mine adit situation and determined that excavation 
should be continued.” At approximately 10:30 am, “DRMS left the [Gold King Mine] site to 
investigate” another nearby mine. WESTON SOLUTIONS, DRAFT TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 
2 (2015).  
182 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166, at 4. 
183 Id. 
Figure 2: Cross-section of Gold King Mine Level 7 New Portal showing condition 
of the adit that was assumed by the EPA OSC and the abandoned mine experts from 
DRMS for use in planning. Source: Bureau of Reclamation, Technical Evaluation 
of the Gold King Mine Incident fig. 40 (Oct. 2015). 
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According to the first post-mortem, the EPA’s August 2015 Internal Review,184 
the EPA’s investigation of the Gold King Mine adit in September 2014 revealed that 
the two twenty-four-inch pipes installed by DMRS in 2009 were located at the “top 
(roof)” of the adit.185 (See Figure 2.) Assuming the height of the adit was ten feet, 
and noticing that water was flowing out below the two 24-inch pipes, the EPA esti-
mated the level of impounded water in the mine at six feet.186 The second post-mor-
tem, the October 2015 Technical Evaluation by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,187 
appeared to confirm these assumptions.188 
The third post-mortem, the EPA’s December 2015 Addendum to its Internal 
Review,189 revealed a significant mistake: the opening to the mine was not ten feet 
high, as the EPA had assumed. It was more like twenty feet high.190 And instead of 
the estimated six feet of water in the adit, the twenty-foot mine opening was appar-
ently full to the ceiling behind the blockage. As such, when the excavator operator 
believed he was scraping at solid bedrock above the mine adit, he was really poking 
at the top of the mine opening itself and at a weak barrier holding back a wall of 
mine water. 
The reason for this mistake—and the reasonableness of it—remain contested 
questions. The EPA’s Addendum suggested the mine opening had widened from ten 
to twenty feet as a result of collapsing of bedrock material above the adit.191 This 
                                                   
184 EPA INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 165. The EPA Internal Review was produced 
by an independent group of EPA personnel from outside of EPA Region 8, with expertise in 
the investigation and cleanup of mine sites. Id. at 2 (listing five members of the EPA’s Inter-
nal Review Team). 
185 Id. at 4. 
186 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 5. 
187 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3. The team producing the BOR Tech-
nical Evaluation consisted of three technical experts from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
with three peer reviewers from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, U.S. Geological Survey, and 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
188 Id. at 46–47 fig.38 (depicting seepage from mine “emerging approximately 5 to 6 
feet above the floor of the adit”).  
189 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166. 
190 Id. at 4 (noting that “the adit brow . . . turned out to be approximately 19 feet above 
the adit floor”). The genuine shock of expecting a ten-foot opening and finding an opening 
twice that size was evident in the excited utterances of the contractors on-site at the moment 
of the blowout. In an audio recording accompanying the video of the blowout, the contractors 
are heard to engage in this exchange:  
Contractor 1: No, this is not good.  
Contractor 2: We were so high too.  
Contractor 1: I know, we were about 20 feet up . . . . 
Contractor 2: Ya know, we were digging high. 
Contractor 1: We’re digging really high . . . . 
House Committee on Natural Resources, Footage from Gold King Mine Spill, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 4, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBPO28FTawQ [https://perma.cc/XU 
6P-BBQN]. 
191 Id. Consistent with this conclusion, the BOR Technical Evaluation describes a “Pho-
tograph taken at 9:46 a.m. August 5, 2015, showing that the loose soil from the upper end of 
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explanation appears consistent with the observed collapses of bedrock inside the 
mine adit as well as active landslides and the sinkhole on the slope above the mine 
adit. However, some members of Congress who participated in an investigation of 
the Gold King Mine spill192 offered an alternate explanation. According to this fourth 
post-mortem, a “Majority Staff Report” issued in February 2016,193 the problem 
stemmed from the EPA’s assumption that the two twenty-four-inch pipes were lo-
cated at the top of the adit. In fact, according to the Majority Staff Report, the two 
pipes were located at the bottom of the adit; i.e., on the floor of the mine tunnel. This 
would mean that when the EPA used the pipes as a marker for digging near the top 
of the adit, it was actually digging near the floor of the adit, exposing and weakening 
the plug holding back the mine water.  
In support of this theory, the Majority Staff Report pointed to contractor docu-
ments from the work DRMS funded at the mine in 2009.194 According to the Major-
ity Staff Report, the contractor documents showed that the pipes were supposed to 
be installed “on the floor of the mine . . . .”195 The problem with this theory is that 
the Majority Staff Report was focused on the wrong adit at the Gold King Mine. As 
noted previously,196 there are actually two adits at the Gold King Mine Level 7, 
known as the “Old Portal” and the “New Portal.” The EPA work and the subsequent 
blowout in 2015 occurred at the New Portal. The contractor document with the lan-
guage about installing the pipe “on the floor of the mine” expressly referred to the 
“OLD Portal” (emphasis in original).197 Assuming the contractor complied with the 
work specifications for both the Old Portal and New Portal, it is fair to assume that 
the pipes were installed on the floor of the Old Portal and were not installed on the 
                                                   
the excavation had been removed exposing fractured and crumbly rock . . . .” BOR 
TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 53 fig.47 (emphasis added). 
192 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2. Other than the Committee Chairman Rob 
Bishop (R-Utah), the Majority Staff Report fails to identify any specific Members of Con-
gress joining the report. 
193 Id.  
194 Id. at 7. See DRMS PROJECT SUMMARY, supra note 144.  
195 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 7 n.14. The Majority Staff Report also 
claimed that the “contractor who performed the work for DRMS in 2009 corroborated the 
DRMS records, stating that the crew placed the pipes on the floor of the adit.” Id. (citing 
telephone call with Roger Prock, K and P Property Design (Jan 29, 2016)). 
196 See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing the Level 7 Old Portal and 
New Portal). 
197 See Colorado Division of Reclamation, Mining & Safety, IMP Bond Forfeiture / 
Reclamation Documents 100 (Dec. 9, 2010) [hereinafter DRMS Files] (on file with author). 
Notably, the same contractor document for the New Portal omits the language about in-
stalling the pipe “on the floor of the mine.” Id. at 101 (“BID ITEM 3 – Gold King Level 7 
NEW Portal Backfill Closure”). 
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floor of the New Portal.198 This would be consistent with the direct observations by 
OSC Way in the field that the pipes were near the “top (roof)” of the New Portal.199 
Given Way’s observation in September 2014 that the pipes were near the top 
of the adit, an observation consistent with the contractor documents for installation 
of these pipes in 2009, it seems reasonable to believe that digging above these pipes 
would be digging above the adit, and not directly at it. This leaves the EPA’s sup-
position that the mine opening expanded due to collapsing rock on the slope above 
the adit as perhaps the most plausible explanation for how digging above the pipes 
led to release of water from the mine. 
 
2.  Consistency with the Plan 
 
Another allegation was that the EPA team, including OSC Griswold filling in 
during Way’s vacation, failed to follow Way’s instructions for that first week of 
August.200 Again, before leaving on vacation, Way provided specific instructions via 
email dated July 29, 2015, listing four steps “to prepare for opening the adit.”201 
Under Step 2, “Water management system,” Way directed the following: 
 
B. Before any excavation towards the adit floor . . . the sump and sump-
pump set up to handle adit discharge must be in place. 202 
 
C. . . . [T]he piping / hose must be in place to allow flow to be directed to 
the [Red and Bonita] pond before removing any adit blockage at or below 
24” pipe in the adit debris. And, the steel stinger pipe, 4” threaded well 
casing pipe, must be prepared and available.203 
 
There is, of course, a logic to the sequence evident in these instructions: before open-
ing a mine full of water, you need a system in place to handle that water. What we 
                                                   
198 The reason for this difference in specifications between the two adits does not seem 
apparent. However, it also does not appear to be a mistake because the directions for the Old 
Portal and the New Portal are back-to-back on consecutive pages and the easiest thing to do 
would be to copy the specifications from one to the other, if that was the intent. Evidently, it 
was not. 
199 STEVEN WAY, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLREP #1 (INITIAL POLLUTION 
REPORT) – REMOVAL ASSESSMENT, GOLD KING MINE SITE (2014), http://www.epa.gov/ 
sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/goldkingmine_polrep1_9-23-14_redacted.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24XA-SDU5] [hereinafter 2014 POLREP]. Again, names are redacted 
from this document, but the author remains well-known in public. See, e.g., MAJORITY STAFF 
REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 n.3. 
200 See MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 8 (“Mr. Griswold followed neither 
the existing work plan nor Mr. Way’s emailed instructions”). 
201 Way email, supra note 2. 
202 Id. The Majority Staff Report misreads this step as requiring that before any exca-
vation towards the adit floor, the sump and sump-pump must be “prepared and available.” 
MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 8.  
203 Way email, supra note 2. 
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 293 
 
know now, however, is that the water management system prescribed in Step 2 was 
not in place before the EPA team moved on to Step 3, “Excavation above adit / hill 
slope,” and Step 4, “Adit face excavation.” The question is whether that was con-
sistent with the plan set out in Way’s instructions. 
Both the EPA’s Addendum to the Internal Review and the BOR Technical 
Evaluation seemed to agree that the actions taken at the Gold King Mine that first 
week of August were consistent with Way’s plan. The BOR Technical Evaluation 
recognized that “excavating the fill to expose the rock crown over the adit” was a 
necessary step toward completion of the water management system. The BOR Tech-
nical Evaluation specifically noted that this excavation was needed before the 
“stinger” pipe could be inserted into the mine pool in order to pump out the water 
before opening the mine.204 The EPA Addendum, released two months after the 
BOR Technical Evaluation, reached the same conclusions, finding unequivocally 
that “[t]he work being conducted on August 4 and 5, 2015 was completely consistent 
with the direction provided” by OSC Way.205  
The Addendum differed from the BOR Technical Evaluation in one important 
respect. The BOR Technical Evaluation assumed that the EPA field team the first 
week of August 2015 was engaged in a “plan to open the adit.”206 However, accord-
ing to the EPA’s findings in the Addendum, that was not the plan at all for that first 
week of August. Rather, the EPA’s plan was to assess the adit.207 Information from 
this assessment, including information on “the exact location of the bedrock above 
and around the adit,” would “help prepare for a decision on future work.”208 Such 
decision would also be informed by consultation with a BOR mining expert in a 
meeting scheduled for August 14, 2015.209 Until a decision to open the adit was 
made, and how, there would be no need to complete all the steps in Way’s email of 
July 29, 2015 including construction and operation of the water management system. 
The email was clear that the water management system must be in place before ac-
tions to open the adit.210 However, the email did not specify a plan to open the adit 
during the first week of August. The July 29, 2015 directions from OSC Way were 
explicitly characterized as work “to prepare for opening the adit.”211 
The Majority Staff Report, prepared by members of the House Committee on 
Natural Resources, disagreed with this interpretation. In their view, the EPA team 
was clearly engaged in a deliberate effort to “breach the plug.”212 In proceeding with 
this deliberate effort, OSC Griswold “followed neither the existing work plan nor 
                                                   
204 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 77–78. 
205 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166, at 5. 
206 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 47. 
207 EPA ADDENDUM, supra note 166, at 3 (“This work was to assess the site conditions 
and to help prepare for a decision on future work.”). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 See Way email, supra note 2. 
211 Way email, supra note 2 (emphasis added). 
212 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
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Mr. Way’s emailed instructions.”213 As one example, the Majority Staff Report 
states that the EPA team did proceed with “excavation towards the adit floor” before 
the water management system was in place, contrary to Way’s instructions. In fact, 
the EPA was not digging “towards the adit floor.” The EPA was digging “high,”214 
at or above its estimation of the top of the adit. As further proof that the EPA inten-
tionally breached the plug, the Majority Staff Report pointed to photographs of a 
“mound” that the EPA team constructed in front of the adit. The Majority Staff Re-
port dismissed the EPA’s assertion that the mound was constructed to serve as a 
ramp for the excavator to reach up to the bedrock above the adit. Instead, the Major-
ity Staff Report speculates that the mound was constructed to “function[] as a berm 
that might contain or control water released from the mine.”215 Continuing with this 
theory, the Majority Staff Report suggests, “With the berm . . . constructed and the 
adit clear of all machinery and crew, EPA was ready to breach the plug.”216 What 
the Majority Staff Report missed, however, was that construction of this mysterious 
“mound” was included in Way’s instructions on July 29, 2015. Specifically, Step 3 
advised that “[e]xcavation above adit / hill slope . . . would require placing enough 
borrow material on top of the existing berm in front of the adit to allow access above 
the adit . . . . ”217 In constructing the “mound” then, OSC Griswold was not acting 
contrary to Way’s instructions in a deliberate plan to “breach the plug.” Griswold, 
in fact, was acting within the scope of work established by Way’s instructions. 
After considerably more investigation, a fifth post-mortem on the Gold King 
Mine spill was produced in June 2017 by the EPA Office of Inspector General 
(OIG).218 The OIG determined that “the EPA plan did not include opening the mine 
                                                   
213 Id. at 8. 
214 Id. (describing excited utterances of contractors at time of blowout). 
215 Id. at 38. 
216 Id. 
217 Way email, supra note 2. For the uninitiated in construction jargon, “borrow mate-
rial” is simply soil or dirt used to fill a space or raise an elevation. See Oliver A. Houck, 
Damage Control: A Field Guide to Important Euphemisms in Environmental Law, 15 TUL. 
ENVTL. L.J. 129, 130 (2001) (noting ironically that ordinary use of “borrow” suggests some 
eventual return of the material after use, a prospect that no one should expect for material 
used to construct levees and highways). 
218 The EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG) performs independent “audits and in-
vestigations of the EPA [and its contractors] to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse” 
of government resources. About EPA’s Office of Inspector General, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/office-inspector-general/about-epas-office-inspector-general [https:// 
perma.cc/XM6G-AYH8]. The EPA OIG was established pursuant to the federal Inspector 
General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452 (1978), which generally requires that each federal 
department and agency establish and maintain an Office of Inspector General for the pur-
poses of providing “leadership and coordination” and recommending “policies . . . to pro-
mote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and . . . to prevent and 
detect fraud and abuse in, [federal] programs.” 5 U.S.C. app. 3, § 2 (2008). For a general 
introduction to the legal authorities and functions of the federal Inspectors General, see Mar-
garet J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal Govern-
ment: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473 (1985).  
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on August 5, 2015, and the EPA was not attempting to open the mine the day of the 
release . . . .”219 The OIG reached this determination after interviewing numerous 
individuals who were at the site on August 5, 2015 including the OSC, two EPA 
contractors, the excavator operator, and a geological engineer for Colorado 
DRMS.220 According to the OIG, they “all indicated that the work being done that 
day was investigative in nature,” with a purpose “to find competent rock above the 
adit [and] no plan that day to open the adit.”221 The OIG found that these statements 
were corroborated by the schedule for work at the site.222 Among other things, the 
field schedule, prepared by the contractors in May 2015, showed that the water man-
agement system would not be completed before the end of August, and that safe 
access to the mine portal would not be secured until mid-September.223 As neither 
the water management system nor safe access to the mine had been planned for or 
established by the first week of August, the OIG concluded, “[o]ur work shows the 
EPA was not attempting to open the mine the day of the release.”224 
Given that the EPA was not attempting to open the mine the day of the release, 
and that all work performed at the site up to the moment of the blowout was within 
the scope of work established by Way’s email of July 29, 2015, it appears that the 
EPA team was acting consistently with the existing plan when the blowout occurred. 
 
3.  Determination of the Water Level Within the Adit 
 
A third allegation against the EPA for the blowout at the Gold King Mine was 
that the EPA failed to take necessary measures for determining the level of water in 
the mine adit. In 2011, at the Red and Bonita Mine lower down on Bonita Peak, the 
EPA did in fact implement such a measure, drilling a well about thirty feet upslope 
from the mine opening.225 After penetrating the mine workings, the EPA then meas-
ured the water level within the mine adit, determining it was not full to the top. With 
this information, the EPA proceeded to drain the mine pool with a stinger pipe and 
pump and then safely open the mine adit.226 Why the EPA did not take the precau-
tionary measure of drilling a well upslope to measure the water level in the Gold 
King Mine became another point of controversy after the blowout. 
This controversy could have been resolved immediately after the blowout with 
the first post-mortem, the EPA Internal Review issued in late August 2015. The EPA 
Internal Review was produced by an independent team of mining experts from 
                                                   
219 OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 18. 
220 Id. at 19. 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
223 ER WORK PLAN, supra note 174, add. B (showing, among other things, “Set-up 
Pumping System” to begin “Mon 8/31/15” and “Bolt Tunnel Brow” to be conducted “Wed 
9/9/15”). 
224 OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 19. 
225 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 24. 
226 Id. at 24–25. 
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outside of EPA Region 8.227 As part of this review, the team visited the site during 
the week of August 16, 2015 and made some important observations that were over-
looked by many critics. The team recognized that the procedure used at the Red and 
Bonita Mine, drilling a well from above the mine down into mine workings, “may 
have been able to discover the pressurized conditions that turned out to cause the 
blowout.”228 However, the team also recognized that the Gold King Mine, higher up 
on Bonita Peak, is significantly different from the Red and Bonita Mine. In particu-
lar, “[b]ased on the site topography (steepness and ruggedness) observed by the 
Team . . . the use of such a technique would have been very difficult and expensive 
at the Adit.”229 Moreover, “[t]he unstable and steep slope above the Adit had loose 
soils and rock and the underlying bedrock was prone to cave-ins, as observed over 
the nearby Old Adit . . . .”230 Recognizing these factors, the Internal Review con-
cluded, in part, that “[s]afety is a key consideration for drilling at the Gold King site, 
and establishing a safe location for the drill pad would be very challenging given the 
steepness and instability of the slopes above and in proximity to the Adit.”231 In light 
of these serious technical challenges and safety concerns, the Internal Review de-
clined to address this question further. 
The BOR Technical Evaluation reached a similar conclusion. BOR recognized 
that drilling a well upslope of the mine portal had allowed the EPA to successfully 
determine the water level inside the Red and Bonita Mine adit.232 Given this, BOR 
opined that had this technique been followed at the Gold King Mine, “the plan to 
open the mine would have been revised, and the blowout would not have oc-
curred.”233 However, BOR also acknowledged that “the prospect of drilling into the 
[Gold King Mine] from above was far more challenging than at Red and Bonita.”234 
In lieu of drilling, BOR agreed with the EPA and DRMS that “indirect evidence 
about the water level in the mine appeared persuasive . . . .”235  
                                                   
227 EPA INTERNAL REVIEW, supra note 165, at 2. Among the members of the EPA In-
ternal Review Team was Ed Moreen, a registered Professional Engineer from EPA Region 
10. Based in Coeur d’Alene, Idaho, Mr. Moreen has more than 20 years of field experience 
working on mine site cleanups, as a project manager for the U.S. EPA and as a project man-
ager for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers before that.  
228 Id. at 7. 
229 Id. 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at 9. 
232 BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3, at 24–25. 
233 Id. at 78. 
234 Id. at 66.  
235 Id. According to the BOR Technical Evaluation, this “indirect evidence” about the 
water level in the mine included each of the following: 
• The Gold King Mine was high up on Bonita Peak, 427 feet above the Red and 
Bonita Mine, making it unlikely that groundwater would be found this high up on 
the mountain. 
• Seepage from the Gold King Mine Level 7 New Portal appeared to be flowing about 
four feet below the top of the adit (or six feet above the adit floor) in 2015, at about 
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Ignoring this “indirect evidence” of the water level inside the mine adit, and 
dismissing the safety concerns and technical challenges observed by the mining ex-
perts in both the EPA Internal Review and the BOR Technical Evaluation, the Ma-
jority Staff Report criticized both the EPA and BOR for “fail[ing] to discuss EPA’s 
critical decision not to test the pressure in the mine . . . .”236 Even with the differences 
articulated in the EPA Internal Review and the BOR Technical Evaluation, the Ma-
jority Staff Report asked, “[i]f BOR had previously advised EPA to test the pressure 
at [the Red and Bonita Mine], why did BOR not address this same issue when re-
viewing EPA’s actions at the Gold King Mine?”237  
Unlike the authors of the Majority Staff Report, the EPA Office of Inspector 
General showed no trouble distinguishing between the Gold King Mine and the Red 
and Bonita Mine, acknowledging the advice of one mining expert that “each mine 
is unique.”238 The OIG report observed that the lead OSC for the Gold King Mine 
site, Steve Way, in fact had drilled the monitoring well into the Red and Bonita Mine 
five years earlier, so he was well-familiar with the technique.239 However, the OIG 
also appreciated this was an easier job at the Red and Bonita Mine, where an access 
road above the Red and Bonita Mine allowed the EPA to lower drill equipment 
safely down above the adit. For the Gold King Mine, higher up on the mountain, no 
access road exists above the mine, creating particular challenges for getting drill 
equipment up above the mine.240 Moreover, the OIG noted that “the Gold King Mine 
portal is located on a steeper and more unstable mountainside than the Red and 
Bonita Mine portal,”241 creating the safety concerns and technical challenges that the 
EPA identified early on in its Internal Review. Carrying out its independent investi-
gation, the OIG spoke with a number of mining experts and found “mixed opinions 
on whether drilling was feasible or advisable at the site due to these risks.”242 One 
                                                   
the same level observed by the EPA in 2014, indicating the water level inside the 
mine was stable. 
• No seeps or wet spots were observed above this level, indicating dry conditions 
above this level inside the adit. 
• Seepage at the base of the blockage was stable at 69 gallons per minute, indicating 
that pressure inside the mine had not increased. 
• Only a small amount of seepage was coming out of the Level 7 Old Portal, located 
100 feet away and connected to the New Portal inside the mine. Id. at 51–52. 
236 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 44, 48 (criticizing EPA INTERNAL 
REVIEW, supra note 165 and criticizing BOR TECHNICAL EVALUATION, supra note 3). 
237 Id. at 48. 
238 See OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 12. 
239 Id. at 14. 
240 Id. at 12–14. 
241 Id. at 14.  
242 Id. According to one of these experts, from the Colorado DRMS, collection of data 
from a monitoring well drilled above the mine may have proven useless, or worse, mislead-
ing, because conditions within the mine could change in the months required to drill, moni-
tor, and proceed to open the mine. Id. at 15. This time lag may be particularly concerning 
given the short field season at the high altitude of the Gold King Mine, requiring drilling in 
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expert, for example, suggested that horizontal drilling into the side of the mountain 
could be used to determine water levels inside the mine. However, that suggestion 
was countered by the advice of another expert, who warned that horizontal drilling 
created the risk of a blowout through the drill hole.243 In the end, the OIG concluded, 
“[w]e found it reasonable that the EPA had not conducted direct testing of the water 
level or pressure during the removal site evaluation at Gold King Mine by the time 
of the release on August 5, 2015.”244 
While critics may never be satisfied, each of the criticisms concerning the 
EPA’s alleged failures at the Gold King Mine appears to find answers both complex 
and simple. One simple fact is that mines are often dangerous places. This fact is 
amply attested by the history of tragic mining accidents in the United States,245 in-
cluding perhaps two dozen deaths at the Gold King Mine itself during its operational 
years.246 Another fact is that there are a lot of abandoned mines, hundreds of thou-
sands in the western United States,247 raising the odds that something will go wrong 
somewhere. Tens of thousands of these abandoned mines may require work to ad-
dress legacy contamination, requiring hazardous activities such as drilling and ex-
cavation that give rise to accidents every year in the course of active mining opera-
tions. To carry out the hazardous work of mine cleanup requires the collective efforts 
of many agencies and entities such as the EPA, the Colorado Division of Reclama-
tion, Mining and Safety, the Animas River Stakeholders Group, and private industry. 
What happened with the EPA crew on August 5, 2015, could have happened on 
anyone else’s watch. Unlike many other tragic accidents in the history of mining, 
we are lucky that this time no one was killed. Of course, that’s a far cry from saying 
the EPA was lucky that day, as the continuing controversy and litigation clearly 
demonstrate.  
 
IV.  THE GOLD KING MINE SPILL AND ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY 
 
To say that the Gold King Mine blowout was truly an accident does not mean, 
of course, that the EPA has no liability for the spill. The EPA may, for example, still 
have tort liability for the Gold King Mine spill under the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA).248 The EPA might also have liability under various federal environmental 
                                                   
the late summer of one year and then, based on the results, reopening the mine in the late 
summer of the following year.  
243 OIG RESPONSE, supra note 19, at 14. 
244 Id. at 15. 
245 Evidence of this fact is unfortunately plentiful. See, e.g., GREGG OLSEN, THE DEEP 
DARK: DISASTER AND REDEMPTION IN AMERICA’S RICHEST SILVER MINE (2006) (discussing 
how in 1972, 91 miners were killed in the Sunshine Mine Disaster in Kellogg, Idaho). 
246 Thompson, supra note 2, and accompanying text. 
247 See GAO REPORT, supra note 57 and accompanying text (GAO estimate). 
248 Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), Pub. L. No. 89-506, 80 stat. 306–08 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). For discussion of the FTCA in the context of 
the Gold King Mine spill, see infra note 427 and accompany text. 
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statutes. For example, both the Majority Staff Report249 and individual Members of 
Congress250 alleged that the EPA’s actions at the Gold King Mine violated the Clean 
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. While early allegations such as these 
were largely rhetorical,251 ongoing litigation alleging violations of both the FTCA 
and federal environmental laws requires that all sides engage in more rigorous anal-
ysis. This Part will take an independent look at the various federal environmental 
statutes the EPA may be alleged to have violated in connection with the Gold King 
Mine spill, along with defenses such as sovereignty immunity. Through this process, 
this Part will demonstrate some of the specific legal protections available to agencies 
and contractors responding to the challenging problems of mining contamination in 
the United States. 
 
A.  The Endangered Species Act 
 
The purpose of the Endangered Species Act (ESA)252 is generally to protect and 
conserve threatened and endangered species and the habitats upon which their sur-
vival depends.253 At the broadest level, the ESA endeavors to achieve such goals 
through two primary mechanisms: (1) the requirement for federal agencies to consult 
with federal wildlife services under ESA Section 7;254 and (2) the general require-
ment for all public and private parties to avoid “take” of any threatened or endan-
gered species under ESA Section 9.255 The prohibition of “take” established by ESA 
Section 9 and implementing regulations generally prohibits “harm” to endangered 
                                                   
249 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 3 (stating flatly, “EPA’s actions at the 
Gold King Mine violated the Clean Water Act and the Endangered Species Act”). 
250 Joint Oversight Hearing, supra note 167, at 7 (quoting Rep. Rob Bishop, “Now, 
EPA . . . [has] violat[ed] . . . environmental laws, like the Clean Water Act and the Endan-
gered Species Act”). 
251 The Majority Staff Report, for example, after declaring flatly in the Executive Sum-
mary that “EPA’s actions at the Gold King Mine violated the Clean Water Act and the En-
dangered Species Act,” devotes a total of three bullet points and one footnote out of a 73-
page report to demonstrate this alleged liability. MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 
3, 17. For another example, see Joint Oversight Hearing, supra note 167, at 24 (statement of 
Rep. Rob Bishop: “[The Endangered Species Act] says if you anticipate a major blowout, 
you have to contact [the U.S.] Fish and Wildlife [Service].”). The actual language of the 
Endangered Species Act, however, says nothing about actions to be taken in anticipation of 
a major blowout. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 
(2018). 
252 Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2018). For an 
excellent introduction and overview of the Endangered Species Act, see DANIEL J. ROHLF, 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973: A GUIDE TO ITS PROTECTIONS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION (1989). 
253 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (describing the purposes of the ESA). 
254 16 U.S.C. § 1536. 
255 Id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (noting that it is unlawful to “take any [listed] species within the 
United States”). 
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and threatened species.256 Fortunately, field biologists from the U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service and other agencies found no evidence or indication of any harm to en-
dangered or threatened species as a result of the Gold King Mine spill.257 As such, 
this section will focus on the sole question of the EPA’s responsibilities for consul-
tation under ESA Section 7.  
In significant part, ESA Section 7 provides as follows: 
 
Each federal agency shall, in consultation with . . . the Secretary, insure 
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency . . . is not 
likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of 
[critical] habitat . . . .258 
 
                                                   
256 Id. § 1532(19) (defining “take” to mean “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct”); 50 C.F.R. 
§ 17.3 (2017) (defining “harm” to mean “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife”). 
“Such an act may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually 
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding or sheltering.” Id. For discussion of the regulatory definition of “harm,” 
see Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 708 
(1995) (affirming regulatory definition of “harm” including “significant habitat modifica-
tion”). While ESA Section 9 on its face applies only to “endangered species,” implementing 
regulations extend Section 9 protections to threatened species as well. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31(a) 
(2017) (extending most, but not all, of the “take” prohibitions that apply to “endangered” 
wildlife to also apply to “threatened” wildlife). 
257 As Department of the Interior Secretary Sally Jewell testified under oath at one con-
gressional hearing, the Fish and Wildlife Service conducted testing “to determine whether 
there had been an adverse impact on threatened and endangered species, and had seen no 
impact, and had done multiple testing.” The Department of the Interior’s Role in the EPA’s 
Animas Spill: Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 114th Cong. 
52 (Dec. 9, 2015) [hereinafter DOI Hearing] (statement of Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. De-
partment of the Interior); see also Scott L. Durst and Mathan R. Franssen, Initial Observa-
tions of the Gold King Mine Spill in the San Juan River Basin 7–8 [hereinafter Durst & 
Franssen Field Report] (undated and unpublished report of field surveys on August 11–12, 
2015, by U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service field biologists) (on file with author) (explaining 
that “[a]ll fish we encountered appeared to be healthy and in good condition”); see also 
EPA’s Animas Spill: Joint Oversight Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Natural Resources 
and the Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong. 94 (Sept. 17, 2015) (testimony 
of Larry Wolk, Executive Director and Chief Medical Officer, Colo. Dept. of Public Health 
and Env’t.) (asserting that water quality staff from the Colorado Department of Public Health 
worked with the Division of Parks and Wildlife, within the Colorado Department of Natural 
Resources, to monitor the spill’s effects on aquatic life and wildlife, and found that “[t]here 
were no fish kills along the Animus river during the plume event, and there were no effects 
observed on terrestrial animals, such as ducks or mammals” and additionally, only one fish 
out of 108 died when placed in cages in the plume in the river). 
258 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018). 
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For purposes of the Gold King Mine spill, the “Secretary” is the Secretary of 
the U.S. Department of the Interior, 259 acting through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service (FWS). Thus, if the duty to consult under ESA Section 7 applies to the Gold 
King Mine spill, it would require EPA consultation with the Secretary of the Interior, 
through the FWS. The FWS defines federal “action” broadly for purposes of Section 
7 consultation, to include “all activities or programs of any kind authorized, funded, 
or carried out, in whole or in part, by Federal agencies.”260 Actions conducted by the 
EPA at the Gold King Mine Level 7 New Portal on August 5, 2015, were clearly 
actions “authorized, funded, [and] carried out” by a federal agency. Congressional 
critics thus accused the EPA of failing to meet legal requirements for consultation 
under ESA Section 7.261  
Of course, Section 7 does not require federal agencies to consult with the Ser-
vice agencies on all actions authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency. 
No one would suggest, for example, that the EPA Administrator must complete Sec-
tion 7 consultation before hiring an intern or testifying at another congressional hear-
ing on the Gold King Mine spill. Section 7 consultation is triggered only by those 
federal actions that may “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered spe-
cies or threatened species or result in . . . adverse modification of [critical] habi-
tat . . . .”262 Drawing directly on this language, the Director of the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service responded to congressional critics of the Gold King Mine spill with 
this authoritative statement: 
 
Federal action agency discretionary actions are subject to [ESA] section 
7(a)(2) consultation when they cause effects to listed species or designated 
critical habitat that are reasonably certain to occur. (In the 1986 ESA im-
plementing regulations preamble, the Service notes that this phrase is not 
the same as “reasonably foreseeable” under the NEPA). Webster’s New 
World College Dictionary (2010 edition) defines “accident” as “a happen-
ing that is not expected, foreseen, or intended.” As a general matter, the 
                                                   
259 The Endangered Species Act defines “Secretary” as either the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or the Secretary of Commerce, through the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining “Secretary”). 
NMFS generally has jurisdiction over marine species and anadromous fishes, 50 C.F.R. § 
223.102 (2017), while the Fish and Wildlife Service has jurisdiction over all other species, 
including terrestrial species and freshwater fishes, 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2017). 
260 50 C.F.R. § 402.02; see also, e.g., Lane County Audubon Society v. Jamison, 958 
F.2d 290, 294 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that U.S. Forest Service plan for managing timber 
harvests in old growth forests of Oregon constitutes federal “action” for purposes of ESA 
Section 7 consultation).  
261 See, e.g., Joint Oversight Hearing, supra note 167, at 24 (statement of Rep. Rob 
Bishop) (asserting that “EPA conducted no consultation with Fish and Wildlife, as is required 
under the Endangered Species Act”); DOI Hearing, supra note 257 at 52 (statement of Rep. 
Cresent Hardy) (claiming that, “[c]learly, [EPA’s] action reached the bar . . . which triggers 
a requirement of consultation with the ESA”). 
262 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). 
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Service does not consider accidents to be discretionary agency actions sub-
ject to consultation or speculate about possible effects that are not reason-
ably certain to occur.263  
 
Recognizing that the Gold King Mine spill was indeed an “accident,” the FWS 
Director found no need for the EPA to engage in consultation on the Gold King Mine 
spill “because an accidental spill is not a discretionary federal action subject to sec-
tion 7 consultation.”264 This conclusion was also shared by the Director’s boss, the 
Secretary of the Interior, who explained under oath during one of the many congres-
sional hearings into the Gold King Mine spill that, “[i]t is the EPA’s choice whether 
or not to do a Section 7 consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service.”265  
Moreover, nothing about the EPA’s work at the Gold King Mine Level 7 New 
Portal on August 5, 2015, suggested any possibility of jeopardizing the continued 
existence of any listed species or critical habitat. A list of all wildlife in San Juan 
County, Colorado, protected under the Endangered Species Act identified a total of 
three species: the Canada lynx (Lynx Canadensis), the Boreal toad (Bufo boreas bo-
reas), and the Southwestern willow flycatcher (Empidonax trailii extimus).266 Sight-
ing of a Canada lynx anywhere in Colorado would be a rare treat, but certainly noth-
ing suggests that the EPA’s investigation at the Gold King Mine could jeopardize 
the continued existence of the species. A Boreal toad on the steep slope of Bonita 
                                                   
263 Letter from Dan Ashe, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to The Honorable 
Rob Bishop, Chairman, H. Comm. on Natural Resources, FWS/AES/064378, at 2 (2016) (on 
file with author). For the “preamble” referenced in the Director’s statement, see Interagency 
Cooperation – Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 Fed. Reg. 19,926 (June 3, 1986). In the 
preamble, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service explained its rejection, for ESA consultation 
purposes, of the “reasonably foreseeable” standard for determining the scope of agency ac-
tions that may trigger the need to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA. 
Instead, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service adopted a “narrower” standard of “reasonably 
certain” for identifying the scope of effects that could trigger requirements for consultation 
under ESA Section 7. Id. at 19,332–19,333. This narrower standard of “reasonably certain” 
remains today in the ESA regulations defining “indirect effect” and “cumulative effects.” 50 
C.F.R. § 402.02 (2017).  
264 Letter from Dan Ashe, Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, to The Honorable 
Rob Bishop, Chairman, H. Comm. on Natural Resources, FWS/AES/064378, at 2 (2016) (on 
file with author).  
265 DOI Hearing, supra note 257, at 52 (testimony of Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. De-
partment of the Interior). As explained in the 1986 preamble to the ESA regulations, the 
wildlife service agency “performs a strictly advisory function under section 7 by consulting 
with other Federal agencies . . . . However, the Federal agency makes the ultimate decision 
as to whether its proposed action will satisfy the requirements of section 7(a)(2).” 51 Fed. 
Reg. at 19,928. 
266 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 8, FINAL DRAFT BASELINE ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT, UPPER ANIMAS MINING DISTRICT 34 (2015) [hereinafter BASELINE RISK 
ASSESSMENT]. 
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Peak would likewise be unlikely.267 As for the third listed species, the Southwestern 
willow flycatcher, the dense riparian habitat that this species requires only exists 
miles downstream from the Gold King Mine, so again, any potential jeopardy to the 
species from investigatory work at the Gold King Mine would be extremely un-
likely.268 As for aquatic species, “it is unlikely that Cement Creek,” immediately 
below the Gold King Mine Level 7, “ever supported fish communities” due to the 
highly mineralized local geology.269 There are no threatened or endangered species 
of fish in the Animas River. Accordingly, as it was highly unlikely that the EPA’s 
investigation at the Gold King Mine Level 7 New Portal would jeopardize the con-
tinued existence of any listed species or critical habitat designated under the Endan-
gered Species Act, it was reasonable for the EPA not to engage in Section 7 consul-
tation before conducting this investigation.  
This conclusion comports with both common practice and common sense in the 
investigation of contaminated sites. If it were true that literally “all activi-
ties . . . funded . . . in whole or in part by Federal agencies” required consultation 
under ESA Section 7, then all site investigations across the United States would 
likely grind to a halt. This would include all site investigations performed by the 
EPA, of course, but also all site investigations by every other Federal agency, in-
cluding the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S. Forest Service, and the U.S. 
Army. This would include all site investigations performed by state agencies, local 
municipalities, tribal governments, and public universities which receive Federal 
funding.270 This would also include the substantial work of the Animas River Stake-
holders Group to investigate mine sites in the Animas River Watershed, which was 
funded “in whole or in part” by the EPA. Nobody would suggest that the ARSG’s 
work triggered ESA Section 7 consultation requirements. Similarly, suggestions that 
the EPA should have consulted under Section 7 before engaging in work at the Gold 
King Mine in the summer of 2015 should be dismissed as equally baseless. 
Of course, after the spill occurred on August 5, 2015, with the slug of sediment 
and metals moving hundreds of miles through the river system, there came a greater 
potential for affecting listed species and critical habitat. This might raise a new con-
cern for ESA Section 7 consultation, except that it is clear that the EPA did, in fact, 
consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service after the spill. According to ESA 
Section 7 regulations, “[w]here emergency circumstances mandate the need to 
                                                   
267 The Boreal toad requires “wet habitats (i.e., marshes, wet meadows, streams, beaver 
ponds, glacial kettle ponds, and lakes interspersed in subalpine forest),” quite unlike the dry, 
rocky slopes of Bonita Peak. See Endangered Species|Amphibians/Reptiles: Boreal toad 
(Anaxyrus boreas boreas), U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, https://www.fws.gov/mountain-
prairie/es/borealToad.php [https://perma.cc/H97G-GX34]. 
268 BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 266, at 24, 34. 
269 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGION 8, DRAFT BASELINE ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENT, UPPER ANIMAS MINING DISTRICT, FACT SHEET 1 (2015); see also Thompson, 
supra note 2, at 13 (“Nature, it turns out, is the biggest polluter in the watershed.”). 
270 Nearly half (approximately 48.3%) of the EPA’s annual budget is passed through 
the Agency to support State & Tribal Assistance Grants. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
FY2018 EPA BUDGET IN BRIEF 7 (2017).  
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consult in an expedited manner, consultation may be conducted informally through 
alternative procedures . . . .”271 The Animas River spill clearly constituted an “emer-
gency circumstance” authorizing the use of “alternative procedures.” According to 
these alternative procedures, “[t]he initial stages of emergency consultations usually 
are done by telephone or facsimile . . . .”272 Consistent with this expectation, within 
two hours of the spill, the National Response Center provided telephone notification 
to the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI).273  
Following that first official notification, DOI consulted with the EPA through-
out the spill response operation. On August 6, 2015, the day after the spill, DOI was 
in direct contact with the Navajo Nation and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service be-
gan assessing the potential impacts to wildlife.274 On August 11, 2015, Fish and 
Wildlife Service biologists from the FWS field office in Albuquerque, New Mexico, 
met at the EPA command post in Farmington with an EPA on-scene coordinator and 
a representative of the Navajo Nation before beginning a fish survey on the San Juan 
River below Farmington.275 On August 12, 2015, the FWS biologists completed their 
fish survey and reported their findings back to the EPA command post in Farming-
ton,276 concluding their real-time consultation on the emergency response.277  
“[A]fter the emergency is under control,” the ESA regulations on emergency 
consultation allow for the conduct of formal consultation.278 However, consistent 
with ESA Section 7 itself, the alternative procedures for emergency consultation 
only require formal consultation “if listed species or critical habitat have been ad-
versely affected.”279 In this case, there was no observed effect on listed species or 
critical habitat as a result of the spill from the Gold King Mine.280 In the San Juan 
                                                   
271 50 C.F.R. § 402.05(a) (2017). 
272 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERV., ENDANGERED 
SPECIES CONSULTATION HANDBOOK 8-1 (1998) [hereinafter CONSULTATION HANDBOOK].  
273 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. According to Secretary Jewell, DOI may 
have been contacted even sooner, through the Colorado Department of Public Health and 
Environment. See DOI Hearing, supra note 257, at 23 (statement of Sally Jewell, Secretary, 
U.S. Department of the Interior). 
274 DOI Hearing, supra note 257, at 22 (statement of Sally Jewell, Secretary, U.S. De-
partment of the Interior). 
275 See Durst & Franssen Field Report, supra note 257. 
276 Id.  
277 During emergency consultation, the role of the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) has 
been specifically described as “offer[ing] recommendations to minimize the effects of the 
emergency response action on listed species or their critical habitat.” CONSULTATION 
HANDBOOK, supra note 272, at 8-1. However, FWS personnel are also advised, “DO NOT 
stand in the way of the response efforts.” Id.  
278 50 C.F.R. § 402.05(b). 
279 CONSULTATION HANDBOOK, supra note 272, at 8-4. 
280 See Durst & Franssen Field Report, supra note 257 and accompanying text. In their 
report, FWS biologists Durst and Franssen documented seining for fishes on a channel of the 
San Juan River below Farmington. At one location, they captured 14 fish, including 2 en-
dangered Colorado Pikeminnows, and reported that, “[a]ll fish we encountered appeared to 
be healthy and in good condition.” Id. at 7. 
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River, there are threatened and endangered species, including the endangered Colo-
rado Pikeminnow (Ptychocheilus lucius) and the endangered Razorback Sucker 
(Xyrauchen texanus), together with designated critical habitat for both species.281 
The FWS field surveys on August 11 and 12, 2015 recovered and examined individ-
uals of the endangered Colorado Pikeminnow and other native fish species, and 
found no adverse impacts to these fishes.282 As such, there was no need for the EPA 
to proceed with formal consultation in this matter, and no further obligations under 
ESA for this emergency response. 
The unfortunate circumstances of the Gold King Mine spill understandably 
raised concerns for the protection of threatened and endangered species and their 
critical habitats. However, the summary declarations that the EPA’s actions at the 
Gold King Mine violated the Endangered Species Act were clearly both premature 
and wrong. Factually, there was no violation of the “take” prohibition of ESA Sec-
tion 9 and legally, there was no violation of the consultation requirements of ESA 
Section 7. Whatever else might be said about the EPA’s liabilities flowing from the 
Gold King Mine spill, violation of the Endangered Species Act was not one of them.  
 
B.  Clean Water Act 
 
Beyond the ESA, critics of the EPA also declared that the “EPA’s actions at the 
Gold King Mine violated the Clean Water Act . . . .”283 This declaration of liability 
may find greater justification than the declaration with respect to the ESA. However, 
important defenses remain to be considered. There are, in fact, fundamental differ-
ences between the mining companies who created the conditions allowing the Gold 
King Mine to fill with water and continuously discharge contaminated water and the 
actions of the EPA which attempted to address this problem. In view of those differ-
ences, this section will examine three important defenses available to the EPA and 
other environmental agencies and actors, based upon theories of permit exemptions, 
permitted releases, and sovereign immunity. 
Jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act (CWA) is generally triggered 
by any “discharge of a pollutant” from a point source to navigable waters.284 Under 
                                                   
281 U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, FINAL BIOLOGICAL OPINION FOR SAN JUAN RIVER 
NAVAJO IRRIGATION REHABILITATION AND IMPROVEMENT PROJECT—FRUITLAND-
CAMBRIDGE AND HOGBACK-CUDEI IRRIGATION UNITS—AND COLORADO RIVER SALINITY 
PROGRAM HABITAT REPLACEMENT (2018). In addition to the Colorado Pikeminnow and Ra-
zorback Sucker, other potentially affected fish species in the San Juan Basin include the 
endangered Zuni Bluehead Sucker (Catostomus discobolus yarrowi), and the threatened 
Greenback Cutthroat Trout (Salmo clarki stomias). See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife 
and Plants; Designation of Critical Habitat for the Zuni Bluehead Sucker, 79 Fed. Reg. 
43,132 (July 24, 2014); Listing of the Greenback Cutthroat as a Threatened Species, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 16,343 (Apr. 18, 1978). 
282 Durst & Franssen Field Report, supra note 257. 
283 MAJORITY STAFF REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
284 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2018) (declaring that, except as otherwise permitted under 
the statute, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful”); see also id. § 
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CWA Section 301, such a discharge is generally prohibited, unless subject to a per-
mit issued pursuant to the statute.285 “Pollutant” is defined broadly to include “in-
dustrial . . . waste.”286 “Point source” is defined broadly to mean “any discernable, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any . . . tun-
nel . . . .”287 Likewise, “navigable waters” are defined broadly to mean “the waters 
of the United States, including the territorial seas.”288 Pulling these definitions to-
gether, one can easily see how the Clean Water Act would apply to the Gold King 
Mine blowout. The tons of metals released with the three million gallons of mine 
water would constitute a “pollutant” from the mining industry. The Gold King Mine 
Level 7 adit is a “point source” as a “discernable, confined and discrete conveyance,” 
and specifically, a kind of “tunnel.” Finally, Cement Creek and the Animas River 
are “navigable waters” as defined to include “waters of the United States.”289 Thus, 
it would appear that the discharge from the Gold King Mine triggered by the EPA 
on August 5, 2015, established liability under the Clean Water Act—unless the EPA 
had a permit for this discharge, which it did not. As any other private party causing 
an unpermitted discharge of pollutants to navigable waters, the EPA might thus be-
come subject to substantial administrative, civil, and even criminal penalties for vi-
olation of the Clean Water Act.290 
One important defense to such liability appears directly within the regulations 
implementing the Clean Water Act. While the discharge of a pollutant from a point 
source to navigable waters generally requires a permit under the Clean Water Act, 
the regulations create several exclusions to this general rule.291 One exclusion ap-
plies to any discharge “in compliance with the instructions of an On-Scene Coordi-
nator . . . .”292 On the books for a quarter-century,293 this exclusion allows On-Scene 
                                                   
1362(12) (defining “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to nav-
igable waters from any point source”). 
285 33 U.S.C. § 1311. 
286 Id. § 1362(6). 
287 Id. § 1362(14). 
288 Id. § 1362(7). 
289 Many readers will recognize that the definition of “waters of the United States” 
remains one of the most controversial and contested terms in environmental law, the subject 
of multiple Supreme Court decisions and ongoing litigation. See generally JOEL A. MINTZ 
ET AL., A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 535–57 (2017). Neverthe-
less, as the Animas River is both “navigable-in-fact” (as attested by the vibrant paddling 
industry on the river) and an interstate water, there should be little doubt that the Animas 
River is a “waters of the United States” for purposes of the Clean Water Act. 40 C.F.R. § 
122.2(a)–(b) (2014). As a tributary to that interstate and navigable-in-fact Animas River, 
Cement Creek should also be uncontroverted as a “waters of the United States.” 40 C.F.R. § 
122.2(e) (2014). 
290 See generally 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (describing “enforcement” of the Clean Water Act). 
291 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.3 (2017). 
292 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(d).  
293 See 48 Fed. Reg. 14,157–14,158 (Apr. 1, 1983). While there appears no evidence 
that the CWA permit exclusion for discharges at the direction of an OSC at § 122.3(d) was 
ever subject to judicial challenge, the EPA’s authority to promulgate such an exclusion from 
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Coordinators (OSCs) the flexibility they need to address the challenging environ-
mental problems they must face in their work. As demonstrated by the Gold King 
Mine itself, mining contamination presents one the most challenging environmental 
problems, particularly where underground workings and water levels within a mine 
may be subject to many unknowns. Thus, any discharge that occurred at the direction 
of the OSCs at the Gold King Mine may be excluded from permitting requirements 
under the Clean Water Act.294 
Another defense to Clean Water Act liability in this case may be provided by 
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA).295 Recognizing the need for expeditious response to contaminated sites 
across the country, Congress included a “permit exemption” in CERCLA Section 
121. This exemption provides, “[n]o Federal, State, or local permit shall be required 
for the portion of any removal or remedial action conducted entirely onsite . . . .”296 
Under CERCLA, “removal” action is defined to include “such actions as may be 
necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazard-
ous substances . . . .”297 The EPA’s actions to assess and evaluate the ongoing re-
leases of contaminated mine water from the Gold King Mine Level 7 adit clearly fall 
within this definition of removal action. As such, “no . . . permit” under the federal 
Clean Water Act (or state counterpart) should have been required for the EPA’s work 
at the Gold King Mine, if this work was “conducted entirely onsite.” The statute 
does not define “onsite,” but such a definition is supplied by the regulations imple-
menting CERCLA. In these regulations, “on-site” is defined to mean “the areal ex-
tent of contamination and all suitable areas in very close proximity to the contami-
nation necessary for implementation of the response action.”298 For the Gold King 
Mine, the “areal extent of contamination” would include the several mine openings, 
associated piles of waste rock, and wherever wastes were carried from the mine 
opening by action of gravity, wind, and water. These areas would include the slopes 
                                                   
permitting requirements appears established through judicial review of other exclusions in 
this same enumerated list. In particular, judicial challenges to § 122.3(i) may be instructive. 
In the Catskill Mountains saga, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
twice rejected the argument that the transfer of water from one basin to another should be 
exempt from CWA permit requirements. Catskill Mountains Chap. of Trout Unlimited, Inc. 
v. City of New York (Catskill I), 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001); Catskill Mountains Chap. of 
Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York (Catskill II), 451 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2006). On the 
third try, after the EPA had formally promulgated this policy as a rule in 2008, the Second 
Circuit upheld the permit exclusion for water transfer, according Chevron deference to the 
EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Catskill Mountains Chap. of Trout Unlimited, 
Inc. v. EPA (Catskill III), 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017). 
294 Of course, even where a discharge occurred after instructions from an OSC, a factual 
question may remain as to whether the discharge occurred “in compliance with” such in-
structions. Such an inquiry in any particular case may ultimately require determinations by 
an appropriate finder of facts. 
295 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2018). 
296 Id. § 9621(d)(1). 
297 Id. § 9601(23). 
298 40 C.F.R. § 300.5. 
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and base of Bonita Peak as well as the waters and floodplains below Bonita Peak. 
The EPA’s investigatory work at the Gold King Mine Level 7 in the summer of 2015 
would therefore constitute actions within the “areal extent of contamination” and 
thus within the meaning of actions “conducted entirely onsite.” As such, another 
defense to Clean Water Act liability available to the EPA in this case may be the 
CERCLA “permit exemption” for removal actions “conducted entirely onsite.”  
A third defense to liability under the Clean Water Act for the Gold King Mine 
spill may be provided by the doctrine of sovereign immunity established in Ameri-
can common law. According to this doctrine, derived from a principle of English 
law that “the king can do no wrong,” sovereign entities cannot be held liable in a 
legal action unless they have waived their immunity to suit.299 For the federal gov-
ernment in particular, the U.S. Supreme Court has established that any waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be “unequivocal” and “construed strictly in favor of the 
sovereign.”300 Consistent with these rules, not only must the particular legal require-
ment clearly apply to the federal government, but the penalties associated with vio-
lation of the requirement must also be expressly extended to the federal government. 
The seminal opinion of the Supreme Court establishing these rules actually dealt 
directly with the federal government’s liability under the Clean Water Act as well 
as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The Court in Department 
of Energy v. Ohio recognized that the Clean Water Act generally applies to the fed-
eral government.301 However, the Court also found that the Clean Water Act had not 
unequivocally waived the federal government’s liability for all penalties under the 
statute.302 Soon after the Court’s decision in Department of Energy v. Ohio, Con-
gress amended RCRA303 and other statutes304 to establish clear, unequivocal waivers 
of sovereign immunity. But Congress has never amended the Clean Water Act to 
establish an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for penalties under the stat-
ute. Accordingly, even if the EPA’s actions at the Gold King Mine constituted a 
violation of the Clean Water Act, penalties against the EPA would not be available 
under the current state of the statute and Supreme Court precedent. 
                                                   
299 For an erudite introduction to the concept of sovereign immunity, and argument for 
rejecting it, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 
1202 (2001) (arguing that “[a] doctrine derived from the premise that ‘the King can do no 
wrong’ deserves no place in American law”). At the same time as he attacks sovereign im-
munity, however, Dean Chemerinsky recognizes that “sovereign immunity is not fading 
from American jurisprudence.” Id.  
300 Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (“We start with a common 
rule . . . that any waiver of the National Government’s sovereign immunity must be unequiv-
ocal . . . and constructed strictly in favor of the sovereign . . . .”). 
301 In fact, the obligation to comply with substantive provisions of the Clean Water Act 
was uncontested by the federal government. Id. at 613. 
302 Id. at 627 (noting that waiver of sovereign immunity for “punitive” penalties that is 
“less certain” fails to meet standard for “unequivocal” waiver). 
303 See infra note 309 and accompanying text. 
304 See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, § 
129, 110 Stat. 1613, 1660 (1996). 
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These three defenses, based upon the Clean Water Act permit exclusion, the 
CERCLA permit exemption, and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, should not be 
taken to excuse any wrongful conduct on behalf of any party including the federal 
government. However, these defenses may provide important safe harbors for any 
party engaging in the challenging work of dealing with contaminated sites such as 
the Gold King Mine. For example, the Clean Water Act permit exclusion for work 
conducted consistent with instructions from an OSC protects not only the employees 
and contractors of the EPA, but potentially other cooperating parties such as state 
and local personnel, community stakeholders, and responsible parties conducting 
response actions under agency oversight. Likewise, the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity protects not only the federal government from suit, but potentially other sov-
ereign governments, including states and tribes.305 As such, it may be important for 
all concerned parties to understand the applicability and contours of these protec-
tions, to encourage their continued engagement in efforts to address contaminated 
sites.  
 
C.  Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)306 is the primary federal 
statute providing for the safe handling, treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and 
hazardous wastes in the United States. Critics of the EPA’s response to the Gold 
King Mine spill, including the State of New Mexico,307 have attempted to use RCRA 
to hold the EPA or EPA contractors liable for the “disposal of solid and/or hazardous 
wastes . . . in the Animas and San Juan Rivers . . . .”308 In favor of this claim, the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity poses no limitation to suit against federal agencies 
under RCRA, as sovereign immunity under RCRA, unlike sovereign immunity un-
der the Clean Water Act, has been waived by Congress “unequivocally.”309 
                                                   
305 For example, while CERCLA expressly waives the sovereign immunity of state 
governments, it does not so waive the sovereign immunity of tribal governments. See 42 
U.S.C. § 9601(21) (defining “person” to include a “State” and any “political subdivision of 
a State,” but not any “Tribe” or tribal government). But see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding that Congress generally lacks authority to abrogate the immunity 
of states under the Eleventh Amendment). 
306 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939g (2017). The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), amended the earlier Solid Waste Disposal 
Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89–272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965), which sought primarily to promote 
the proper disposal of refuse and recycling of waste materials. See generally RODGERS, supra 
note 101, at 531–35.  
307 See Complaint, State of New Mexico v. United States, et al., Civ. Action No. 1:16-
cv-00465-KK-LF (D.N.M. May 23, 2016) [hereinafter NM Complaint]. 
308 Id. at 35–36 (stating that the “Third Cause of Action” seeking injunctive relief under 
RCRA against parties including EPA contractor Environmental Restoration).  
309  
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of the Federal Government . . . shall be subject to, and comply 
with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both substance and 
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However, in response to the Gold King Mine spill, action under RCRA will likely 
be rejected by limitations under RCRA established by the Bevill Amendment and 
the RCRA citizen suit provisions, as this section will discuss. 
 
1.  Bevill Amendment 
 
The RCRA program for safe handling, treatment, storage, and disposal of haz-
ardous wastes, 310 known as “Subtitle C,” attempts to effect a system of “cradle to 
grave” management of hazardous wastes, from the point of generation through trans-
portation, storage, and ultimate treatment and disposal.311 The Subtitle C regulatory 
regime generally begins with the identification of some “hazardous waste.”312 For 
purposes of Subtitle C regulation, “hazardous waste” may encompass a broad range 
of substances commonly associated with hardrock mining, including forms of arse-
nic, lead, and mercury.313 However, in 1980, Congress effectively removed most 
mining wastes from regulation as hazardous waste under Subtitle C through addition 
to RCRA of a provision known as the “Bevill Amendment.”314 Under the Bevill 
                                                   
procedural . . . respecting control and abatement of solid waste and hazardous 
waste disposal and management in the same manner, and to the same extent, as 
any person is subject to such requirements. . . . The Federal, State, interstate and 
local substantive and procedural requirements referred to in this subsection in-
clude, but are not limited to, all administrative orders and all civil and administra-
tive penalties and fines, regardless of whether such penalties or fines are punitive 
or coercive in nature or are imposed for isolated, intermittent, or continuing vio-
lations. The United States hereby expressly waives any sovereign immunity oth-
erwise applicable to the United States . . . .  
 
42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (2017) (emphasis added). This provision was amended by Congress in 
Fall 1992 to effect an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity under RCRA following the 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court earlier that spring in Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 
607 (1992), which held that the waiver of sovereign immunity then under RCRA and the 
Clean Water was not unequivocal. Congress responded immediately to the decision by en-
acting the Federal Facility Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961). Unfortunately for the interests of environmental protection, 
Congress never got around to amending the Clean Water Act in order to effect a similar 
unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. For a more complete analysis of waivers of sov-
ereign immunity in federal environmental law, see generally Kenneth M. Murchison, Waiv-
ers of Sovereign Immunity in Federal Environmental Statutes of the Twenty-First Century: 
Correcting a Confusing Mess, 32 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 359 (2008). 
310 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921–6939e. 
311 RODGERS, supra note 101, at 531. 
312 42 U.S.C. § 6921. “Hazardous waste” may be identified either by specific designa-
tion in EPA regulations, 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.31–33, or by means of exhibiting at least one of 
four hazardous “characteristics,” 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(a)(2)(i). 
313 40 C.F.R. § 261.33(e). 
314 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A). On its face, the Bevill Amendment only prohibited Sub-
title C regulation of certain wastes until various studies were completed. Id. Almost 40 years 
later, the Bevill Amendment remains an enduring block to Subtitle C regulations of mining 
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Amendment, Subtitle C regulation is generally barred for any “solid waste from the 
extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and minerals . . . .”315 In this context, 
“extraction” generally means mining, the process of removing materials from the 
ground, and “beneficiation” generally means “milling,” the process of crushing the 
ore and separating out the valuable minerals.316 These terms are directly applicable 
to the contaminants from the Gold King Mine spill. While the Animas River has 
been contaminated with wastes from mining and milling for more than a century,317 
the discharge from the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015, was the direct conse-
quence of mining activity on Bonita Peak. In short, no Gold King Mine, no possible 
blowout from the Gold King Mine. 
This conclusion comports with the congressional purposes behind the Bevill 
Amendment, which recognized the impracticability of maintaining “cradle to grave” 
management for certain “high volume, low toxicity wastes.”318 Clearly, the three 
million gallons of mine water from the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015, was a 
“high volume” event. And yet, there was no documented impact on fish or any other 
species, suggesting “low toxicity” waste. As “high volume/low toxicity” waste from 
the “extraction . . . of ores and minerals,” mine water from the Gold King Mine, as 
discharged on August 5, 2015, and on every other day over the past century, should 
be subject to the Bevill Amendment and thus exempt from regulation as “hazardous 
waste” under RCRA Subtitle C. 
 
2.  Citizen Suit Provisions 
 
While mine waste is generally exempt from regulation under RCRA as “haz-
ardous waste,” it may still be addressed under RCRA as “solid waste.” RCRA de-
fines “solid waste” broadly to include any “discarded material, including solid, liq-
uid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, 
mining, and agricultural operations.”319 Thus, waste from the Gold King Mine seems 
to be within RCRA’s definition of solid waste. However, in order to compel action 
to address concerns for solid waste, prospective plaintiffs, including states and 
tribes, must bring claims under the citizen suit provision of RCRA Section 7002.320 
The RCRA citizen suit section may pose two distinct challenges to maintaining an 
                                                   
wastes. For a thorough examination of the Bevill Amendment in the context of mining 
wastes, see Steven R. Barringer, The RCRA Bevill Amendment: A Lasting Relief for Mining 
Wastes?, 17 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 155 (2003). 
315 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
316 Barringer, supra note 314, at 155. 
317 See supra Section III.B (describing how the City of Durango was forced to find 
alternate water source in 1902 due to discharge of wastes from mills upstream in Silverton 
area). 
318 See Envtl. Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (re-
counting legislative history of the Bevill Amendment). 
319 RCRA § 1004, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). The statutory definition also includes certain 
exclusions, such as for “domestic sewage,” but no reference to the Bevill Amendment. 
320 See 42 U.S.C. § 6972. 
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action in response to the Gold King Mine spill: first, the prospective plaintiff must 
show that its intended action is not preempted by certain other ongoing actions to 
address the same discharge;321 and second, the prospective plaintiff would have to 
meet a burden of proving that conditions caused by the discharge “may present an 
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”322 Each of 
these requirements will be discussed briefly below. 
The RCRA Section 7002 requirement to prove that a discharge “may present 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” stands out 
as an exception to the more common rule of strict liability for violations of federal 
environmental law. For example, in actions brought for violations of RCRA Subtitle 
C, the EPA need only establish “that any person has violated or is in violation of any 
requirement . . . .”323 To bring suit under RCRA Section 7002, however, the plaintiff 
must prove more than simply “any . . . violation,” but must establish that the dis-
charge resulted in some potential endangerment to human health or the environment. 
Courts have recognized that this standard does not require evidence of any actual 
injury to human health or the environment.324 However, the plain language of the 
provision does require proof of at least some potential endangerment that is both 
“imminent” and “substantial.”325 Three years and counting after the Gold King Mine 
plume passed, it may be difficult to establish that any “endangerment” remains both 
imminent and substantial. One might suggest that some danger lies in the metals 
released by the spill on August 5, 2015, some of which likely remain in the sediments 
of the Animas and San Juan Rivers. However, whether any danger from these metals 
remains “imminent” and “substantial,” particularly in light of the metals also re-
leased on any of the other 34,000 days since the Gold King Mine effectively shut 
down in 1923, remains to be seen. 
The biggest problem with action under RCRA Section 7002 for the Gold King 
Mine spill probably lies in the preemption provisions of Section 7002. Under Section 
7002(b),326 “[n]o action may be commenced” unless several conditions are satisfied. 
One of these conditions is that the plaintiff must give notice of the violation at least 
                                                   
321 Id. § 6972(b)(2)(B). 
322 Id. § 6972(a)(1)(B). 
323 Id. § 6928(a)(1). 
324 See, e.g., Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Grant, 575 F.3d 1013, 1020 (10th Cir. 
2007) (stating that “Endangerment,” for purposes of RCRA’s imminent hazard provision, 
“has been interpreted by courts to mean a threatened or potential harm,” not necessarily proof 
of actual harm to health or the environment).  
325 For a thorough study of judicial interpretations of the “imminent and substantial” 
endangerment provisions of RCRA and other environmental statutes, see generally Charles 
de Saillan, The Use of Imminent Hazard Provisions of Environmental Laws to Compel 
Cleanup at Federal Facilities, 27 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 110–17 (2008) and accompanying 
notes. As concluded by Mr. de Saillan, while courts have construed the “imminent hazard” 
provisions “quite liberally,” courts may still reject a finding of endangerment where the risk 
of harm “is remote in time, completely speculative in nature, or de minimis in degree,” or 
where the cause of the endangerment “no longer presents such a danger.” Id. at 110–11 (ci-
tations omitted).  
326 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b). 
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 313 
 
sixty days before filing the action.327 Another condition is that “[n]o action may be 
commenced . . . if the [EPA], in order to restrain or abate acts or conditions which 
may have contributed . . . to the activities which may present the alleged endanger-
ment” takes one or more actions under CERCLA, including “actually engaging in a 
removal action” under CERCLA or “incur[ing] costs to initiate a Remedial Investi-
gation and Feasibility Study” under CERCLA.328 The policy choices of Congress 
behind this preemption provision are apparent: there should be no need for citizen 
litigation under RCRA if the EPA is already working to address the same contami-
nated site under CERCLA.  
This, in fact, is what the EPA is doing now for the Gold King Mine. As the 
State of New Mexico expressly acknowledged in its civil complaint, “[o]n January 
15, 2016—one day after New Mexico served its RCRA notice letter—EPA released 
an ‘action memorandum,’ which documents EPA’s decision to undertake an emer-
gency removal action under CERCLA Section 104 after the Gold King Mine blow-
out.”329 The EPA’s “action memorandum” documented that the EPA was “actually 
engaging in a removal action” for the Gold King Mine blowout, an emergency re-
moval action that actually began the day of the blowout and continued for many 
weeks and months.330 Therefore, the EPA was “actually engaging in a removal ac-
tion” before plaintiffs, including New Mexico, filed their RCRA complaint or even 
filed their RCRA notice of intent to sue. Moreover, it may also be possible that the 
EPA “incurred costs to initiate a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study” un-
der CERCLA before New Mexico or other plaintiffs filed their civil complaint or 
RCRA notice of intent to sue in this case. Among other things, an early component 
of a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS) is an assessment of risks 
to ecological resources posed by contamination.331 Via contractor, the EPA actually 
completed such a Baseline Ecological Risk Assessment in April 2015,332 four 
months before the Gold King Mine blowout. 
The preemption provisions of federal environmental statutes, including RCRA, 
have been interpreted strictly by courts as establishing conditions precedent to sue; 
in other words, unless these conditions have been met fully, courts are without ju-
risdiction to hear a case. This principle was demonstrated most notably in the case 
                                                   
327 Id. § 6972(b)(1)(A). Notice must be given to the EPA, the state where the violation 
occurs, and the alleged violator. Id. The State of New Mexico implicitly recognized this 
notice requirement when it averred that it had provided notice of intent to sue under RCRA 
on January 14, 2016. NM Complaint, supra note 307, at 36. 
328 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B).  
329 NM Complaint, supra note 307, at 37.  
330 Action Memorandum from Shaun McGrath, EPA Region 8 Adm’r et al., to Mathy 
Stanislaus, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Land & Emergency Mgmt. (Jan. 13, 2016) [hereinaf-
ter Action Memorandum] (documenting emergency removal action with Removal Start Date 
of “8/5/2015”) (on file with author).  
331 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 
GUIDANCE FOR SUPERFUND: PROCESS FOR DESIGNING AND CONDUCTING ECOLOGICAL RISK 
ASSESSMENTS, INTERIM FINAL (1997). 
332 BASELINE RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 266. 
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of Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S 20 (1989), where the U.S. Supreme 
Court dismissed a case that had been in litigation for many years for the plaintiffs’ 
failure to strictly follow the notice provisions of RCRA Section 7002. While Hall-
strom addressed the notice provisions of RCRA Section 7002, the same judicial re-
sponse may be expected for enforcing other conditions precedent established by 
RCRA Section 7002. The EPA was “actually engaging in a removal action” before 
the RCRA complaint was filed in this case, and the EPA had likely “incurred costs 
to initiate an [RI/FS].” Therefore, as in Hallstrom, it may be expected that courts 
will dismiss the RCRA claims in this case.333 More broadly, such dismissal would 
be consistent with the concepts of judicial efficiency inherent in the RCRA citizen 
suit provisions, reserving RCRA authorities for cases where no other remedial au-
thorities, such as CERCLA, may be available. 
 
D.  Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
 
Jurisdiction under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is generally established by a “release” (or 
substantial threat of release) of a “hazardous substance” into the “environment.”334 
For jurisdictional purposes, “hazardous substance” under CERCLA is a broader cat-
egory of substances than “hazardous waste” under RCRA, unrestricted by the RCRA 
Bevill Amendment.335 Among other things, “hazardous substances” under CERCLA 
include most metals associated with hardrock mining contamination, including ar-
senic, cadmium, lead, mercury, and zinc.336 Accordingly, CERCLA represents the 
primary federal authority for addressing contamination from hardrock mining in the 
United States.337  
                                                   
333 In one early judicial decision in the Gold King Mine litigation, the U.S. District 
Court of New Mexico denied a motion to dismiss filed by one EPA contractor, finding that, 
“as pleaded, Plaintiffs may be able to prove facts establishing that [the EPA contractor] meets 
the definition of an operator” for purposes of CERCLA liability. New Mexico v. EPA, 310 
F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1245 (D.N.M. 2018). 
334 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1). For definitions of “release,” “hazardous substance,” and 
“environment,” see 42 U.S.C. § 9601. 
335 While the mining industry initially argued that the Bevill Amendment should apply 
to CERCLA hazardous substances, courts did not agree and now “continue to routinely hold 
that even if a material is clearly exempted from RCRA regulation under the Bevill Amend-
ment, it can nonetheless be a hazardous substance under CERCLA.” P.B. “Lynn” Walker-
Coffey, The Circle of CERCLA or Is the Silver Tarnished, 43 ROCKY MOUNTAIN MIN. L. 
FOUND. J. 283, 294 (2006) (summarizing cases dismissing Bevill Amendment arguments in 
CERCLA litigation). 
336 40 C.F.R. § 302.4. 
337 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 61, at 72. For further background on the 
massive contamination resulting from a century of mining in the Coeur d’Alene River Basin 
of northern Idaho, and the EPA’s decades of efforts to address these problems under 
CERCLA, see Villa, supra note 80, at 256–63. For a comprehensive analysis of the chal-
lenges and opportunities with applying CERCLA authorities to hardrock mining contamina-
tion, see generally Seymour, supra note 16. 
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CERCLA jurisdiction clearly applies to the Gold King Mine, where releases of 
hazardous substances including high concentrations of cadmium, copper, and zinc 
made the Gold King Mine a high priority for CERCLA response.338 In fact, the EPA 
was acting under CERCLA jurisdiction to conduct a “Removal Assessment” at the 
Gold King Mine when the blowout occurred on August 5, 2015.339 The question for 
the Gold King Mine spill is not really one of CERCLA jurisdiction, but of CERCLA 
liability. Unlike the Clean Water Act, for example, CERCLA liability applies com-
prehensively to federal agencies, given a broad waiver of sovereign immunity under 
CERCLA.340 Applying the CERCLA waiver of sovereign immunity, the EPA could 
be liable in appropriate circumstances “in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent . . . as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section [107] of 
this title.”341 Thus, to evaluate the CERCLA liability of the EPA—and other poten-
tial responders under CERCLA, including state agencies and response contractors—
we need to examine the general liability scheme of CERCLA. 
CERCLA is infamous for its “draconian liability.”342 Like most other federal 
environmental statutes, CERCLA Section 107343 begins with a presumption of strict 
liability. To strict liability, CERCLA adds retroactive liability plus joint and several 
liability.344 Retroactive liability under CERCLA—that is, liability that reaches con-
duct or circumstances prior to passage of the CERCLA statute in 1980—may be an 
                                                   
338 2014 POLREP, supra note 199, at 3. 
339 See id. at 5 (anticipating “additional work to reopen the [Gold King Mine] portal” 
in 2015). 
340 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a); see United States v. Shell Oil Co., 294 F.3d 1045, 1051–53 
(9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting U.S. defense to CERCLA liability based on sovereign immunity); 
Clare Bienvenu, United States v. Shell Oil Co.: The Tension of CERCLA Arranger Liability 
for Government Wartime Production Facilities, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 199, 200–01 (2002) 
(discussing Shell Oil Co. and, more broadly, waiver of sovereign immunity under CERCLA). 
Indeed, many of the costliest CERCLA sites in the United States are federal facilities, in-
cluding the nuclear weapons complex managed by the U.S. Department of Energy. High-
Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Oth-
ers, U.S. GAO (Feb. 2017), https://www.gao.gov/highrisk/us_government_environmen-
tal_liability/why_did_study [https://perma.cc/CL96-6V4H]. According to one recent study 
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) between 1989 and 2016 spent more than $164 billion to address the cleanup of nuclear 
and hazardous waste at 107 contaminated sites across the country. Id. And yet, DOE’s envi-
ronmental liability roughly doubled in the last ten years, from $176 billion in 1997 to an 
estimated $372 billion in 2016. Id. Half of this liability is associated with cleanup at just two 
designated CERCLA sites: Hanford in Washington State and the Savannah River Site in 
South Carolina. Id.  
341 42 U.S.C. § 9620(a)(1). 
342 See Emilee Mooney Scott, Bona Fide Protection: Fulfilling CERCLA’s Legislative 
Purpose by Applying Differing Definitions of “Disposal,” 42 CONN. L. REV. 957, 960 n.8 
(2010) (cataloging ubiquitous scholarly references to the “draconian liability” of CERCLA). 
343 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
344 For a thorough overview of the CERCLA liability scheme as of 2017, see MINTZ, 
supra note 289, at 765–841. 
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important authority for regulators to hold certain parties liable for present contami-
nation that may have originated in the past.345 Retroactive liability in the case of the 
Gold King Mine may be an important authority to pursue cleanup costs from the 
mining companies (or their corporate successors) who profited from the mining ac-
tivities in the San Juan Mountains and remain most directly responsible for the pre-
sent contamination in the Animas River watershed. Retroactive liability will likely 
not apply to CERCLA responders, however, as such responders would not have been 
responding under CERCLA prior to CERCLA’s enactment in 1980. CERCLA re-
sponders may be liable, however, under doctrines of strict liability as well as joint 
and several liability, as will be considered below.  
 
1.  Strict Liability 
 
CERCLA Section 107 specifically establishes four categories of “Potentially 
Responsible Parties” (PRPs), two of which are (1) the current “owner and operator” 
of a facility; and (2) the owner or operator of a facility “at the time of disposal.”346 
For the prima facie case against these PRPs, it is generally irrelevant whether they 
had anything to do with causing an actual release on the facility they own or operate; 
if they own or operate a facility where there has been a release of hazardous sub-
stances, they presumptively own any associated CERCLA liability as well.347 As an 
owner and operator of facilities where there has been a release of hazardous sub-
stances, the EPA has, in fact, agreed to carry out response actions as a PRP in the 
past.348 In the context of the Gold King Mine, the EPA and EPA contractors might 
be seen as strictly liable as the operators of the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015, 
with an EPA On-Scene Coordinator and EPA contractors directing and actually car-
rying out field operations including the use of heavy equipment at the site.349 How-
ever, overlooked or ignored by some critics of the EPA’s response to the Gold King 
                                                   
345 See, e.g., United States v. Asarco Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1101 (D. Idaho 2003) 
(holding mining companies liable under CERCLA for disposal activities that occurred “over 
100 years of mining in the Coeur d’Alene Basin” of northern Idaho).  
346 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (2018). 
347 For one of the seminal cases on strict liability as an owner/operator under CERCLA, 
see New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that 
CERCLA “unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current owner of a facility,” even if 
all disposal activities on the property occurred before the current owner acquired the prop-
erty). 
348 See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND RECORD OF DECISION: OLD 
NAVY DUMP MANCHESTER LABORATORY (1998) (noting that EPA is the current owner and 
operator of a laboratory in Manchester, Washington, where prior disposal practices by the 
U.S. Navy resulted in its designation on the CERCLA National Priorities List). 
349 In one early judicial decision in the Gold King Mine litigation, the United States 
District Court for the District of New Mexico denied a motion to dismiss filed by one EPA 
contractor, finding that, “as pleaded, Plaintiffs may be able to prove facts establishing that 
[the EPA contractor] meets the definition of an operator” for purposes of CERCLA liability. 
N.M. on Behalf of N.M. Eviron. Dep’t v. U.S. EPA, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1245 (D.N.M. 
2018). 
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Mine blowout,350 CERCLA also contains specific provisions to protect CERCLA 
responders from strict liability and thus avoid the disincentives to response action 
that might otherwise follow from the threat of strict liability. 
One provision that may protect some CERCLA responders from strict liability 
is the so-called “Good Samaritan” provision of CERCLA Section 107(d).351 Under 
this provision, “no party” that takes “action . . . in the course of rendering care, as-
sistance, or advice” in accordance with the implementing rules of CERCLA352 or at 
the direction of a CERCLA On-Scene Coordinator “with respect to an incident cre-
ating a danger to public health or welfare or the environment as a result of any re-
lease of a hazardous substance,” shall be subject to strict liability. Such parties shall 
only be liable for costs or damages “as a result of negligence on the part of such 
person.”353 Because “no party” shall be strictly liable, protection from CERCLA li-
ability may be extended broadly to state agencies, such as the Colorado Division of 
Reclamation, Mining and Safety (DRMS); municipalities, such as the City of Farm-
ington, New Mexico; private parties, such as construction contractors; and volunteer 
organizations, such as the Animas River Stakeholders Group. Courts have generally 
taken a broad understanding of the CERCLA Good Samaritan provision and specif-
ically applied it in the context of hardrock mining contamination.354 Accordingly, 
                                                   
350 See, e.g., LARKIN, JR. & SEIBLER, supra note 60, at 2 (“[T]he EPA claims to have a 
different interpretation of federal law for ‘polluters’ and ‘responders.’ No statute makes that 
distinction, however, nor does any federal law establish a ‘responders’ defense to environ-
mental liability.”). This assertion by Larkin and Seibler is demonstrably false, as may be 
confirmed by a quick perusal of the CERCLA Table of Contents, which identifies such pro-
visions as Section 9607(d) (“Rendering care or advice”) and Section 9619 (“Response action 
contractors”). See infra notes 351–360 and accompanying text for discussion of these provi-
sions, and the specific “responders” defenses to environmental liability that they effect. 
351 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d). For analysis of the legislative history of the CERCLA Good 
Samaritan provision and its specific application in the context of hardrock mining contami-
nation, see Bart Lounsbury, Digging Out of the Holes We’ve Made: Hardrock Mining, Good 
Samaritans, and the Need for Comprehensive Action, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 174–
75 (2008). A recent comment erroneously characterized the CERCLA Good Samaritan pro-
vision as providing indemnity for EPA contractors. Shriver, supra note 179, at 1010–11. In 
actuality, this CERCLA provision does nothing of the kind. “[S]imply stated, indemnity is 
an obligation by one party to make another whole for a loss that the other party has incurred.” 
41 AM. JUR. 2d Indemnity § 1. Nothing in CERCLA Section 107(d) creates any obligation to 
make a contractor or any other party “whole for a loss that the other party has incurred,” it 
simply may relieve a party from liability created under the CERCLA statute. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9607(d). 
352 As indicated in CERCLA § 107(d)(1), the rules implementing CERCLA are known 
commonly as the “National Contingency Plan.” See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d); 40 C.F.R. § 300. 
353 42 U.S.C. § 9607(d)(1). Even more, for actions taken “in response to an emergency 
created by the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance,” state and local gov-
ernments shall not be liable unless they acted with “gross negligence or intentional miscon-
duct.” Id. § 9607(d)(2).  
354 See, e.g., United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 1432, 1443 (E.D. 
Cal. 1995) (observing that “CERCLA expressly addresses the liability of those who act in a 
remedial capacity . . . and provides them with protection from strict liability”). 
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parties assisting in any CERCLA response action, to include assistance with re-
sponse to the Gold King Mine, should have no fear of CERCLA liability, even when 
things go wrong, as long as they remain consistent with the CERCLA Good Samar-
itan provision. 
Another provision of CERCLA providing protections from strict liability is 
Section 119, which generally confers liability protections on “response action con-
tractors” and certain government employees.355 As with the CERCLA Good Samar-
itan provision, the CERCLA Response Action Contractor provision preserves po-
tential liability in cases of conduct that is “negligent, grossly negligent, or which 
constitutes intentional misconduct,”356 but relieves the prospect of strict liability un-
der CERCLA for any “person who is a response action contractor with respect to 
any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance . . . .”357 For purposes of 
this liability protection, CERCLA defines “response action contractor” broadly to 
mean generally any party who enters an agreement with the EPA or other federal 
agencies, or an agreement with any “State or political subdivision,” or with any PRP 
performing work under order or settlement with the EPA, to provide for any 
CERCLA removal or remedial action.358 The policy supporting this liability protec-
tion is readily apparent. Given the inherent hazards of working with hazardous sub-
stances, no rational contractor would eagerly agree to undertake such work without 
substantial liability protections. For similar reasons, Congress also extended the Re-
sponse Action Contractor protection to subcontractors and consultants359 and to any 
                                                   
355 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a). 
356 Id. § 9619(a)(2). 
357 Id. § 9619(a)(1). In her comment, Shriver asserts that CERCLA Section 119 “grants 
Response Action Contractors broad indemnification from liability . . . .” Shriver, supra note 
179, at 1018 n.99 (emphasis added). Section 119 clearly does not grant indemnity to any 
party. Section 119 merely authorizes the federal government to indemnify some Response 
Action Contractors in certain cases. Id. § 9619(c)(1) (providing “The President may agree”). 
Such indemnity, however, must be established in a separate “written agreement.” Id. § 
9619(c)(2). Nowhere does Shriver identify a “written agreement” providing indemnity to the 
Response Action Contractors working on the Gold King Mine. Shriver specifically focuses 
on Environmental Restoration, LLC, the EPA’s lead contractor for the work at the Gold King 
Mine, alleging that Environmental Restoration enjoyed “broad sweeping indemnity” from 
the EPA for any potential liability at the site. Shriver, supra note 179, at 1020. However, the 
actual contract with the EPA provided Environmental Restoration no “sweeping indemnity” 
nor any indemnity whatsoever. Emergency and Rapid Response Services Contract between 
U.S. EPA, Region 8, and Environmental Restoration, LLC (April 11, 2013) (on file with 
author).  
358 42 U.S.C. § 9619(e). The definition of “response action contractor” exhibits some 
circularity, as “response action contractor” is defined as one who enters a “response action 
contract,” which itself is defined as a contract “entered into by a response action contractor.” 
Id. § 9619(e)(1). Nonetheless, the intent and effect of the Response Action Contractor pro-
vision remains clear. 
359 Id. § 9619(e)(2)(B) (defining “response action contractor” as extending to “any per-
son who is retained or hired by a [response action contractor]”). 
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“state employee or an employee of a political subdivision who provides services 
relating to response action while acting within the scope of his authority . . . .”360  
Applying this liability protection in the context of the Gold King Mine, we can 
see that the EPA contractors and subcontractors retained to perform the CERCLA 
removal assessment in the summer of 2015 should be protected from strict liability 
as “response action contractors.” This liability protection should also extend to em-
ployees of the Colorado DRMS and to all state and local employees and contractors 
engaged in the CERCLA response to the Gold King Mine spill. Without proof of 
negligent conduct or more, none of these agencies, private parties, or employees 
should worry about strict liability under CERCLA as a result of their assistance with 
CERCLA actions in the Animas River watershed that both preceded and followed 
the spill. For all these parties, given the protections of both the CERCLA Good Sa-
maritan provision and the Response Action Contractor provision, the general rule of 
strict liability under CERCLA should not apply for CERCLA responders in the Ani-
mas River watershed or other contaminated sites. 
 
2.  Joint and Several Liability 
 
In addition to retroactive liability and strict liability, the “draconian liability” 
scheme of CERCLA also provides for joint and several liability, whereby one liable 
party could be held liable for the entire cost of cleaning up a site contaminated by 
multiple parties. While joint and several liability is not articulated in the language 
of the CERCLA statute, courts have followed the seminal opinion in United States 
v. Chem-Dyne Corp.,361 which examined the legislative history of CERCLA to find 
a rebuttable presumption of joint and several liability under CERCLA. Under the 
theory of joint and several liability, one might suggest that the EPA or any other 
CERCLA responder could be held liable for the entire cost of cleaning up the Ani-
mas River watershed because some amount of metals from the Gold King Mine spill 
on August 5, 2015, remain in the watershed today. Any such suggestion, however, 
would evince a fundamental misunderstanding of joint and several liability under 
CERCLA. 
From the beginning, joint and several liability under CERCLA was always 
simply a presumption, one that could be rebutted according to “common law princi-
ples.”362 In Chem-Dyne, Chief Judge Rubin found that the appropriate “common law 
principles” for determining joint and several liability under CERCLA were set forth 
in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provided the familiar rule: 
 
                                                   
360 Id. § 9619(a)(4). 
361 United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a dis-
cussion of joint and several liability under CERCLA, and the courts that embraced the Chem-
Dyne decision, see MINTZ ET AL., supra note 289, at 826–841. Among other courts embrac-
ing the Chem-Dyne analysis was the U.S. Supreme Court. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–14 (2009). 
362 See Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 806 (quoting comments from Senator Randolph, 
sponsor of the CERCLA bill that became enacted into law in 1980). 
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[W]hen two or more persons acting independently caused a distinct or sin-
gle harm for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the 
contribution of each, each is subject to liability only for the portion of the 
total harm that he has himself caused.363 
 
Since Chem-Dyne in 1983, courts have accepted various means for determining 
a “reasonable basis for division” of liability under CERCLA. The U.S. Supreme 
Court, for example, in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United 
States,364 affirmed a calculation of CERCLA liability based upon three factors: the 
relative area of land ownership at the contaminated site, the percentage of time each 
party held ownership in the property, and the percentage of chemicals released at the 
property.365 In the specific context of comingled mining contamination in northern 
Idaho, a federal court found a “reasonable basis” for allocating CERCLA liability 
based on historical records of mining production and disposal attributed to individ-
ual mining companies.366  
Applying the original and enduring “common law principles” of joint and sev-
eral liability to the Gold King Mine, the blowout discharged approximately three 
million gallons of mine water, containing some 540 tons of metals (primarily iron 
and aluminum) on August 5, 2015.367 According to peer-reviewed, scientific esti-
mates, this is about same amount of metals released to the Animas River in “two 
days of high spring runoff.”368 In fact, according to some estimates, the three million 
gallons of mine water discharged on August 5, 2015, is exceeded every single day 
by the collective discharge of some 5.4 million gallons of mine water to the sur-
rounding Animas River watershed.369 Moreover, some of these mines in the Animas 
River watershed may have discharged wastes for over a century. As such, whatever 
share of CERCLA liability the EPA might have for the blowout on August 5, 2015, 
under common law principles of joint and several liability, it must be the proverbial 
                                                   
363 Id. at 810. 
364 556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
365 Id. at 613–19. A number of commentators decried these rough mathematics and even 
proclaimed the “end of joint and several liability” under CERCLA. See, e.g., Aaron Ger-
shonowitz, The End of Joint and Several Liability in Superfund Litigation: From Chem-Dyne 
to Burlington Northern, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 83 (2012); William C. Tucker, All Is Number: 
Mathematics, Divisibility and Apportionment Under Burlington Northern, 21 FORDHAM 
ENVTL. L. REV. 479 (2010). However, other commentators were more reserved in their re-
sponse, emphasizing application of the original principles of joint and several liability first 
articulated in Chem-Dyne. See, e.g., Steve C. Gold, Dis-Jointed? Several Approaches to Di-
visibility After Burlington Northern, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 307 (2009). 
366 United States v. Asarco, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1121 (D. Idaho 2003) (finding 
reasonable basis for divisibility of CERCLA liability supported by determination that 
“Asarco is responsible for contributing 22% of the [mine] tailings and Hecla is responsible 
for contributing 31% of the [mine] tailings” to the Coeur d’Alene River basin).  
367 ORD REPORT, supra note 5, at ii. 
368 Id.  
369 ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 2. 
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“drop in a bucket” compared to the amount of metals and volume of mine water 
released into the Animas River watershed over the history of mining in the region. 
More fundamentally, talk of the EPA’s liability under CERCLA for response 
to the Gold King Mine spill is largely misdirected370 given the EPA’s affirmative 
mission under CERCLA to protect human health and the environment. In further-
ance of this mission, the EPA is likely to spend far more for cleanup as a CERCLA 
responder, addressing a legacy of mine contamination throughout the Animas River 
watershed, than as a liable party under CERCLA making amends for one day of 
releases from the Gold King Mine. To protect human health and the environment, 
the EPA exercises legal authorities and funding under CERCLA to conduct assess-
ment activities and discrete “removal actions”371 to address most contaminated sites. 
The largest, most contaminated sites may require long-term “remedial actions.”372 
CERCLA begins with a presumption that the “polluter pays” for cleanup, whether 
removal or remedial action, and over the history of CERCLA implementation, that 
has largely been true.373 One of the major exceptions to this, however, has been the 
mining industry.374 With its persistent cycles of “boom and bust,” the mining indus-
try has left behind some of the most contaminated sites in the country and without 
viable parties to pay for full cleanup.375 Nevertheless, the EPA can and does pursue 
                                                   
370 There may be some valid argument that the EPA remains liable to states, tribes, or 
other governments for unreimbursed costs they incurred specifically in responding to the 
Gold King Mine spill. Such costs are routinely reimbursed to partner agencies directly, with-
out need for litigation between agencies. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9604(d)(1) (Cooperative 
agreements), and implementing regulations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 35.6000–35.6025 (Cooperative 
Agreements and Superfund State Contracts for Superfund Response Actions). Whether such 
reimbursement remains to be completed in the case of the Gold King Mine spill may be a 
factual question beyond the scope of this article.  
371 The CERCLA statute defines “removal” action to include “the cleanup or removal 
of released hazardous substances from the environment” and “such actions as may be neces-
sary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release.” Emphasizing the limited natural of removal 
actions, the term also includes “temporary evacuation and housing of threatened individu-
als.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23).  
372 In contrast with removal actions, the CERCLA statute defines “remedial action” to 
mean “those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to 
removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance,” to 
specifically include “the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses and com-
munity facilities” where necessary. Id. § 9601(24). For one careful analysis of the difference 
between removal actions and remedial actions under CERCLA, see generally United States 
v. W.R. Grace, 429 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2005).  
373 In one study from FY91 to FY99, almost 75% of the remedial sites were funded by 
PRPs, instead of by the EPA. KATHERINE N. PROBST & DAVID M. KONISKY ET AL., 
SUPERFUND’S FUTURE: WHAT WILL IT COST? 43 (2001). 
374 In the reverse of the historical record of PRP funding, the same study found that 
only 39% of mining sites were funded by PRPs. Id.  
375 For example, the Milltown Reservoir-Clark Fork River Superfund Site in Montana 
includes “120 river miles of the Clark Fork River contaminated with metals stemming from 
mining activities” upstream, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SUPERFUND AND MINING 
MEGASITES: LESSONS FROM THE COEUR D’ALENE RIVER BASIN 413 (2005), requiring 
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mining companies, including corporate successors, for mining contamination,376 and 
in fact the EPA is pursuing mining companies today for contamination in the Animas 
River watershed.377  
When the EPA must pay for cleanup, it may draw funding from the Superfund 
trust fund.378 In general, discrete removal actions funded by Superfund are capped 
at expenditures of $2 million,379 with exceptions for extraordinary circumstances in-
cluding emergencies.380 In response to the Gold King Mine spill, the EPA did, in 
                                                   
cleanup costs on the order of $1.3 billion dollars, Tyer, supra note 138. The East Tennessee 
Copper Basin, “one of the largest contaminated sites in the eastern United States,” contains 
“[s]oils, sediment, and water throughout the basin [that] have been severely degraded by 
metals contamination and acid rock drainage.” SUPERFUND AND MINING MEGASITES, supra 
at 422. The Iron Mountain Mine Superfund Site, in northern California, has been the subject 
of protracted litigation to address the discharge of some of the most acidic mine drainage in 
the world. See United States v. Iron Mountain Mines, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 
2010) (awarding U.S. cost recovery from PRPs of more than $57 million); Carl T. Hall, 
World’s “Worst Water” Found Near Redding, S.F. GATE (Mar. 23, 2000, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/green/article/World-s-Worst-Water-Found-Near-Redding-3304745. 
php [https://perma.cc/7FSH-JCXT]. 
376 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CASE SUMMARY: BIG RIVER SUPERFUND SITE 
$80 MILLION SETTLEMENT FOR LEAD CONTAMINATION CLEANUP OF APPROXIMATELY 4100 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES (2018), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/case-summary-big-
river-superfund-site-80-million-settlement-lead-contamination-cleanup [https://perma.cc/ 
7YRD-TNHK] (describing a settlement for cleanup of mine waste in the “Old Lead Belt” 
south of St. Louis, Missouri); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CASE SUMMARY: $600 MILLION 
SETTLEMENT TO CLEAN UP 94 ABANDONED URANIUM MINES ON THE NAVAJO NATION (May 
22, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/case-summary-600-million-settlement-clean-
94-abandoned-uranium-mines-navajo-nation [https://perma.cc/96Y8-J862]; U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, CASE SUMMARY: $143 MILLION SETTLEMENT FOR CLEANUP WORK TO 
PREVENT FUTURE CONTAMINATION OF RED RIVER IN NEW MEXICO (2017), 
https://www.epa.gov/enforcement/case-summary-143-million-settlement-cleanup-work-
prevent-future-contamination-red-river [https://perma.cc/BA2E-T4WU]. 
377 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. EPA, EPA orders Sunnyside Gold Corporation to con-
duct groundwater investigation at Bonita Peak Mining District Superfund site (Mar. 15, 
2018), https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-orders-sunnyside-gold-corporation-conduct-
groundwater-investigation-bonita-peak [https://perma.cc/EHX8-XYVN]. 
378 The “Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund,” known first colloquially and then 
officially as the “Superfund,” was originally established by Congress and funded from taxes 
on the chemical and petroleum industry. See generally MINTZ ET AL., supra note 289, at 739. 
In 1995, however, the tax expired, so the Superfund coffers have depended on Congressional 
appropriations and recovery of costs from PRPs since then. Since 1986, Congressional ap-
propriations to the Superfund have averaged approximately $1.3 billion per year. Id. at 742–
43. 
379 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1) (2018) (stating that except in cases of remedial actions where 
the State has met certain requirements, “obligations from the Fund . . . shall not continue 
after $2,000,000 has been obligated for response actions”). 
380 Id. § 9604(c)(1)(A) (stating that there are no obligations from the Fund beyond 
$2,000,000 except where the President finds that “continued response actions are immedi-
ately required to prevent, limit, or mitigate an emergency”). 
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fact, invoke emergency authority to exceed the presumptive cap for removal ac-
tions,381 spending nearly $30 million in the year that followed.382 Nevertheless, the 
staggering scale of contamination in many former mining districts often requires 
long-term remedial actions with attendant costs that are orders of magnitude greater, 
often in the hundreds of millions of dollars.383 Long-term funding for remedial ac-
tions requires a designation on the National Priorities List (NPL),384 resulting in what 
is commonly known as a “Superfund site.” Designation of a “Superfund site” (or 
more properly, an “NPL site”)385 allows the EPA access to funding on a much larger 
scale, limited only by the availability of funds in the Fund and competition from 
other sites around the country.386  
Recognizing the “severe impacts to aquatic life” from mining contamination in 
the area, the EPA could have designated the “Upper Animas Mining District” as an 
NPL site in the early 1990s.387 However, due to local opposition and “[i]n 
                                                   
381 Action Memorandum, supra note 330, at 1 (“Request for Approval and Funding to 
Continue Emergency Removal Action including Exemptions from the . . . $2 Million Statu-
tory Limits on Removal Actions”). 
382 ONE YEAR AFTER, supra note 27, at 3. 
383 For example, to address the mining contamination in the Coeur d’Alene Basin of 
northern Idaho, the EPA selected a remedy in 2012 with an estimated cost of $601 million. 
While this may be an enormous sum by any measure, it may still be less than half of what is 
ultimately needed to complete the cleanup at this site. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INTERIM 
RECORD OF RECORD AMENDMENT, UPPER BASIN OF THE COEUR D’ALENE RIVER 12–11 
(2012). 
384 The usual process for designating a site for the NPL is through application of the 
Hazard Ranking System, which Congress requires to “assess[] the relative degree of risk to 
human health and the environment posed by sites and facilities” where there has been a re-
lease or threat of release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(c)(1) (2018); 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 300 app. A (The Hazard Ranking System). 
385 “NPL site” is the more proper term to describe a site on the National Priorities List, 
among other reasons because “Superfund” monies can also be spent on sites that are not on 
the NPL, up to specified spending caps. See supra note 379 ($2 million presumptive cap on 
Superfund funding for removal actions). 
386 Competition for funding from the Superfund trust fund can be fierce, with limited 
funds that must be allocated each year to dozens of Superfund sites across the country. In 
1995, the EPA established a National Risk-Based Priority Panel to help ensure that limited 
funding goes to the highest priority sites. See generally U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
SUPERFUND NATIONAL RISK-BASED PRIORITY PANEL (2018), https://www.epa.gov/super 
fund/superfund-national-risk-based-priority-panel [https://perma.cc/2J82-X8F8] (describing 
the National Risk-Based Priority Panel and the factors that help determine the level of prior-
ity of specific sites). The most successful sites in this competition are often those not only 
with the most urgent threats to human health and the environment, but also those that appear 
“shovel ready” (i.e., with completed remedy selection and remedial design) and with broad 
support from state, local, and tribal entities. 
387 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY REGION 8, UPPER ANIMAS MINING DISTRICT (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/region8/upper-animas-mining-district [https://perma.cc/R5W2-
KFPU]. Had the EPA proceeded with this NPL listing in the early 1990s, it seems unlikely 
that the Gold King Mine blowout would have happened, as the Gold King Mine workings 
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recognition of the community-based collaborative effort” represented by the Animas 
River Stakeholders Group, the “EPA agreed to postpone” the NPL listing.388 Two 
decades later, the blowout from the Gold King Mine in 2015 drew attention to the 
broader and continuing problem of mining contamination in the Animas River wa-
tershed. Faced with this reality, local communities finally dropped their opposition 
to NPL listing.389 With the support of local communities and Colorado Governor 
Hickenlooper,390 the EPA moved promptly to formally propose and then finalize on 
September 9, 2016, a new NPL listing to address mining contamination in the Ani-
mas River watershed.391 This listing would include forty-eight mining features in the 
area, including the Gold King Mine, within a new NPL site identified as the “Bonita 
Peak Mining District.”392  
Among other things, NPL listing brings with it new protections for CERCLA 
responders. In particular, CERCLA Section 113(h) presumptively bars federal 
courts from reviewing any “challenges to any removal or remedial action” selected 
under the statute until the cleanup work is actually completed.393 This “blunt 
                                                   
were evidently not flooded at that time. See supra notes 117–118 and accompanying text 
(plugging of American Tunnel in 1996 resulted in dramatic changes after 2000 to hydrology 
within Bonita Peak, including Gold King Mine). 
388 See Thompson, supra note 2, at 12 (“The last thing most people wanted was to be 
declared the nation’s next Love Canal.”). 
389 Letter from Town of Silverton and San Juan County, Colorado, to John W. Hick-
enlooper, Governor, Colorado (Feb. 22, 2016) (on file with author) (documenting a “request 
that the State of Colorado make a request to the EPA that the Bonita Peak Mining District 
Site . . . be added to the National Priority List”); Jessica Pace, Silverton, San Juan County 
Say Yes to Superfund, DURANGO HERALD, (Feb. 22, 2016, 3:38 PM), https://durangoher-
ald.com/articles/2033 [https://perma.cc/5ZEP-RLV9]. 
390 Letter from John W. Hickenlooper, Governor, Colorado, to Shaun L. McGrath, Re-
gional Administrator, EPA Region 8 (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author). 
391 81 Fed. Reg. 62,397, 62,401 (Sept. 9, 2016). The NPL listing was also supported by 
the Navajo Nation. Field Hearing, supra note 17, at 14 (dictating a statement by Hon. Russell 
Begaye, President, Navajo Nation). 
392 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST, BONITA PEAK MINING 
DISTRICT (2016). Elements of the final NPL listing for the Bonita Peak Mining District, not 
including the Gold King Mine, were immediately challenged by one of the mining companies 
with potential liability at the site. Following oral argument before the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, the challenge to the NPL listing was dismissed. Sunnyside Gold Corp. v. Envtl. 
Prot. Agency, 715 Fed. App’x 7, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Notwithstanding this dismissal, the 
exact boundaries of any NPL site, including the Bonita Peak Mining District site, remain 
inherently fluid following the CERCLA definition of “facility,” which includes “any site or 
area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or oth-
erwise come to be located.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2018) (emphasis added). 
393 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (2018). Note that challenges to removal or remedial action may 
be pursued through citizen suits only after the cleanup action has been “taken” (past tense), 
id. § 9613(h)(4), effectively barring challenges at some mining sites where remedial actions, 
including water treatment, may be needed in perpetuity.  
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withdrawal of federal jurisdiction”394 serves the congressional purposes of CERCLA 
to provide for expeditious completion of hazardous waste cleanups, a policy that 
Professor Rodgers colorfully captured as “shovels first, lawyers later.”395 This policy 
effected by CERCLA Section 113(h), also known as the bar on pre-enforcement 
review,396 provides the EPA, other federal agencies, states, and tribes with protection 
from lawsuits while they are planning and carrying out removal and remedial actions 
under CERCLA. For the Gold King Mine and the broader Bonita Peak Mining Dis-
trict NPL site, the EPA is indeed planning and carrying out removal and remedial 
actions under CERCLA,397 an endeavor likely to carry on for years, if not decades. 
As a result, citizen suits and other challenges to the ongoing CERCLA actions at the 
Bonita Peak Mining District site may be barred by CERCLA Section 113(h).  
Of course, for every rule, there may be an exception. For the CERCLA Section 
113(h) bar on pre-enforcement review, one exception allowing judicial review is, of 
course, in a case involving enforcement. Where the EPA, for example, brings an 
affirmative case under CERCLA Section 107 to recover its cleanup costs, defendants 
may then respond by challenging the remedy selected.398 This exception is not, how-
ever, limited on its face to cases where the EPA brings a cost recovery action under 
Section 107; it could also apply to a case where a state, tribe, or private party brings 
a cost recovery action under Section 107. In the case of the Gold King Mine spill, 
states, tribes, and private parties all brought cost recovery claims under Section 107 
against the EPA.399 Whether, or to what extent, this now removes the bar on pre-
                                                   
394 See Cannon v. Gates, 538 F.3d 1328, 1333 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); 
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328 (9th Cir. 1995) (quota-
tions omitted) (citation omitted); North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir. 
1991). In McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS), concerning the former McClel-
lan Air Force Base near Sacramento, the Ninth Circuit found that citizen claims under both 
RCRA and the Clean Water Act were barred by CERCLA Section 113(h) because the inac-
tive waste sites giving rise to the citizen concerns would be subject to an eventual cleanup 
plan under CERCLA.  
395 RODGERS, supra note 101, at 681. 
396 The CERCLA Section 113(h) bar on pre-enforcement review, and the MESS deci-
sion in particular, inspired considerable criticism from commentators (although no changes 
in the law). See, e.g., Margot J. Pollans, A “Blunt Withdrawal”? Bars on Citizen Suits for 
Toxic Site Cleanup, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 441 (2013); Jonathan N. Reiter, CERCLA 
Section 113(H) & RCRA Citizen Suits: To Bar or Not to Bar? 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 207 (1998); Michael P. Healy, The Effectiveness and Fairness of Superfund’s Judicial 
Review Preclusion Provision, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 271 (1996).  
397 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BONITA PEAK MINING DISTRICT UPDATE, 
2017 YEAR IN REVIEW (2017) (identifying continuing removal actions at the Gold King Mine 
and several ongoing activities as part of a Remedial Investigation / Feasibility Study). 
398 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(1) (2018) (authorizing challenge to a selected removal or re-
medial action under CERCLA Section 107 “to recover response costs”).  
399 NM Complaint, supra note 307, at 32 (“First Cause of Action: Cost Recovery under 
CERCLA 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)”); Amended Complaint at 44, Navajo Nation v. EPA, No. 16-
cv-00931-MCA/LF (D.N.M. Aug. 16, 2016) (consolidated with 16-cv-00465 MCA/LF 
(D.N.M. Mar. 28, 2017)) [hereinafter Amended Navajo Complaint] (“First Claim for Relief” 
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enforcement review of CERCLA actions in this particular case remains to be seen.400 
However, the bar remains an important authority available to CERCLA respond-
ers—including states and tribes, in many contexts—in order to promote the expedi-
tious cleanups of contaminated sites across the country. 
Concerning the application of CERCLA to the Gold King Mine, one can imag-
ine two wildly opposing views of the EPA: (1) a PRP with direct liability as an 
“operator” of the Gold King Mine on August 5, 2015; or (2) an environmental reg-
ulator, with a mission to protect human health and the environment before and after 
the spill on August 5, 2015. Some may see “the fox guarding the hen house,”401 
while others see sustained efforts to address a problem that is much greater than one 
terrible accident at one mine in the Animas River watershed. The two views of the 
EPA, however, are not irreconcilable.  
The EPA may indeed be liable under CERCLA for some costs related to the 
spill on August 5, 2015. But how much should that be? To use the rough mathemat-
ics endorsed by the Supreme Court,402 consider this analysis. Assume that the prob-
lems of mining contamination in this area developed over a period of thirty years,403 
roughly since the last mine shut down. Assume, as researchers found, that the Gold 
King Mine blowout contributed a load of metals equal to two days of high spring 
runoff.404 Imagine high spring runoff occurs over two weeks each year. Over thirty 
years, that makes 420 days of high spring runoff. Liability for two days out of 420 
would equal less than one-half of one percent. Double it for easy numbers and you 
get one percent. Assume an ultimate cleanup cost for the Bonita Peak Mining Dis-
trict of $1 billion,405 and you get EPA liability of $10 million dollars. Double that 
for good measure and you get $20 million. Triple it and you get $30 million. At this 
point the EPA has already paid some $30 million for responding to the Gold King 
                                                   
includes “Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Against USEPA” and EPA contractors and min-
ing companies). 
400 Arguments based upon CERCLA 113(h) have, in fact, been asserted by defendants 
in the Gold King Mine litigation and remain for resolution. See Gold King Mines Corp.’s 
Supplemental Brief on Lack of Jurisdiction Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), New Mexico 
v. EPA, Case No. 16-cv-00465-MCA-LF (D.N.M. Nov. 22, 2017). 
401 Lisa A. Decker, Is EPA the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 31 NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENV’T 48 (2016). 
402 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599 (2009). 
403 Of course, we know in fact that mining contamination has been pouring into this 
system for more than a century. See Thompson, supra note 2 and accompanying text (noting 
that the Animas River was so polluted by 1902 that Durango was forced to find an alternate 
water supply). 
404 See LARKIN, JR. & SEIBLER, supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
405 Of course, there is no reason to believe that cleanup in the Animas River watershed 
would cost anywhere near one billion dollars. But if the cleanup is half that, it simply doubles 
the point illustrated by the rough math. 
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Mine spill.406 If the EPA is a “fox guarding the hen house,” then it is a fox that 
already paid for all the hens in the house, three times over.407 
The real question concerning CERCLA and the Gold King Mine is not one of 
the EPA’s liability, but of the EPA’s responsibility for carrying out a federal pro-
gram designed to ensure the protection of human health and the environment from 
the release of hazardous substances. That work by the EPA and its partners began 
decades ago in the Animas River watershed, and with the NPL listing of the Bonita 
Peak Mining District, may be expected to expand and accelerate toward final solu-
tions for mining contamination in this region. 
 
V.  WHAT NOW? 
 
Four years after the Gold King Mine blowout, litigation continues although 
temperatures, perhaps, have cooled. In the weeks and months immediately after the 
blowout, critics cried out not only for agency accountability, but for blood.408 While 
                                                   
406 See supra note 364 and accompanying text. 
407 The author recognizes that the costs already incurred by the EPA for responding to 
the Gold King Mine spill do not, at this time, include costs for damages related to the spill, 
such as economic losses in agricultural production. Nor can any sum of money fully com-
pensate for every related injury that may have been suffered. See, e.g., Robert Kuehn, A 
Taxonomy of Environmental Justice, 30 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10681, 10694 (2000) (expressing 
preference for “corrective justice” over “compensatory justice” because “the latter term may 
imply that, provided compensation is paid, an otherwise unjust action is acceptable”). More 
than compensation, many injured parties may desire some form of apology. The EPA did in 
fact offer direct apologies after the spill. See, e.g., Amy Harder & Dan Frosch, EPA Chief 
Apologizes as Anger Mounts, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/arti-
cles/epa-chief-apologizes-for-toxic-spill-affecting-rivers-in-colorado-new-mexico-143932 
1379 [https://perma.cc/2MR8-36CU] (quoting former EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy at 
a news conference, “I am absolutely deeply sorry this ever happened”); Bruce Finley, Re-
gional EPA Director Calls Wastewater Spill in Animas River ‘Tragic,’ DENVER POST (Aug. 
7, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/08/07/regional-epa-director-calls-wastewater-
spill-in-animas-river-tragic/ [https://perma.cc/FR3K-MM5N] (quoting Dave Ostrander, 
EPA regional director of emergency response, at a public meeting in Durango, “We are very 
sorry for what happened. This is a huge tragedy. It’s hard being on the other side of this. 
Typically we respond to emergencies; we don’t cause them . . . It’s something we sincerely 
regret”). For a powerful commentary on the value of apology, both in receiving and in giving, 
against a backdrop of legal liability, see Mark A. Chinen, On Lawyers and Good Samaritans: 
A Reflection, 4 SEATTLE J. SOCIAL JUST. 497 (2006). 
408 See, e.g., Joint Oversight Hearing, supra note 167, at 5 (statement of Rep. Rob 
Bishop: “If an individual or a private company had done this, EPA would already have made 
sure there was hell to pay. EPA’s aggressive enforcement tactics have often resulted in crim-
inal charges for mistakes or accidents.”); id. at 11 (statement of Rep. Jason Chaffetz: “I am 
not aware of anybody who has been dismissed, held accountable, let alone given some crim-
inal charges along the way”); Letter from Sen. John McCain & Sen. John Barrasso to Hon. 
Loretta Lynch, Att’y Gen. (May 3, 2016) (on file with author) (“[W]e ask that you review 
the circumstances surrounding the Gold King Mine spill to determine specifically whether 
evidence warrants the prosecution of any EPA manager, employee or contractor for the 
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there have been a number of retirements since the spill,409 no one was fired, sued, or 
thrown in jail as punishment for it, and for good reasons.  
In terms of civil liability, federal and state employees enjoy qualified immunity, 
generally protected from suit when they are acting within the scope of their employ-
ment410 and are not violating any “clearly established rights” provided by statute or 
constitution.411 The policy supporting qualified immunity has been explained suc-
cinctly by the U.S. Supreme Court: “As recognized at common law, public officers 
require this protection to shield them from undue interference with their duties and 
from potentially disabling threats of liability.”412 Consistent with this policy, EPA 
employees and other federal and state responders generally enjoy qualified immun-
ity when they are acting within the scope of their employment. For an EPA On-
Scene Coordinator (OSC), including the “backup” OSC who was on-site the day of 
the Gold King Mine blowout, qualified immunity may be particularly essential as 
their “scope of employment” includes regular work with hazardous substances, and 
often in hazardous locations such as abandoned mines on steep mountain slopes like 
those of Bonita Peak. Without any suggestion, much less proof, that any agency 
personnel acted beyond their scope of employment or in violation of “clearly estab-
lished rights,” it should come as no surprise that no civil liability for individual em-
ployees was ever established for the Gold King Mine spill. 
As for the prospect of criminal liability, prosecution was clearly considered and 
quickly rejected by the local U.S. Attorney’s Office.413 Like the rejection of civil 
liability, the rejection of criminal prosecution should also be no surprise in this case. 
                                                   
criminal violation of federal environmental law, criminal negligence, obstruction or any 
other crime.”). 
409 Among other notable retirements was OSC Steve Way in June 2016. See Bruce Fin-
ley, EPA Gold King Mine Coordinator Retires as Animas Water, Soil Tests Begin, DENVER 
POST (July 14, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/06/14/epa-gold-king-mine-coordi-
nator-retires/ [https://perma.cc/TBS6-SS58]. 
410 Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (“Westfall 
Act”) provides as follows: “Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant 
employee was acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident 
out of which the claim arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such 
claim . . . shall be deemed an action against the United States . . . and the United States shall 
be substituted as the party defendant.” 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1).  
411 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011) (“Qualified immunity shields federal 
and state officials from money damages unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the 
official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly estab-
lished’ at the time of the challenged conduct.”).  
412 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (observing that “our decisions con-
sistently have held that government officials are entitled to some form of immunity from 
suits for damages”). For a brief review of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on qualified 
immunity, see Kit Kinports, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Expansion of Qualified Immunity, 
100 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 62 (2016). 
413 Bruce Finley, No Prosecution Against EPA Official Linked to Gold King Mine Dis-
aster, Feds Say, DENVER POST (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.denverpost.com/2016/10/12/ 
gold-king-mine-epa-employee-will-not-prosecute/ [https://perma.cc/T4MB-T38P]. 
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Criminal prosecution assumes violation of a statute establishing criminal penalties. 
Most federal environmental statutes, including the Endangered Species Act, RCRA, 
and the Clean Water Act, do establish criminal penalties, including possible jail 
time.414 Most of these statutes are also “general intent” crimes, where no proof of 
specific design to break the law or cause a particular outcome is required for criminal 
conviction.415 As low as this standard for mens rea might be for environmental 
crimes, in the case of the Gold King Mine spill, there may two important reasons 
why criminal prosecution was declined. First, as demonstrated earlier in this Article, 
there may have been no actual environmental violation, much less an environmental 
crime.416 Second, the circumstances of the Gold King Mine spill likely failed to meet 
the traditional case selection criteria for environmental crimes. Under these criteria, 
for criminal prosecution, not only must there be an underlying environmental crime, 
but there must also be evidence of (1) “culpable conduct”; and (2) “significant envi-
ronmental harm.”417 “Culpable conduct” includes such considerations as a “history 
                                                   
414 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (2018) (noting that any person who violates certain 
sections of the statute “shall, upon conviction, be . . . imprisoned for not more than one 
year”); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (2018) (any person who “knowingly violates” certain sections 
of the statute “shall be punished . . . by imprisonment for not more than 3 years”); 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6928(e) (2018) (any person who knowingly violates certain statutory requirements and 
“who knows at that time that he thereby places another person in imminent danger of death 
or serious bodily injury, shall upon conviction, be subject to . . . imprisonment for not more 
than fifteen years”). 
415 See, e.g., United States v. Spatig, 870 F.3d 1079, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(2)(A) provides for a “general-intent crime” so that “the prosecution 
is not required to prove that [defendant] intended a particular purpose or objective, as would 
be required for a specific-intent crime”); United States v. Weitzenhoff, 35 F.3d 1275, 1286 
(9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the “criminal provisions of the [Clean Water Act] are clearly 
designed to protect the public at large from the potentially dire consequences of water pol-
lution . . . and as such fall within the category of public welfare legislation”). Judicial findings 
of general intent in these and earlier cases provoked some strong criticism among commen-
tators. See, e.g., Randall S. Abate, & Dayna E. Mancuso, It’s All About What You Know: The 
Specific Intent Standard Should Govern “Knowing” Violations of the Clean Water Act, 9 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 304 (2001); Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental State in Fed-
eral Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1164 (1995); Kevin A. 
Gaynor, Jodi C. Remer & Thomas R. Bartman, Environmental Criminal Prosecutions: Sim-
ple Fixes for a Flawed System, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L. 1, 11 (1992) (criticizing prosecutions and 
convictions based upon a “watered-down version of general intent”). 
416 See, e.g., supra notes 253–298 and accompanying text (discussing lack of impacts 
to species protected under ESA, limited applicability of RCRA due to Bevill Amendment, 
and exemptions from Clean Water Act permit requirements).  
417 MINTZ ET AL., supra note 289, at 976 (“Case Selection Criteria”). The two specific 
criteria for prosecution of environmental crimes dates back at least to 1994 with the issuance 
of the “Earl Devaney memo,” which still provides directions to environmental prosecutors 
to this date. Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, Dir., Office of Criminal Enforcement, to 
All EPA Employees Working in or in Support of the Criminal Enf’t Program (Jan. 12, 1994) 
(on file with author). For a vigorous empirical study confirming the actual application of 
these two major criteria for environmental prosecution, see David M. Uhlmann, 
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of repeated violations,” “deliberate misconduct,” and “concealment of miscon-
duct.”418 In the case of the Gold King Mine, there was certainly no “history of re-
peated violations,” and while there may have been some vague allegations suggest-
ing concealment,419 they were ultimately unsupported. Perhaps more significantly, 
in the case of the Gold King Mine spill, there may have been no “significant envi-
ronmental harm” for purposes of the criminal prosecution, which generally requires 
“an identifiable and significant harmful impact on human health or the environ-
ment.”420 As this Article has shown, no significant harmful impact to any fish or 
other living thing was ever identified as a result of the spill.421 While the optics of 
the spill may have caused deep emotional responses and real economic damages, 
proof of a significant “environmental” harm is something that prosecutors would 
have to consider in deciding whether to bring charges in this case. While we may 
never know all the factors that prosecutors considered in the case of the Gold King 
Mine spill,422 we do know that it resulted in a decision not to prosecute individual 
agency employees or contractors. 
Of course, the decision not to pursue legal actions against agency employees or 
contract employees leaves pending many legal actions against government agencies 
and government contractors as a consequence of the Gold King Mine spill. In May 
2016, the State of New Mexico filed suit against the EPA, EPA contractors, and 
three mining companies.423 The New Mexico complaint alleged violations of 
                                                   
Prosecutorial Discretion and Environmental Crime, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 159, 164 
(2014) (analyzing criminal prosecutions for “significant environmental harm” and measuring 
culpable conduct through factors including “deceptive or misleading conduct,” “operating 
outside the regulatory system,” and “repetitive violations”). 
418 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 417, at 4–5. 
419 See, e.g., Letter from John Barrasso, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs & 
John McCain, U.S. Senator, to Loretta Lynch, Attorney General, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (on 
file with author) (urging criminal investigation for violations including “18 U.S.C. 1001 
(false statements)”). 
420 Memorandum from Earl E. Devaney, supra note 417, at 4. 
421 For comparison, the discharge of contaminated water from the Summitville Mine, 
in the San Juan Mountains east of the Animas River basin and the Continental Divide, clearly 
resulted in “significant environmental harm” and appropriately led to criminal investigation 
and charges. See Luke J. Danielson et al., The Summitville Story: A Superfund Site Is Born, 
24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10388, 10388 (1994) (noting criminal investigation by the FBI and U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice); Timothy Egan, The Death of a River Looms over Choice for Interior Post, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/01/07/us/the-death-of-a-river-
looms-over-choice-for-interior-post.html [https://perma.cc/SP35-HJP5] (reporting that the 
“spill of cyanide and acidic water from a gold-mining operation killed virtually every living 
thing in a 17-mile stretch of the Alamosa River”). After criminal investigation, “Two former 
managers of the mine, and the company itself, pleaded guilty to numerous felonies arising 
from the pollution.” Id.  
422 See Finley, supra note 413 (quoting a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Denver, “It has been a long-standing policy that the U.S. Attorney’s Office does not discuss 
declinations”). 
423 Complaint, New Mexico v. EPA, No. 1:16-cv-00465 (D.N.M. May 23, 2016). 
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CERCLA, RCRA, and the Clean Water Act, and put forth claims for cost recovery 
and declaratory judgment under CERCLA, injunctive relief under RCRA, and dam-
ages under common law theories including trespass, public nuisance, and gross neg-
ligence.424 In August 2016, the Navajo Nation filed a complaint alleging similar 
claims against similar parties, including the EPA.425 Both the State of New Mexico 
and the Navajo Nation later amended their complaints426 after the EPA declined to 
pay administrative claims for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act.427  
In June 2016, the State of New Mexico attempted to invoke the original juris-
diction of the U.S. Supreme Court428 in a direct suit against the State of Colorado for 
damages relating to the Gold King Mine and discharges to the Animas River.429 Af-
ter a year of briefing, however, the petition by the State of New Mexico was denied 
by the Supreme Court.430 Entering the fray a bit behind the other plaintiffs, the State 
of Utah filed a related complaint in July 2017 against the EPA, EPA contractors, and 
mining companies.431 In the same month, a group of fourteen private plaintiffs from 
Aztec, New Mexico, filed civil claims alleging personal injuries and property dam-
ages.432 A year later, in August 2018, some 295 members of the Navajo Nation filed 
                                                   
424 Id. 
425 Complaint, Navajo Nation v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-00931 (D.N.M. Aug. 16, 
2016). 
426 First Amended Complaint, New Mexico v. United States, No. 1:16-cv-00465-WJ-
LF (D.N.M. May 11, 2018); Amended Navajo Complaint, supra note 399. 
427 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2675. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) generally waives 
the sovereign immunity of the United States for tort claims “in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . .” Id. § 2674. However, 
before filing a tort claim against the United States in court, the claim “shall have first [been] 
presented . . . to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied 
by the agency in writing . . . .” For this purpose, denial of the claim also includes the “failure 
of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed . . . .” Id. 
§ 2675(a). 
428 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2. 
429 Mot. for Leave to File Bill of Complaint, New Mexico v. Colorado, No. 220141 
(U.S. June 20, 2016).  
430 New Mexico v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 2319 (2017) (Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissent-
ing). For brief analysis, see Christine Powell, High Court Scraps NM Suit Against Colo. over 
Gold King Mine, LAW 360 (June 26, 2017), https://www.law360.com/articles/938281 
[https://perma.cc/6RQP-9AU8]. 
431 Complaint, Utah v. Environmental Restoration, LLC, No. 2:17-cv-00866-BCW (D. 
Utah July 31, 2017). Notably, unlike the complaints filed the State of New Mexico and the 
Navajo Nation, the original complaint by the State of Utah did not name the EPA as a de-
fendant. See Pl. State of Utah’s Response to D. Environmental Restoration LLC’s Mot. to 
Transfer for Coordinated or Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (Jan. 
16, 2018). This is an omission that cannot be taken as a careless oversight. On January 4, 
2018, Utah filed an amended complaint to add claims against the EPA. Id. However, Utah 
withheld serving the amended complaint to allow more time for pre-filing negotiations with 
the United States. Id. 
432 Complaint, McDaniel v. EPA, No. 1:17-cv-00710-WJ-SCY (D.N.M. July 7, 2017) 
(showing that the fourteen “McDaniel Plaintffs” all alleged that they are residents of Aztec, 
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a similar complaint for personal injuries and property damages.433 Civil litigation 
filed by the State of New Mexico, State of Utah, Navajo Nation, and private plain-
tiffs have all been consolidated and remain pending in the U.S. District Court of 
New Mexico.434 As of 2019, litigation continues, with discovery proceeding and 
motions to dismiss denied.435 
What does all this litigation mean for the Gold King Mine? Most immediately, 
one may hope that it means the United States will soon choose to settle claims for 
damages genuinely attributable to the Gold King Mine spill. Claims for damages 
such as losses in recreational opportunities and agricultural production436 should 
have been paid already through the administrative claims process of the Federal Tort 
Claims Act,437 and EPA Headquarters clearly should reconsider its original denial 
                                                   
New Mexico, just south of the border with Colorado, and owners of property adjacent to the 
Animas River). 
433 Complaint, Allen v. EPA, No. 1:18-cv-00744 (D.N.M. Aug. 3, 2018) (showing that 
the “Allen Plaintiffs” alleged that they were “members of the Navajo Nation and residents 
of New Mexico, Colorado, Arizon, and Utah”). Plaintiffs farmed land and/or raised livestock 
adjacent to the Animas River or San Juan River and depended upon these rivers for irrigation 
of their crops and livestock.” Id. ¶ 1. 
434 In re: Gold King Mine Release in San Juan County, Colorado, on August 5, 2015, 
291 F.Supp. 3d 1373 (mem.) (J.P.M.L. 2018).  
435 In re: Gold King Mine Release in San Juan County, Colorado, on August 5, 2015, 
2019 WL 1282997 (D.N.M. Mar. 20, 2019) (denying Federal contractors’ motion to dis-
miss); In re: Gold King Mine Release in San Juan County, Colorado, on August 5, 2015, 
2019 WL 999016 (D.N.M. Feb. 28, 2019) (denying Federal defendants’ motion to dismiss). 
436 By one early estimate, the Navajo Nation lost $892,000 in agricultural production 
within the first few weeks of the Gold King Mine spill. Field Hearing, supra note 17, at 3 
(citing economic analysis by economist Douglas Holtz-Eakin). 
437 Following the Gold King Mine spill, EPA staff encouraged submission of FTCA 
claims through use of the Standard Form 95. Federal Tort Claims Act Information, U.S. EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/federal-tort-claims-act-information [https://perma.cc/ 
Z3QF-TMTW]. However, EPA staff were probably as surprised as anyone when these 
claims were later rejected by an EPA claims officer. As explained in the denial notice, the 
FTCA “does not authorize federal agencies to pay claims resulting from government actions 
that are discretionary – that is, acts of a governmental nature or function and that involve the 
exercise of judgment.” Decision on Federal Tort Claims Act Claims: Jan. 13, 2017 Decision, 
U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/goldkingmine/decision-federal-tort-claims-act-claims#jan-
uary132017 [https://perma.cc/Z8S7-CNCR]. The FTCA does indeed contain a “discretion-
ary function” exemption. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (excluding from the FTCA “any claim 
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government . . . based upon the exercise 
or performance [of] a discretionary function . . . .”). The discretionary function exemption 
may provide a basis for denying a claim under the FTCA, but is not necessarily a bar against 
an agency paying a claim. See generally Katie Schaefer, Reining in Sovereign Immunity to 
Compensate Hurricane Katrina Victims, 40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 411 (2013) (analyzing the FTCA 
discretionary function exemption, and criticism of perceived abuses by federal agencies).  
2019] GOLD KING MINE SPILL 333 
 
of claims.438 Notwithstanding its potential legal defenses, a conciliatory approach by 
the EPA (represented in litigation by the U.S. Department of Justice) will facilitate 
settlement of all pending claims and help return the collective focus to the continuing 
problems of mining contamination in the Animas River watershed.  
On a longer horizon, with the NPL listing of the Bonita Peak Mining District 
and the potential for hundreds of millions of dollars from PRPs and the Superfund 
trust fund, the opportunities for substantial cleanup and economic revitalization in 
the Animas River watershed have never been greater. Long-term remedial work cre-
ates good, local jobs for all the engineering, earth-moving, and infrastructure needed 
to support large-scale design and construction activity.439 Completion of this work 
in the Animas River watershed will create new opportunities for economic redevel-
opment,440 and ultimately, help restore the health of local communities and ecosys-
tems impaired by more than a century of mining activity.  
Finally, on the broadest level, the Gold King Mine case should reaffirm the 
important roles of environmental agencies, employees, and contractors in addressing 
the most challenging environmental problems. Just as we need police officers, fire-
fighters, and other first responders to protect the public safety, we need environmen-
tal responders to protect our environment. We need the U.S. EPA and the Navajo 
Nation EPA441 doing their jobs within their respective authorities. We need the 
                                                   
438 The EPA did, in fact, announce that it was reconsidering its original denial of claims 
under the FTCA. Dan Elliott, Three years after gold king mine spill, victims awaiting pay-
ment from EPA, DENVER POST (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.denverpost.com/2018/08/ 
03/3-years-after-colorado-mine-spill-victims-awaiting-payment/ [https://perma.cc/5PUT-
8FG9]. However, three years after the spill, the EPA had yet to approve any payments for 
the some 380 claims undergoing agency review. Id.  
439 For example, mining cleanup provides an estimated 400 local jobs in the Coeur 
d’Alene Basin of northern Idaho. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BASIN BULLETIN: 
UPDATES ON THE COEUR D’ALENE RIVER BASIN CLEANUP 2 (2017), 
https://semspub.epa.gov/work/10/100069520.pdf [https://perma.cc/2VZV-VPQ4]. For an-
ecdotal evidence of the impacts of cleanup spending in a local economy where mining once 
reigned, see Dave Smith, World’s Largest Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram Dealer, DAVE SMITH, 
http://www.davesmith.com [https://perma.cc/9MC2-GYNB]. The dealership is based in the 
former mining town of Kellogg, Idaho, in the heart of the present Bunker Hill Mining and 
Metallurgical Superfund Site.  
440 The EPA’s “Superfund Redevelopment Initiative” aims to help communities reclaim 
cleaned-up Superfund sites, promoting their safe reuse. See generally Superfund Redevelop-
ment Initiative, U.S. EPA, https://www.epa.gov/superfund-redevelopment-initiative 
[https://perma.cc/LR9R-J2Q6]. The success of this initiative has been well-documented. See, 
e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND SITES WORK FOR COMMUNITIES: HOW 
SUPERFUND REDEVELOPMENT IN EPA REGION 10 IS MAKING A DIFFERENCE IN 
COMMUNITIES 3 (2016), https://semspub.epa.gov/work/HQ/100000579.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/MGA8-HA5X] (demonstrating that across the four northwestern states of Oregon, Wash-
ington, Idaho, and Alaska, the reuse and continued use of Superfund sites and former Super-
fund sites has supported an estimated 6,456 jobs, providing total employee income of $491 
million in 2016). 
441 See generally NAVAJO NATION ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://navajonationepa.org/ 
main/index.php [https://perma.cc/J3BU-QH2Z]. 
334 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
 
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment,442 the New Mexico Envi-
ronment Department,443 and the Utah Department of Environmental Quality protect-
ing the places where people live, work, and play within their respective states.444 
Agencies, contractors, and, ultimately, people, will make mistakes. When they do, 
we should expect they will fix them—and learn from them. Many lessons have been 
learned from the Gold King Mine spill,445 and much work remains to be done to 
restore the Animas River watershed and impaired ecosystems across the United 
States. 
                                                   
442 COLORADO DEP’T OF HEALTH & ENV’T, https://www.colorado.gov/cdphe 
[https://perma.cc/8FLG-2QDJ]. 
443 NEW MEXICO ENV’T DEP’T, https://www.env.nm.gov/ [https://perma.cc/237P-
BVNR].  
444 UTAH DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, https://deq.utah.gov/ [https://perma.cc/MBN6-
BTJ6]. 
445 In November 2015, the EPA assembled an internal team to study the emergency 
response to the Gold King Mine spill and compile lessons learned. That study resulted in ten 
specific recommendations for improving agency response to emergency incidents. See In the 
Rearview Mirror: Implementation of the Gold King Mine After-Action Review, U.S. EPA 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-01/documents/gkm-after-
action-review-implementation-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ADW3-XUPF].  
 
